


THE CITIZEN AND THE ADMINISTRATOR  
IN A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY

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# The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy

*An empirical study in Delhi State*

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TO  
**V. K. N. MENON**

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## FOREWORD

In January 1950, India launched upon its career as a free democratic republic. One of the features of the Indian democracy is the exercise of adult franchise by millions of people who are relatively new to representative government and who do not have the benefit of a high level of literacy. More than a decade of experience of the working of Indian democracy in the above context makes a fascinating study.

Secondly, India is committed to achieve a rapid rate of development through democratic process with the initiative and enterprise of administration at different levels. Students of Political Science and Administration are naturally attracted to a study of the Citizen-Administrator relationships and interactions in a developing democracy like India to observe and verify the conventional hypotheses about democracy in the older democratic countries and also to examine the adaptation of democratic institutions and procedures to the developmental needs and requirements.

The immediate impetus to this study was a consideration of the topic of citizen attitudes toward government administration at the 1961 annual conference of the Indian Institute of Public Administration on "Administration and the Citizen" and a suggestion by a top level group in the Government of India that the IIPA should conduct such a study.

In further development of this, Professor V.K.N. Menon, the then Director of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, and Dr. Howard K. Hyde, Chief Management Advisor, United States Agency for International Development, pursued the suggestion and persuaded Professor Samuel J. Eldersveld of the University of Michigan then in India in connection with a few other research projects to conduct the study in collaboration with the staff of the Indian School of Public Administration.

The study, it was hoped, would demonstrate the application of scientifically designed survey research techniques, and thus break new ground in the study of public administration in India.

A partial precedent for the study was a somewhat similar one conducted by Morris Janowitz and others in the Detroit, U.S.A., area, entitled "Public Administration and the Public—perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community." This provided experience in structure and analysis, and a basis for some comparison of results.

With Professor Eldersveld were associated Professor V. Jagannadham and Dr. A.P. Barnabas as co-authors. Professor R.D. Singh also participated in the study in the early stages of its formulation. The Institute is grateful to the authors of the study. The Institute is also happy to note that the study has provided an opportunity for employing and training its alumni, Sarvashri Subhas C. Mehta, T.S. Shahi, T. Venkaiah, M.V. Narayana Murthy, and Kumari Shanta Kohli and others, namely, B.B. Kumar, S. Satyamurthi and Mrs. Mehta. The authors and the investigating staff have worked as a team and prepared questionnaires both in English and Hindi and carried out the survey notwithstanding many inconveniences and discomforts.

This is a pilot study of the mutual images of citizens and administrators in a developing democracy. I hope that the publication of this study by Scott, Foresman in the United States and by our Institute in India will encourage further studies of a similar nature in other parts of India and in other developing countries so as to extend the frontiers of knowledge about the working of democracy and democratic administration processes in the developing countries.

J. N. KHOSLA

*Director*

March, 1968.  
New Delhi. Indian Institute of Public Administration

## PREFACE

This study is in a sense an implementation of a research interest articulated at the Indian Institute of Public Administration several years ago. It was strongly supported by Indian government officials who serve in an advisory capacity to the Institute.

The attitudes of Indian citizens towards the officials and agencies of their government—national, state, and local—have been the subject of much speculation for years. The press, public administration scholars, and governmental officials, to say nothing of the citizens themselves, have discussed and debated at length the performance of government, as measured by objective criteria or by the evidence, unsystematically collected, of the level of public approval and cooperation. In August 1961, an annual conference was held under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Public Administration, on the subject of "Administration and the Citizen". Shri V.T. Krishnamachari, Chairman of the Institute's Executive Council, in opening the session emphasized the concepts of "active citizenship" and "self-help" on which he felt the success of Indian administrative relationships with the citizen rested. He then stated : "The Institute should study this subject in great detail in the coming year and make arrangements to publish the results of its studies so that they might be of practical value to the Central and State Governments. Under the encouragement of Prof. V.K.N. Menon, the former Director of the Institute, and Dr. J.N. Khosla, the present Director, with the continuous support and assistance of Dr. Howard K. Hyde, Chief Management Advisor of USAID, as well as top officials in the Central Government, notably Shri L.P. Singh, the then Special Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Institute pressed ahead in January 1964 with the study. This is the first major report of the findings of that

study. It is a study which seeks to generalize about public perspectives and attitudes towards government and administration, in the urban and rural sections of Delhi State, on the basis of scientifically selected samples of the population and administrators, and on the basis of interviews personally conducted in the field. We hope the results as presented here will have both theoretical value and practical utility.

We are grateful for the support which we received from the Government, particularly from the major officials in the five agencies on which our investigation focused. The financial assistance received from the USAID was indeed liberal and helpful for successfully completing the present study. And we cannot forget the host of administrators and village leaders who believed in the value of work and took innumerable pains to see that it would succeed. Finally, the loyal research assistants and interviewers at the Indian Institute of Public Administration and the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, who worked indefatigably in the face of a demanding operational schedule, were indispensable to this achievement. We only hope that our results will eventually justify this confidence and support.

Samuel J. Eldersveld  
V. Jagannadham  
A.P. Barnabas

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE CITIZEN AND THE ADMINISTRATOR : THEORETICAL CONCERNS

The achievement of social and political change in developing societies like India is heavily dependent on the qualitative performance of the administrative system. "Administration" is a set of crucial structures and processes serving as intermediary media between citizens and leaders, between consumer-producers and planners. In this dual capacity administration is involved, in one sense, with the utilization, management allocation, and development of human and material resources. However, it is not merely concerned with the satisfaction of material needs. It is aware that it will not succeed unless it modifies public attitudes and beliefs, and redirects public and official behaviour.

In modern, developed, societies today we are more than ever inclined to emphasize the importance and complexity of the roles of administrators. In developing societies these roles are pre-eminent, particularly in societies dedicated to massive programmes of social innovation. In such developing societies the communication of welfare state goals, the socialization of the populace, the mobilization of citizen support, and the translation of this support into new patterns of action, make the role of administrative structures and personnel central. The roles of others such as the politician, the intellectual, the entrepreneur are important, but the administrator is a vital cog in the achievement of social planning. Public servants in the new, developing society must adapt themselves to new, challenging responsibilities. A basic requirement for them is "commitment"—to the larger goals of the welfare society, to the norms of the new bureaucracy, to the function of administration as the agent of change. Above all, whatever the "democratic" orientations of the new system, the new bureaucrats need to be identified, recognized and supported as the "public's administrators".

B

The growing technicalities and complexities in the administrative organization of "modernized" societies stagger the imagination. In a developing society administration is equally complex and perhaps more demanding. This is so because of the rapid movement from subsistence economies and colonial traditions to modern demands and pressures of industrialization and urbanization through democratic processes. It is so also because of the scarcity of resources and the necessity for administrators to husband these resources toward egalitarian objectives. It is so finally because of the current inevitable gulf in a developing society between the social status and cultural orientations of the governors and the governed. The problem of administration in the developing society is to accommodate the hoary past with the modern present, to economize resources in the face of mounting and cumulating demands, and to elicit intelligent and meaningful public cooperation from a public thus far ignorant and indifferent in its orientations towards government which has so far been away from them both in physical and participational aspects. Active citizen participation is the central, bewildering, problem of administration in India. It is the problem which, in a limited and exploratory fashion, this study seeks to analyze.

#### *Concepts and Criteria for Effective and "Democratic" Administration: Some Excerpts from the Literature*

There has been an impressive, and constantly increasing, body of literature in the Twentieth Century which has concentrated attention on the problems of administration in modern and developing nation-states. There has been, however, much less empirical study of the problems posed in this literature. Theories have been advanced and models of the administrative process have been formulated. The absence of reliable data, however, leads to confusion, if not skepticism, on the part of governmental leaders, who hope for pragmatic insights, and on the part of social scientists who seriously search for answers to significant theoretical questions about the administrative process.

The relationship between administrators and citizens has proved particularly intriguing and crucial to many theorists. This is so particularly in Western societies because of the

assumption that the nature and quality of citizen-administrative interactions vitally affect the pattern and prospects for the achievement of democracy. One may well argue the importance and relevance of "democratic" criteria for evaluating administrative performance in a developing society. Nevertheless, in a country like India, "democratic" perspectives are important, because of the assumption that the achievement of developmental goals hinges in large part on the extent to which public involvement and cooperation can be mobilized by the bureaucracy.

In some of the recent literature the emphasis is on the subtlety of the relationship between citizen and official. The nineteenth century conflict between the state and the citizen as stated in simplistic theory is no longer perceived as exclusively important, if important at all, primarily because it is an obscurantist formulation. The relationship is not clearly conflictual nor dichotomous : all citizens versus all officials. As one student has put it : "The central administration is not isolated from the community, but entangled in it everywhere, in office hours and out of them." A gradient of relationships exists, from elite bureaucrats to secondary officers and divisional heads to that administrative cadre most closely in day-to-day contact with the citizenry. And the public in turn is not one "mass", but is also distinguishable in terms of differential patterns of social status and administrative contact, ranging from those who are frequent "clients" of administrative agencies to those who are completely isolated from the administrative process. It is this image of the administrative-citizen subsystem of the society which must be borne in mind in any study of the functioning of bureaucracy in modern societies.

Underlying the concern for a "democratic" or "effective" public administration is, first, a belief that public administration must be based on public consent or support. The actions of public agencies and officials, should reflect the aspirations, interests, demands, and support-potential of the public it serves and directs. Official action should be responsible, as well as rational, and above all must command the respect and cooperation of citizens. Second, there is the conception of administration as a "circular process", from the initial formulation of policy to its implementation to the modification of policy

subsequent to its evaluation in the process of implementation, including "feedback" from the citizen public at various steps in this process. This is a continuous, dynamic set of interactions. It conceives of citizens in a double role, as producers and consumers of goods and services, or as policy-makers and subjects. From both analytical and value premises, therefore, has come the emphasis on "democratic" responsiveness by officials, as well as responsible citizen involvement, as preconditions for an effective administrative process in the modern polity.

But what specific conditions or criteria for the achievement of a "democratic" and "functional" set of relationships in administration can one specify? Professor William A. Robson, who is well read in India has had much to say on this subject. He suggests the following bureaucratic "maladies" as relevant: "an excessive sense of self-importance on the part of officials"; "an indifference towards the feeling or the convenience of individual citizens"; "an obsession with the binding and inflexible authority of departmental decisions, precedents, arrangements or forms"; "an inability to consider the government as a whole"; "a failure to recognize the relations between the governors and the governed as an essential part of the democratic process".<sup>1</sup> On the other hand, he emphasizes the role of the citizen:

"The achievement of good relations between the government and the public is a matter which does not by any means depend solely on the conduct of civil servants and politicians. It depends equally on the attitude of citizens, groups, corporations, associations of all kinds and indeed of all unofficial bodies to public authorities. If we want public servants to behave well towards us, we must behave well towards them. Moreover, we must normally assume that they for their part will behave well. . . . If politicians and civil servants are held in low esteem, if their work is derided, if abuse and invective is poured on them continuously, if loose and unsubstantial allegations are made about their incompetence, dishonesty, laziness and indifference to the public interest, it is unlikely that officials will

<sup>1</sup> William A. Robson (ed.), *The Civil Service in Britain and France*, London, The Hogarth Press, 1956, p. 13.

develop or display qualities of integrity, industry and public spirit."

The Report of the Committee on the Training of Civil Servants has also commented on those faults which impede a democratic pattern of administration : "The faults most frequently enumerated are overdevotion to precedent; remoteness from the rest of the community; inaccessibility and faulty handling of the general public, lack of initiative and imagination, ineffective organization and waste of manpower, procrastination and unwillingness to take responsibility or to give decisions." These tendencies, if true, lead to expectations concerning the mental image which the common man has of "the bureaucrat". C.R. Hensman has summarized these aptly :

"He is at various times : (a) a perverse God who must be propitiated; (b) a recalcitrant ass that must be driven; (c) a privileged snob, impossible to get the better of; (d) a lazy hound, impossible to bring to book; and (e) (occasionally) a hardworked, underpaid and harassed officer doing his best under difficult circumstances. This last is likely to be a judgment by, and of, upperclass layers and no doubt often coincides with the self-image of the high ranking public servant."

Probably the best attempt to conceptualize the citizen-administrator relationship in "democratic" terms was that of Morris Janowitz, in his unique empirical study in 1958 of public attitudes toward administration in Detroit, Michigan. Janowitz was primarily concerned with the "democratic" components of the citizen's relationship to the bureaucracy. "A bureaucracy is in imbalance", he says, "when it fails to operate on the basis of democratic consent.... Bureaucratic imbalance may be either despotic or subservient. Despotic implies that the bureaucracy is too much the master while subservient implies that it is too much the servant." He then proceeds to specify four types of requirements for the achievement of a democratic balance :

- (1) Knowledge. The public must have an adequate level of knowledge about the operations of the public bureaucracy...
- (2) Self-interest. The public must consider that its self-

interest is being served by the public bureaucracy. As a check on the disruptive consequences of self-interested demands on the bureaucracy, the public must be aware simultaneously of the bureaucracy's capacity to act as a neutral and impartial agent in resolving social conflicts.

- (3) Principle-mindedness. The public must be of the general opinion that the public bureaucracy is guided in its actions by a set of principles guaranteeing equal and impersonal treatment. Administrative routines, however, must be sufficiently flexible to cope with individual differences in order to insure adequate dealings with clients.
- (4) Prestige. Public perspectives toward the public bureaucracy must include adequate prestige value toward public employment as compared with other types of careers. Very low and very high prestige values would interfere with the bureaucracy's ability to operate on the basis of democratic consent."<sup>3</sup>

These operationalizations were heavily relied upon in our study of citizen-administrative relationships in India.

#### *The Focus for Analysis*

These are but a few of many attempts to identify the essential requirements for the development and maintenance of a "democratic" and effective pattern of relationships between the citizen and the official. It is apparent that these formulations are concerned with attitudes, perceptions and/or evaluations which relate to both the citizen and the official. Thus, the content of the administrator's *self-image* is involved, as well as *his* image of the public; on the other hand, the content of the citizen's image of *his* own place in the system is involved, as well as *his* image of the administrator, the agency, and its programmes and procedures. Implicit in any complete analysis, therefore, a comparison of at least two different levels is required —a comparison of the official's view of his own performance

<sup>3</sup> Morris Janowitz, Deil Wright, and William Delany, *Public Administration and the Public-Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community*, Ann Arbor, Institute of Public Administration, 1958, pp. 6-8.

and role with the public's view of that official's performance and role; a comparison of the official's view of the public's role with the public's view or expectations about that role. An additional type of comparison is also useful—the administrator's estimate of what the content of public perspectives towards administrators is or is likely to be, compared to the *actual* content of the public's perspectives. Since the behaviour of leaders and citizens in any society is based on expectations, understandings, or estimate of the attitudes and behaviour of other actors in the system, this type of analysis may be vital. It may lead us to clues as to the premises, perhaps empirically unsubstantiated, on which actions, by both administrators and citizens, rest.

In any analysis where both the administrator and the citizen are the objects of observation and interview we are basically concerned, then, with the need for different types of data and analysis. First, we need a *description* of the content of public and official attitudes or perspectives toward the administrative process. Second, we need an *explanation* of the differential attitude patterns for subpopulations, in terms of independent variables such as social status, group identifications, geographical residence, political affiliation, or psychological predispositions. Third, we must be interested also in the extent of *congruence* or "distance" in the perceptions, attitudes, and orientations of officials, on the one hand, and citizens, on the other. Fourth, if the function of the bureaucracy is to be properly examined, we must examine the nature of communicative and contact patterns between officials and citizens, with the particular goal in mind of determining the relevance of bureaucratic contact for citizen perceptions, attitudes, and orientations. The problem posed particularly in a developing society is that of analyzing how administrative action is, and can be, translated into citizen action functional to developmental goals.

#### *The Historical and Contemporary Context: Indian Bureaucracy in Transition*

In adapting the concerns of various writers on the subject to the Indian context, we were preoccupied with several primary convictions. It is important to remember that the theory and practice of the Indian administrative system is to

a certain extent yet today a blend of the "steel frame" of the British administrative system and the concepts and directions of the indigenous system established since Independence. The formalism, impersonality, and deferential character of the old regime, its emphasis on security and lack of bureaucratic initiative, have naturally left an imprint. They are a legacy which the new leaders of India have had to cope with in establishing and motivating a new development bureaucracy. In contrast to the British period there are certain key values in the post-Independence theory of administration which are crucial to bear in mind. First, within the framework of central direction from Delhi, it was based on the theory of considerable decentralization of structure and function, with much autonomy and initiative vested in the states and local units of government. Second, it was welfare-state oriented, with the explicit goals of egalitarianism in role and services replacing older colonial and capitalistic norms. Third, administrative structure and practices were viewed as functional to the vital objective of integrative "nation-building", involving both communication of administrators with the most isolated sectors of the society and the development of a commitment and identification by both administrators and citizens to the broad goals of the total society. Finally, it emphasized a public not parasitic idea in its relationship to the administrative system, but participant, a public which accepted duties as well as made demands, a public with confidence in the administrative hierarchy and motivated to share in the responsibilities of development.

The transformation of the old bureaucracy into a new order has not been simple. Administrators do not easily change their professional backgrounds, normative orientations, or behavioural practices much less over night. Nor can the public be expected to understand the system and adapt to it quickly. Penetration of the new ethic is a slow process, especially in a democratic society in which indecision, deliberation, debate, and conflict attended the movement towards new structures and new norms. The communication of the new philosophy and the activization of an old society are indeed baffling tasks. It is a tribute to India since Independence that the pace of political and social progress has been so great during this period despite the strains and

tensions of releasing a nation from the administrative thraldom of the former occupying power.

The key problem in India is the training, socializing, and direction of a cadre of administrators who can and will be adaptive to public needs and sensitivities. Although this is so for all branches of public administration, it is particularly vital for the Community Development programme. Reinhard Bendix has described the problem and context well.

"The Community Development Movement of the Indian Government is an attempt to bridge the gap between the ruling elite and the masses of the Indian people . . . At the level of the village the development officials have the delicate task of enlisting cooperation with projects of whose soundness and desirability the villagers must first be convinced. To do this officials must strike a balance between making suggestions and listening to demands, taking advantage of modern knowledge but also adapting it to the local situation."<sup>4</sup>

Bureaucratic impersonality, compulsive professionalism, and procedural rigidity must give way to pragmatism, populism and perhaps even personalism if the system is to succeed.

At the Administrative Reforms Conference held at the Indian Institute of Public Administration in August, 1963, the term "cutting edge" was used to refer to "the level at which a counter clerk deals with a common citizen in a public office". In reviewing the state of Indian public administration it was contended that "under cover of hierarchy, decentralization and delegation, the task of administration at the level of its 'cutting edge' comes to be dealt with by low level functionaries, ill-equipped and ill-trained for the point of physical contact between the administration and the citizen . . . as one descends down the hierarchical ladder, generally speaking, competence decreases, there is less resilience in administration, less wisdom in using judgment or discretion within the law or regulation, more rigidity, and a tendency to be 'authoritative'." The working paper of the Conference posed the key question: "What

<sup>4</sup> "Public Authority in a Developing Political Community: The Case of India", *Archives Européennes de Sociologie*, IV, 1963, Number 1, pp. 61-63.

then are the principal lines along which administrative reform... should be pursued so as to make the cutting edge of administration more efficient, more resilient and more responsive to the common citizen whom it seeks to serve?" Both as an indictment and as a conception of the problem of administration in India today, this statement sets the stage for our empirical study of the citizen and the bureaucrat in Delhi State.

### *Our Theory and Objectives*

There were certain critical, system-relevant, theoretical concerns which motivated our research. In a general sense we were preoccupied with communication patterns between "the elite sector" and "the citizen mass". These patterns can be conceived as "instrumental" to the elite in achieving the support of its own personnel and the citizens in the realization of the objectives, its recruitment of personnel and its aims for the maintenance and development of consensus, or in its transformation. The "intelligence function" and interactions of such above mentioned factors cannot be understated—the elite needs constant contact with and evaluation of the ever-changing content of citizen demands. Only then can it determine both the cooperation potential and the alienation potential of significant sectors of society. From the viewpoint of the citizen, such communicative relationships can resolve his doubts about elite objectives and motivate him to share in government programmes.

In a developing society like India these elite-citizen contacts and interactions are more than ordinarily significant. First, of course, is the post-Independence aim of national integration and unity, explicitly recognized in the Constitution as a major goal, which today, 18 years after Independence, seem still threatened with contingencies. This is not merely a matter of linguistic or geographic provincialism. It is a question of the identification of the rural peasant and urban resident with larger social collectivities than the immediate village or caste or religious group in which he is born and lives. It is also a matter of the extensiveness of the average citizen's knowledge of, and commitment to, the goals of the larger society and political order.

A second problem in a developing society like India is that of the involvement of the citizen with the developing, more

“modern”, social and political institutions and secondary, or intermediary associations in the society. As the traditional associations are modified and adapted to the processes of modernization, the question is whether the ordinary peasant or urban resident will perceive these institutions as meaningful agencies for action or will see them as alien and ineffectual for him. A new “development” bureaucracy, a new party system, new interest groups come into existence, while at the same time old castes and religious associations are changed, wittingly or unwittingly, to conform to the requirements for organized action in the new order. For the ordinary citizen, still illiterate and clinging to the traditional forms, involvement in these new or modified forms of social and political action is necessary if the gulf between them and the new elite is not to become hopelessly distant in the ongoing society. Under what conditions does the common citizen trust this new bureaucracy, this new party system, these new agencies for action ? How does he arrive at cognition of these agencies as useful avenues for political action, as agencies through which he can communicate to, support, or take reprisal action against the elite—how to utilize such institutions for legitimate political action objectives ? The processes by which those committed to the traditional order come to accept and participate in these “westernized” and secular institutions for action is of crucial importance for the development of a country like India.

A third problem concerns the citizen’s involvement in economic and social development programmes. The extent of this participation is not only vital for the immediate aims of these programmes ; it is also highly relevant for the development of a modern, truly national, state. Such participation in economic and social planning is essentially again a matter of communication, in the broadest sense. It requires a citizenry which is informed about these goals, supports them, has social and economic aspirations and perspectives which mesh with such goals, and which are realistically achievement oriented, and, finally, aspirations which as the result of contacts with “the elite”, or even without such contacts, results in certain specific citizen actions which are congruent with and do indeed contribute to implement developmental goals. The requirement is an aspiration pattern and action pattern among the people which is

utilitarian, pragmatic, and consistent with elite aspirations and actions. If in India today there is a failure in certain programmes, such as that in the field of agricultural production, it may be traceable in part to a failure of the elite to commit the peasantry to action—through the party system, through traditional group leadership, through more modernized interest groups, or through bureaucratic contacts with the public.

The study of the administrative-citizen relationship in India today must bear in mind these contextual theoretical and historical conditions. Above all, the special "field" conditions within which the Indian administrator works cannot be ignored. Cognizant of such conditions, and working with this theoretical perspective, in the research reported here we concentrated our attention or specific dimensions of official and citizen behaviours and orientations relevant to the Indian context and we ask repeatedly two types of questions :

- (1) What evidence is there that citizens and officials perceive, understand, and accept the norms of the new administration ; what conditions and factors impede the acceptance of these new norms, and in what sub-populations; in what respects are there incompatible images of the administrative process, incompatibilities which signify a breakdown in the communication process and which may lead to dissensus if not alienation ?
- (2) What is the evidence that a *participant* orientation toward the administrative process has developed in India, on the part of both officials and citizens ; is there a movement in the direction of citizen confidence in the system which he translated into realistic achievement perspectives, public cooperation with the new bureaucracy, and positive action leading to social and economic change ?

These two leading questions focus attention on two problems and needs. One basic need in India is unity, integration, *consensus* ; the second basic need in India is *achievement*. The two needs are intertwined. Is the new "development bureaucracy" one which the Indian citizen accepts or rejects or is indifferent to ; and, if he accepts it, is it a bureaucracy which

he can and will work with or one which he merely submits to or tolerates ?

The major components of the citizen-bureaucrat relationship on which we focused attention in our study, were similar to those identified by others. We applied them specifically to the Indian setting. Our theory specified the following prerequisites for an effective, functional, and democratic administrative system in India :

- adequate citizen and official knowledge of administrative norms, practices, and structure ;
- genuine support for the goals, policies, and programmes of the government ;
- positive evaluations of the job performance of governmental officials ;
- perceptions of the administrative system as sensitive and responsive to the public, rather than inflexible and remote ;
- belief in the integrity and honesty of the administrative cadre, rather than a tendency to view it as corrupt or corruptible ;
- a high prestige status for public employment ;
- perception of administrators as committed to egalitarian goals and practices, rather than to favouritism or political advantage ;
- feelings of efficacy and optimism about citizen action in the political system generally, and in the administrative subsystem particularly ;
- motivational orientations emphasising cooperation action with administrative officials in the implementation of developmental goals.

These theoretical concerns indicate the range of our research perspectives. They apply, though in different ways, to the administrative cadre as well as to the citizen public. We are convinced that these areas of concern must be the major focus of any study of citizen-administrative relationships in India. Although all are in our opinion relevant elements of the problem, we are inclined to feel that the emergence of a functional and democratic system of relationships in India is probably more contingent on the spread of greater knowledge of administrative structure and norms, on the mobilization of

support for developmental programmes, on convictions that the bureaucracy is accountable and sensitive to public interests, as well as believes in the egalitarian aims of the system, and on feelings of citizen self-competence, confidence and optimism. But certainly prestige perceptions, positive public evaluations of job performance by officials, and the extent to which officials are perceived as "principle-minded", are theoretically significant, and possibly crucial.

Since this is an exploratory analysis we intend, therefore, to examine and describe these components of public and administrative behaviour. After description, we were interested in looking at the factors which might explain the differential patterns of their incidence.


There are many factors in the Indian society, as in any society, which have to be examined if one is to understand elite and public behaviour. What we have focused our research on in this study is the phenomena of public knowledge and support of the Indian administrative system, narrowly conceived, and the "expansion of the polity", "democratic integration", and the public's role in social and economic development, broadly conceived. A complex set of social and individual forces converge to facilitate or obstruct such specific or general societal goals. We have attempted to isolate such factors as differential social status, the conditions of village life, and exposure to mass communication. In addition, we have looked at individual orientations towards authority, towards administrators and the political system, and towards the "modernization" process itself. But, above all, we have attempted to investigate carefully the relevance and impact of bureaucratic structures and personnel—their social characteristics, internal training and socialization processes, and their contacts with the public—for the achievement of administrative support by the public. Hopefully, then, we will secure evidence related to the larger theoretical concerns of political and socio-economic development. These relationships are set forth in the accompanying diagram.

The public, as well as the new bureaucrats, in the Indian "developing" society, as the diagram suggests, is in a conflict-laden, transitional, "crisis" period. On the one hand certain social conditions predispose it to individual orientations towards

Framework for Our Analysis:  
Major Variables and Critical Relationships

Citizen Environment:  
Social and Individual

"The Public's Political Response"



the political order which theoretically could induce either apathy and isolation or involvement and participation. These social preconditions also may have limiting effects on the contacts citizens have with political and administrative officials. On the other hand, a counter pressure is supplied by the perspectives and actions of the "new bureaucrats", dependent in turn on the structural, social, and psychological stimuli to which these officials are exposed in the particular agencies in which they have careers. The effects of these stimuli on administrators will vary considerably, some being socialized to "democratic" job perspectives, others reflecting bureaucratic perspectives. Citizen contacts with administrators will also vary in frequency and content, given the range of citizen opportunities and interest, as well as the varying job perspectives of administrators and the action commitments of their agencies. The basic test, then, for political development in our research is the relative strength and direction of the societal environmental factors and individual predispositions, on the one hand, and the stimulus resulting from bureaucratic contacts, on the other hand. Our theory suggests that administrative contacts can move the public towards greater knowledge of the system, greater optimism about the public's role in the system, greater attitudinal support for the system, and greater cooperation with the goals of the system. This depends, however, on the strength and nonfacilitative nature of the "traditional" social and individuals orientations as well as the extent and nature of their bureaucratic contacts.

In a very real sense in our study we are concerned with the "stages in the modernization process" as manifested at one point in time. We are studying citizens and bureaucrats with differential caste statures, economic position, educational levels, and individual orientations, living in different types of urban areas and villages, villages which are both geographically and traditionally isolated as well as villages which are "modernizing". These citizens are exposed in varying degree to mass media, political communications, and administrative contacts. Thus the citizens in our study are arranged along one traditional-modernism continuum: our bureaucrats are arranged along another. The major question is: Does the interaction of the two change the position of the individual on the

continuum, in functional terms, towards more involvement or less, towards democratic commitments or away from such commitments, towards support for the system or alienation, towards new forms of social, economic, and political behaviour or towards old forms? This is indeed one central question which confronts a developing society like India: Does the bureaucracy, and can it, facilitate the achievement of developmental goals and aspirations?

### *The Sample Design*

The data for this exploratory study were obtained in a series of interviews with citizens and administrators in Delhi State from January to May, 1964. Delhi State according to the last census, had a population of 2,659,000, of which almost 300,000 were found in the 256 villages in the State. We drew a random, probability sample of 400 adults from the rural area and a second sample of 400 from the urban area. In constructing our rural sample we stratified the villages by population size and by objective measures of their degree of "traditionalism" or "modernization". We selected eight villages from the strata, so devised, in which we did our interviewing.<sup>5</sup> The objectives of the study were defined by the project staff of the IIPA, the questionnaire was prepared and pre-tested by the staff and research assistants of the IIPA, and the final interviewing was done jointly by these research assistants and the field staff of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion. In designing our questionnaire we relied heavily on the only other similar study, that completed by Morris Janowitz in the Detroit area in 1958. Many of our questions were adopted from his schedule. In addition to interviewing a cross section of adults, we drew a sample of about 220 administrators from the five basic agencies or departments in the area on which we concentrated most of our attention. These five agencies were: Health, Police, Postal, Community Development, and the Delhi Transport Undertaking. The administrators we interviewed were presumably in fairly close and constant interaction with the public—VLWs, Panchayat secretaries, Block Development officers, constables,

<sup>5</sup> See the Appendix for a more detailed description of the sample selection process, the questionnaires, and the indices used.

postal workers, bus inspectors, doctors and compounders. This permitted us to study administrative contacts with the public from both the viewpoint of the administrator and the citizen. It must be emphasized that this was a "demonstration" or "pilot" project. Its findings are strictly applicable only to Delhi State. It is hoped that with modification it can be used to study the same problem in other regions of India.

## CHAPTER TWO

### PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS AND EVALUATIONS

In a developing society one might well expect that the prerequisites for effective administrative relationships with the public would be only minimally met. The public's limited experience with the new "development bureaucracy", the brief opportunity for the new agencies to establish contact with the public and to demonstrate their utility, would suggest limited public knowledge of administration, partial penetration, and marginal commitment. In this first chapter we seek to explore the general pattern of public perspectives about Indian public administration. After presenting this overall survey we will analyze more specifically the factors related to public attitudes, and the role of administrative behaviour in inducing these attitudes.

#### *Evaluations of Governmental Performance*

The Indian public's estimate of the job being done at various governmental levels reveals a considerable range in approval for different types of officials. If one looks at the proportions of our sample populations who feel that governmental officials are doing a "poor job", one notices that rural adults seem relatively more satisfied than the residents of the city of Delhi. Thus 15% of the rural sample felt that village officials were doing a "poor job", while 36% of the urban sample felt that the Municipal Corporation officials were performing poorly. (Table 2 : 1) Again, 12% of rural adults were dissatisfied with the Central Government's record while 21% of urban adults considered its performance to be poor. With a fifth or less of the public being ordinarily dissatisfied (with the exception of the evaluation of the Delhi Municipal Corporation), one cannot claim that the public is unduly disillusioned. This does not

mean that they are extremely enthusiastic, since less than 6% considered the performance at any governmental level as "very good". Rather there is a grudging agreement by the vast majority of the public that their government is "middling", tolerable, and reasonably satisfactory.

TABLE 2:1

## General Evaluations of Governmental Performance

(What do you think of the job the governmental officials are doing in village, state, and the Central Government ?)

	Poor Job	Fair Job	Good Job	Very Good Job	Don't Know
Village officials	15%	12	63	4	7
Delhi Corporation Officials	36	22	25	1	16
Delhi State Officials					
Rural Sample	12	7	46	3	32
Urban Sample	23	27	23	1	27
Central Government Officials					
Rural Sample	12	8	51	4	24
Urban Sample	21	26	34	3	17
Block Officials	17	12	53	6	13

Greater variations can be found in the reactions to the job performance of individual agencies (Table 2:2). Only 5% to 6% feel the postal service is poor. About one fifth are overtly critical of Health and Community Development agencies. But, in urban Delhi particularly, there is greater disapproval of the two other departments we studied : the Police and the Delhi Transport Undertaking. Over a third of the urban adults feel the police are doing a poor job, while 47% are dissatisfied with the bus service provided by the DTU.

TABLE 2 : 2

## Comparative Levels of Public Disapproval of Certain Administrative Agencies

	"dissatisfied", "disapprove", or "doing a poor job"
Postal	
Urban Sample	6%
Rural Sample	6
Health	
Urban Sample	19
Rural Sample	21
Community	
Development (rural sample)	20
Police	
Urban Sample	36
Rural Sample	24
Delhi Transport (Urban Sample)	47

A comparison of these levels of approval-disapproval with the 1954 study in Detroit suggest higher proportions of rejection or dissatisfaction in India (Table 2 : 3). At both the State and Municipal levels the performance of officials is criticized more frequently by the Delhi sample than was the case in Detroit. Public transportation, interestingly enough, evokes the greatest criticism in both studies. For all agencies and levels, then, the range of criticism and the amount of dissatisfaction is greater in Delhi—as low as 6% dissatisfaction with postal officials and mounting to 47% who were dissatisfied with bus services. It is significant in this connection to note comparative results also on another question : "In general, would you say that your dealings with public employees were—poor, fair, good, or very good ?" In Detroit 28% of the sample said their relationships were "poor" or only "fair"; in Delhi 60% responded the same way<sup>1</sup> (Table 2 : 4). Our Indian urban sample,

<sup>1</sup> For the Indian rural sample the comparable percentage was 32%.

TABLE 2 : 3

Comparisons of Extent of Public Dissatisfaction with Administrative Agencies or Officials—Detroit and Delhi

	1954 Detroit	1964 Delhi
Municipal officials— “doing a poor job”	6%	36%
State Officials— “doing a poor job”	4	23
Police— “doing a poor job”	6	36
Municipal Transportation* —critical and dissatisfied	24	48

\*For comparative purposes, these percentages are based on those who had contact with or used transportation facilities.

thus, is both more critical of officials and agencies as well as more aware that their own relationships with officials are relatively poor. Yet, in both urban and rural Indian samples less than one fifth feel their “dealings” with governmental employees are “poor”. There is no evidence here of widespread and majority discontent.

TABLE 2 : 4

General Perception by Public of Relations  
with Governmental Employees

(In general would you say that your dealings with  
public employees are poor, fair, good or very good ?)

	Delhi State, 1964		Detroit Area, 1954
	Urban	Rural	
Poor	19%	16	6
Fair	41	16	22
Good	24	57	48
Very Good	3	3	17
Don't know	13	9	7

*Evaluations of the Worth of Governmental Activity*

The worthwhileness of governmental activities, an important dimension of citizen relationships with the government in a democracy, is clearly endorsed by Indian citizens (Table 2:5).

TABLE 2:5

Public Acceptance of the Worthwhileness of  
Health and Community Development Programmes

(Do you think it is necessary for the government to  
provide these health services?)

	Rural	Urban
Yes	96%	91
No	1	3
No Opinion	4	6
(Do you think the Community Development programme is worth- while or do you think the govern- ment should stop this programme?)		
Is worthwhile	67	
Should be stopped		8
Uncertain, no opinion	22	
Not ascertained	2	

When asked if they feel that health services should be provided by the government, only a small fragment of less than 3% dissent. Although a larger proportion have uncertainties about the Community Development programme (22% are not sure or have no opinion), fully two thirds are convinced of the worthwhileness of this programme. And, as Table 2:6 indicates, the rural population sees only a small proportion of 12% as opposed to the Community Development programme. Not only do individuals when queried about their own degree of support for these programmes indicate overwhelming approval of them, but they sense that the majority of people do not stand in opposition.

Another measure of evaluations of the worthwhileness of governmental activity concerns attitudes towards taxes. When

we asked our respondents how they felt about paying taxes, we found 39% of the rural sample and 48% of the urban sample responding that they were paying more taxes than they should. On the identical question in the Detroit study, 41% felt that taxes were too high. Another, similar, question was asked seeking to probe evaluations concerning the relative "balance" between "what the government gives the public" and what "the government gets back from the public". Over 50% of our urban respondents (53%) and 39% of our rural respondents felt the government got back from the public more than it gave. These findings indicate that while there is generalized acceptance of government programmes as worthwhile there were large numbers of respondents who feel taxes are too high, and who failed to see sufficiently tangible results from governmental programmes for themselves to warrant the taxes they paid. For many there is obviously no close link in their thinking between the worth of governmental programmes, personal taxes, and services rendered by government.

#### *Public Knowledge of Governmental Programmes*

Although these findings concerning the levels of generalized public discontent may be at least partially gratifying, the lack of public knowledge about public administration and governmental programmes may be a greater cause of worry. Throughout our study the inadequacies of general and specific infor-

TABLE 2:6  
 Public Awareness of Opposition or Support for  
 Community Development  
 (Who are the people here who are opposed to  
 Community Development? And who are the  
 people in favour of it? Rural sample)

No one is opposed	47
Many are opposed	4
Some, or a few, are opposed	8
Don't know if there is opposition	41

mation about government was very apparent. In the health and community development fields this is particularly clear. Over

50% of the rural sample have no knowledge of the goals of community development, and about the same proportion do not know any Community Development officials at any level in the rural areas (Tables 2:7-9). So far as the agricultural programme itself is concerned less than 20% know precisely what the government expects them to do. Responses to very specific "informational" questions often produce considerable ignorance. When asked to state what the sources of income for the government were, over 50% of both the urban and rural samples did not know or gave vague and incorrect replies. Perhaps more relevant is the ignorance revealed when our respondents were asked where the nearest Family Planning Centre is located—

TABLE 2:7

Public Knowledge of Goals of Community Development (Rural only)

(What would you say are the most important purposes, or goals, or activities of the Community Development Programme here ?)

Has considerable knowledge	5%
Has some knowledge	40
Has poor knowledge	26
No knowledge	30

TABLE 2:8

Public Knowledge of Community Development Official in the Area or Block (Rural only)

(Who are the officials in the Community Development programme in this area ?)

Knows none or can mention none	48%
Mentions one	33
Mentions more than one	18
Mentions one or more officials <i>and says he has seen him frequently in the past month</i>	26

TABLE 2:9

 Public Awareness of Governmental Programmes and  
 Expectations for Increasing Agricultural Production  
 (Rural Sample)

"In what ways has the government been trying to increase agricultural production?"		"What does the government want you to do to increase agricultural production?"	
Mention nothing	29%	Nothing or don't know	30%
Mention 1 or 2 ways	24	General response only (as "work hard") and irrelevant response	55
Mention 3 or 4 ways	35	Specific and relevant response	15
Mention more than 4 ways	12		

60% of the urban sample and 77% of rural sample said they did not know. One must, of course, proceed cautiously in interpreting these findings. But one might argue that if the government is to secure the cooperation of the public in the implementations of its social welfare programmes this level of public knowledge may not be high enough. It appears that although Indian citizens are generally satisfied with the performance record of officials, their inadequate knowledge of this government and its programmes raises questions as to the meaningfulness of this generalized support.

We do not mean to imply here that *Comparatively* the Indian public is more ignorant of governmental programmes than in other countries, even Western countries. Indeed, though comparisons with the Detroit study in this connection are difficult and probably misleading, Indian citizens may be as well informed as those in the United States.<sup>2</sup> But for a developing society which has staked much of its plans on programmes requiring public information, instrumental knowledge, and understanding of its goals, our findings on the level of public knowledge are disillusioning. Our data suggest a serious communication gap between the planners and a majority of the Indian rural, and probably urban, public.

<sup>2</sup> Janowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-21.

*Citizen Perceptions of the Accessibility of Officials*

While a system which is structured so that leaders are too accessible may be subverted to particular interests at the cost of the broader goals of governmental policy, a system in which citizens see their government as inapproachable or approachable only through devious pressure may be a system where manipulation may replace service. The question we posed throughout our study was: Does the Indian citizen perceive his government's officials as accessible, approachable, and sensitive to public needs and demands, and oriented towards the "public interest" rather than towards narrow, particular, and special interests? Where does the balance lie in India?

To begin with, we asked our samples whether, if they had to go to a governmental department for action on a problem, they would act by themselves or get help from others. Our respondents indicated clearly that the probabilities of success if they worked by themselves were limited (Table 2:10). Thus, almost two thirds of those in rural areas, and 50% in urban areas (with another 25% having no opinion) felt they should get help from other persons or organizations. The rural public felt more helpless in such a situation than did the urban population. This may be construed as a high level of pessimism or futility

TABLE 2:10

Perceived Need for Assistance from Others  
in Contacting Governmental Officials

(In general, if you had a problem to take up with a governmental department or municipal office, would you do it yourself, or do you think you would be better off if you got the help of some person or organization?)

	Delhi, 1964		Detroit 1954
	Rural	Urban	
Do it myself	23%	25	16
Get help	64	50	67
It depends	7	1	11
No opinion	5	25	—

for individual action ; if so, it applies equally to Detroit, as Table 2:10 indicates.

TABLE 2 : 11

Perceived Importance of "Political Pull" in the  
Public's Contacts with Administrative Officials

(In your opinion does "political pull"—or knowing  
the right person—play an important part in whether  
the government will help a private person with some  
problem he has ?)

	Delhi		Detroit
	Rural	Urban	
Yes—"Pull" is important	70%	54	41
Yes—"Pull" sometimes is important	5	6	28
It depends	2	3	4
No—"Pull" hardly matters	11	7	15
No Opinion	12	30	13

In pressing this matter further, we asked the same question in India which had been used in the United States study, concerning the need for "political pull" or "knowing the right person". We asked the respondent whether he thought this "played an important part in whether the government will help a private person with some problem he has". The levels of public agreement to the need for "political pull" are somewhat higher than in the Detroit study (Table 2:11). At least 70% of the rural public agree (plus an additional 7% who feel it may be important). In urban areas the affirmative response was 54% (plus an additional 9%). This contrasts with 41% who saw it as important in the American study (although an additional 28% said it played some part). This is, then, a high level of public cynicism (or realism) so far as the nature of successful citizen-administrator interrelationships are concerned.

It is interesting to note that most of those who see "political pull" as important are individuals who admit that they have not had any personal experience with this phenomenon.

Only 19% of our rural sample, and 17% of the urban sample, claimed to have had such a personal experience. Janowitz notes in the American study the same findings. It seems that in democratic societies, developed or developing, there is an expectation that the way to get proper and satisfactory administration is through the utilization of influence. This is the norm which is accepted.

There is an added note of futility, however, in the Indian data which may be more alarming. The great majority of Indians do not feel that the ordinary citizen can do much if administrative officials do not perform their jobs properly. And at least 30% to 40% do feel that administrators do not treat all citizens alike. The question we asked on this matter was used at several places throughout the questionnaire. The findings vary for different agencies. For health, as an example, we found that only 38% of the urban sample felt that "all are treated fairly and are given the same treatment" while the comparable percentage for the rural sample was 58%. Large numbers feel that the wealthy, the elite, or politicians are given favourable treatment (Table 2:12). This non-egalitarian perception of public administration is compounded by feelings of inadequacy so far as appealing or reporting improper behaviour by officials is concerned. (Table 2:13) over a third say bluntly that "nothing could be done" if a health official was not performing his job properly, while only 21% of the urban sample indicated he knew *that* he could complain and *to whom* he could complain. In rural areas approximately 40% were self-confident about their right to complain, and the efficacy of such action.

There appears to be a complex attitudinal and perceptual set of expectations about the citizen's relationship with administrators. The components of this syndrome are: lack of self-confidence on the part of the ordinary citizen in dealing directly with officials, a feeling that the best way to deal with administrators is by enlisting the support of others, particularly individuals with the right contacts and "political pull", that administrators do not and will not treat all people equally, and that these administrative actions are final, complaints availing very little or being difficult to process. In one sense this view, represents a type of "realism" about political life. But though

these attitudes do not find a reflection in general images of the task performance of administrative officials, they can hardly be expected to lead to great enthusiasm for and cooperation with

TABLE 2:12  
"Egalitarianism" in Administration as  
Perceived by the Public

(Do you think that all people are treated fairly and  
are given the same treatment by the health officials,  
or isn't the treatment equal and fair?)

	Rural	Urban
Yes—all are treated equally and fairly	58%	38%
No—some people are favoured (wealthy, the influential, etc.)	30	40
Don't know	11	22

TABLE 2:13  
Sense of Personal Confidence or Efficacy in  
Contacting Governmental Officials

(Suppose you found that a health official was not  
performing his job properly, could you do anything  
about it? If yes, what could you do?)

	Rural	Urban
Could complain to higher officials or other leaders	41%	21%
Don't know if he could complain or to whom to complain	23	39
Nothing could be done	33	39

governmental personnel or programmes. There is a mixture of cynicism and realism here which may both reflect and contribute to an unhealthy orientation towards democratic involvement.

#### *Prestige Perceptions of Public Service*

The prestige levels of public service in India are

sensationally high. We asked the same general question which has been used in studies in other countries : "If the pay were the same would you prefer to work for the government or for a private firm ?" In urban Delhi 76% of our respondents said they would prefer governmental employment ; in rural Delhi 89% gave the same response (Tables 2:14 and 2:15). This compares with a 56% prestige level in the U.S. in 1954, a 44% level in an Australia study in 1948, and a 36% level in Canada in a study there in 1948.<sup>3</sup> In addition, as was done in the United States, we asked our samples to indicate their preference for public or private employment for specific types of occupations. Thus, we asked them to tell us "if the jobs were the same in kind of work, pay, and so forth", whether they would prefer a clerk's position in a private firm or in a municipal government office; the same comparisons were made for night watchman, lawyer, and doctor. The level of prestige remains very high, although only 53% of the urban respondents would prefer a doctor's position in government, compared to 77% who thought that a clerk's position in government would be preferable. In

TABLE 2:14

## The Prestige Level of Indian Government Service

("If the pay were the same would you prefer to work for the government or for a private firm?")

	Urban	Rural
Government preferred	76%	89%
Private firm preferred	9	3
Don't know	14	7
Not ascertained	1	1
No. of cases	347	337

the rural areas 87% thought more of a doctor's position in government as compared to a private practitioner's position.

These data document the tremendously high status which government employment has in India. They indicate that in terms of status perceptions private employment has been

<sup>3</sup> See the Janowitz study, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

rated low in the public's eye. Without going into the reasons for this high prestige value of government positions, one might argue that this indicates an unbalanced and unhealthy relationship. When prestige for governmental employment is at such a high level, it may be difficult for administrative behaviour to be "based on consent" and if the system seeks to function through the cooperation and effective management of the "private sector" of society, such prestige levels may prove a hindrance. The danger always exists in a society with such high prestige for the public service, useful as it may be for govern-

TABLE 2: 15  
Prestige of Selected Occupations in Government  
and Private Employment

("If the jobs were the same in kind of work pay, and so forth, which has the most prestige—that is, which do you think the most of?")

Note : Each percentage is a proportion of the urban or rural sample who indicated a particular preference.

mental goals, that administrative behaviour may be arbitrary and not adequately public service-oriented. Admittedly, however, where practically automatic public compliance with administrative actions is desired, such prestige levels may be in one sense exceedingly functional. But what may appear to be superficially functional to governmental programmes may not be functional to the development of healthy democratic relationships between administrators and the public.

*The Public's Image of Official Corruption*

The irony of these attitudinal patterns emerges when we look at responses concerning corruption among governmental officials, both general and in specific departments. We asked, "How many of the government officials would you say are probably corrupt—many of them, just a few, or none at all?" For our urban sample we found that almost 60% felt that at least half of the government officials were corrupt, with 19% saying "just a few", and only 7% saying "none at all" (Table 2:16). When asked about individual departments the percentages vary, as our subsequent analysis will indicate. The contrast with the findings of the Detroit Study are striking. Only 13% of the Detroit sample said "many are corrupt", compared to 57% of our rural sample and 60% of our urban sample. The expectation of dishonesty and corruption in government is high in India and, paradoxically, for the same people who see government service as prestigious. Government service is apparently seen in two separate images, from two distinct value positions. It is both corrupt and prestigious!

TABLE 2: 16

## Perceptions of Corruption in the Public Service

("How many of the government officials would you say are probably corrupt—many of them, just a few, or none at all?")

	Delhi		Detroit, 1954
	Urban	Rural	
Majority are corrupt	42%	48	13
About half	17	9	
Just a few	19	16	71
None at all	7	12	7
Don't know	14	15	
Not ascertained	1	1	9
Number of Cases	347	337	764

*Conclusions : Indices of Public Support and Self-Confidence*

In assessing the meaning of these general findings concerning public perspectives one is struck by the seemingly contradictory patterns which emerge. The Indian public in Delhi State is inclined to feel that officials are doing a good job and supports developmental programmes as worthwhile. On the other hand there is evidence that this public is not convinced that officials treat citizens equally, nor is a majority certain that action can be taken against officials who do not perform their jobs properly. There are cynical overtones to responses about the integrity of officials. Yet, the great majority look on governmental positions as highly valued.

Any citizen has a host of impressions and perceptions about administrators, not all necessarily consistent from the view point of the outside observer. Together these may be conceived as contributing to a general orientation or "potential" for cooperation, influence, or democratic involvement. To seek to establish a composite image of the Indian citizen's "potential" for such involvement we have developed two indices for each of our respondents. One is an "index of attitudinal support" for governmental officials and programmes.<sup>4</sup> The second index is that of "citizen self-confidence" in his relationships with governmental officials.<sup>5</sup> Five items were used in developing the "support" index ; four items were used in the "self-confidence" index. Together these two indices give us a basis for generalizing what the general pattern of support and potential for administrative involvement is.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Based on the questions we asked as to the kind of jobs officials were doing, whether governmental programmes were necessary, whether officials were egalitarian, and whether they were corrupt.

<sup>5</sup> Based on our questions about the citizen's "dealings" with officials, whether he felt he could act if he had a problem to process with administrators, as well as his general reactions to two statements we presented to him at the end of the interview, and to which we asked him to indicate his agreement or disagreement :

"People like me don't have any say about what the government does."

"Public officials really care quite a lot about what people like me think."

<sup>6</sup> The maximum score possible on the first index was 10 ; on the second index it was 8.

If we look at the general distributions emerging from these indices there may be greater cause for optimism concerning the "potential" for involvement, particularly in the rural sector (Table 2 : 17). The rural population is inclined to be more supportive and also more self-confident than the urban sample. This is particularly apparent when one compares those highly supportive as well as highly self-confident for both samples—20% or more of the rural sample rank high; only 3% to 8% of the urban sample do. In sum, from a fifth to a third of the population reveals a pattern of negativism and pessimism in their attitudes toward the bureaucracy.

When we combine the two indices, five types of patterns emerge, as follows :

	Rural	Urban
High support—high self-confidence	9%	1%
Moderate Support—moderate or high self-confidence	57	47
Moderate or high support—low or no self-confidence	13	16
Low or no support—high self-confidence	14	17
Low or no support—low or no self-confidence	8	19

Very few, less than 10%, of our samples combine both high support for governmental programmes and officials with high self-confidence in dealing with such officials. Close to 30% rank high on one or the other, but not on both. A large minority in these samples do not meet both criteria for involvement, while 8% to 19% seem completely withdrawn or alienated. In the urban sector, therefore, less than 50% of the population approximate needed levels of "potential" for involvement, while the figure is close to two thirds in the rural areas.

There is strong evidence that these two attitudinal sets, or orientations toward administration, are linked though not perfectly, as the above data indicates. Table 2:18 reveals that as support for governmental officials and programmes declines, and

TABLE 2:17

Summary Indices of Attitudes Toward  
Government and Administration

	Rural	Urban
<b>A. Index of attitudinal support for officials and programmes</b>		
Very supportive	20%	8%
Moderately supportive	59	57
Moderately critical	20	33
Very critical	2	3
<b>B. Index of self-confidence about own status and relationships with governmental officials</b>		
High self-confidence	22%	3%
Moderate self-confidence	57	62
Limited self-confidence	18	29
No self-confidence	3	6
<i>Number of Cases</i>	332	347

as people become more critical, there is less self-confidence in the citizen's relationships with officials. Thus, in rural areas, 44% of those who are highly supportive are also highly self-confident, but only 5% of those who are critical of officials are highly self-confident—a percentage difference of 40. And, while only 9% have low self-confidence if they are very supportive, 36% have low self-confidence if they are very supportive, 36% have low self-confidence if they are critical of governmental officials and programmes. The urban sample reveals a similar direction of relationships. This suggests that an identification of those factors which lead to more support for, and less criticism, of governmental administration and programmes may be important if one is interested in maximizing citizen attitudes of cooperation, optimism, and self-confidence in relationships to officials. It is the total pattern of citizen perspectives and their consequences for citizen action, rather than inaction and

withdrawal, which must be the focus of attention in any programme of development in a society which is participant-oriented.

TABLE 2:18

Patterns of Correlation Between Attitudes Toward  
Governmental Officials, and Attitudes of Self-Confidence  
in Citizen Relationships Toward Governmental Officials

Levels of Self-Confidence	Levels of Support for Government		
	High Support	Moderate Support	Low or No Support
<i>Rural</i>			
High self-confidence	45%	22	6
Low or no self-confidence	9	19	36
<i>Urban</i>			
High self-confidence	11	3	2
Low or no self-confidence	11	28	52

Note : Each percentage is a proportion of the support group with a particular level of self-confidence.

## CHAPTER THREE

### PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIAN ADMINISTRATION

The social distinctions and distances in Indian society lead one to expect clear patterns of social conformities and divergencies in attitudes toward governmental authority generally, and administrative behaviour specifically. Caste and religious communities persist, educational stratification is admittedly steep, age differences seemingly are significant, income differences are considerable. One is inclined to hypothesize that these social differences will be reflected in the varying patterns of public attitudes towards officials, and, indeed, may help explain them. The existence of status hierarchies and distinctive social groups suggests that some groups are on the periphery of the political system while others are more proximately involved. This assumption plus the expectation of mutual exchange and reinforcement of attitudes by relatively self-contained groups, *i.e.*, patterns of insulation as well as isolation, combine to lead one to a theory of the importance of social group status and membership for knowledge about the system, communicative involvement with it, and support for it.

To what extent this theoretical position is valid is the focus of this chapter. In it we are concerned with two simple questions: to what extent are there significant differences in public attitudes towards the bureaucracy among caste, educational, income, social categories and groups; where, in what social sectors, does one find the major pockets of public criticism, ignorance, and alienation concerning bureaucratic programmes and efforts?

That social group attitudinal variations exist in India can be seen from the data on most of the individual questions we asked in our study. For example, we asked all respondents what type of job they thought the officials in the "central

government" in Delhi were doing. As Table 3:1 reveals, the group differences are sometimes large. The high caste groups are more critical of official performance than low caste groups

TABLE 3:1

Social Group Differences in Public Evaluation of the  
Job of Central Government Officials:  
Caste and Education

	Doing a poor or fair job		Doing a good or very good job		Don't know	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
<i>Caste Groups</i>						
High caste	21%	49	59	37	21	15
Middle	24	—	48	—	27	—
Low	15	38	62	45	21	16
<i>Education groups</i>						
Illiterate	22	30	47	43	29	27
Primary	15	47	62	28	23	25
Middle	19	48	70	34	11	18
Highest	23	56	73	41	4	3

Note: Each percentage is a proportion of the social category giving a particular response.

in both urban and rural areas. But more significant probably is the much greater criticism of government in urban caste groups. There is more than a 20 percentage point differential for the same caste level—thus, only 21% of rural *high* caste members are "critical" but 49% urban high caste members are critical (among the *low* caste members the comparable figures are 15% rural, 38% urban).

Among educational groups the same general picture emerges, although rural persons do not vary greatly by educational level. The rural and urban illiterates and those with a little education are much less able to evaluate the job being done by governmental officials than are those with more than a

primary school education. But generally only one fifth of rural groups are overtly "critical" of official performance despite educational level. In the urban sample, however, the criticism is greater and it varies much more by educational level. Thus, while 30% of urban illiterates are critical of government, over 50% of those who have a good education are critical. This suggests both more rural social homogeneity or conformity in attitude distributions, as well as more general support for government in rural areas.

The lowest income groups, again, are the least critical of the government in both urban and rural areas. Among the higher income groups, however, as Table 3.2 reveals, there is much more criticism in the urban sample. Among those in the highest income bracket in the city, 60% tend to have low evaluations of governmental officials. Our breakdown by age groups

TABLE 3:2

Social Group Differences in Public Evaluations of the Job of  
Central Government Officials : Income and Age Groups

	Doing a poor or fair job		Doing a good or very good job		Don't know	
	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural	Urban
<i>Income Groups*</i>						
Under 50 Rs.	20%	16	50	62	29	23
51—100	21	40	55	35	22	24
101—200	15	43	63	39	22	18
201—300	19	47	57	43	24	10
over 300	30	60	61	33	9	7
<i>Age Groups</i>						
Below 25	20	45	55	36	23	18
26—35	19	49	60	35	18	17
36—45	22	43	57	36	20	21
46—55	22	42	57	46	19	12
Above 55	16	49	47	37	38	15

\*Based on Monthly family Income.

indicates a similar anti-official pattern of attitudes in the city, although there is no significant difference by age within the urban and rural samples separately.

Four types of findings are suggested from such data: (1) lower status groups (in urban areas particularly) are inclined to be more supportive and less critical than are the high status groups; (2) lower status groups are more in doubt as to their attitudes, or more reluctant to make an evaluation of official performance; (3) rural groups are more homogeneous and like-minded in their attitude patterns than are urban respondents; (4) rural support in all social groups is higher, and usually much higher, than in the same groups in urban areas.

The same general patterns emerge if we look at responses to the question concerning the job that local officials in the village or in Delhi Corporation are doing (Table 3:3). The

TABLE 3:3

Social Group Differences in Evaluation of Job of *Local*  
Officials (city, village)

	Percentage Saying "Poor" or "Fair"	
	Rural	Urban
<i>Caste Groups</i>		
Low	22%	60
Middle	30	—
High	24	62
<i>Income Groups</i>		
Under 50 Rupees	23	31
51—100	35	52
101—200	16	59
201—300	29	52
Above 300	30	72
<i>Education Groups</i>		
Illiterate	28	48
Primary	24	52
Middle	16	55
High and Above	35	70

criticism of Delhi City government officials was relatively very high. But again, except for the caste group differentials, low status groups were less critical. In the villages we find only a minority who evaluate official performance negatively, with no consistent variation by social categories. In Delhi City from 30 to 70% have negative impressions, depending on the social group concerned.

Another type of question was designed to determine citizen attitudes toward the worth of governmental activity in relation to the burden of taxation. Almost half, 48%, of our urban sample felt that taxes were too high, while 39% of the rural sample felt that way. Again, when we look at the percentages of anti-taxation sentiment by social groups we find no discernible pattern among rural groups, with the variations among rural groups being small (Table 3:4). In Delhi City, however,

TABLE 3:4  
Social Group Differences in the Citizen Attitudes Toward  
Taxation

(Percentage who say they are paying more taxes than they  
should in terms of the services rendered by government)

	Rural	Urban
<i>Caste Groups</i>		
Low	41%	35
Middle	39	—
High	36	52
<i>Income Groups</i>		
Under 50 Rupees	31	42
51—100	41	34
101—200	35	51
201—300	35	59
Above 300	39	53
<i>Education Groups</i>		
Illiterates	40	31
Primary	39	41
Middle	36	56
High and Above	36	61

there is a pattern. The high status groups are much more antagonistic than low status groups. Thus among urban illiterates 31% feel taxes are too high, while 61% of those with the most advanced education are critical. There is corroboration in these data again, therefore, for the finding that social status is related to perceptions and attitudes toward government in urban Delhi.

The extent of citizen knowledge about governmental activities shows striking contrasts between the urban and rural populations (Table 3:5). As an example of the state of "instrumental knowledge" we used a series of questions about the type of health services available and their cost to the citizen. The data reveal that whereas only 21% of our rural sample was ignorant of the nature of these services, 65% of our urban sample was uninformed. This ignorance pervaded all urban social groups.

TABLE 3:5  
Differential Levels of Knowledge About Health Services  
(% who have no knowledge of Health Services)

	Rural	Urban
<i>Income groups</i>		
Under 50 Rupees	25	69
51—100	21	68
101—200	16	65
201—300	19	60
Above 300	4	65
<i>Educational Groups</i>		
Illiterate	28	67
Primary	15	70
Middle	8	70
High and Above	4	59
<i>Caste Groups</i>		
Low	19	61
Middle	23	—
High	19	65

High status groups in the city were not significantly better informed. In rural Delhi State all social groups were much more knowledgeable, with some evidence that those with advanced education and higher incomes were the best informed. Thus 28% of the rural illiterates were uninformed about these health services while only 4% of those with a high, intermediate, or advanced education were uninformed. The most significant fact, however, is the low level of "instrumental" knowledge in the city, coupled with our previous findings of a relatively greater criticism of governmental activities and officials in the urban population. From our data the rural population seems better informed on this particular question, more homogeneous in their attitudes toward government, less hostile, and less alienated.<sup>1</sup>

A variety of questions were used in our study to determine the extent of self-confidence or efficacy people have in dealing with administrative officials. For example, we asked them whether they could do anything if the officials of a particular agency were not performing their jobs satisfactorily. The pattern of responses by social groupings for one type of officials, the health officials, is given in Table 3:6. The differences in self-confidence between the urban and rural population are striking again. For every one of these social categories the total proportion who either do not know whether they can take action against officials, or do not know what channels to use, is higher in Delhi City than in Delhi villages. For illiterates it is 71% in the villages, 84% in the city; for low caste members it is 60% in the villages; 88% in the city; for those with the lowest incomes it is 54% in the villages, 84% in the city. In comparison with these low status groups, there is more confidence in approaching officials among high status groups. The differential is not great among caste groups. But only 31% of those with considerable education in rural areas feel inadequate—a 40 percentage point differential. In urban Delhi the difference between high and low status groups exists also but is much smaller.

From these data it seems then that the majority of residents of both urban and rural areas have no conception at all of

<sup>1</sup> The probability exists, of course, that services such as these were indeed more available to rural citizens, and perceived as more vital to them.

TABLE 3:6  
 Social Group Differences in Sense of  
 Efficacy of Citizens in Relation to Administrators  
 (If Health Officials are not performing their jobs properly is there anything  
 you can do? What can you do?)

		RURAL			URBAN		
		Can do Nothing	Don't know Channels	Total— Low Sense of Efficacy	Can do Nothing	Don't know Channels	Total— Low Sense of Efficacy
<i>Caste Groups</i>	30%	30	60	46	42	46	88
	Low	35	24	59	—	—	—
	Middle	35	22	57	38	37	75
<i>Education Groups</i>	Illiterates	42	29	71	38	46	84
	Primary	33	23	56	46	40	86
	Middle	3	24	27	44	44	88
<i>Income Groups</i>	High and Above	12	19	31	35	33	68
	Under 50 rupees	27	54	38	46	46	84
	51—100 rupees	22	62	45	44	44	89
	101—200 rupees	30	60	41	43	43	84
	201—300 rupees	38	57	38	31	31	69
	Over 300 rupees	22	39	31	31	31	66

how to take action against ineffective or delinquent officials, and that this sense of inadequacy may be related to social status. There is much less pessimism or ignorance (or both) in the rural population, which may be linked in turn to the generally higher level of administrative support, greater knowledge of administrative officials and programmes, and closer contact with the bureaucracy in rural areas.

We developed two indices (of support for administrative officials and programmes, and of citizen self-confidence in relation to administration), which were described in Chapter two. We found urban respondents less supportive (36% at the lowest score levels, compared to 21% for rural respondents), as well as having less self-confidence (35% at the lowest score

TABLE 3:7

The Relationship of Caste and Education to Public  
Levels of Support and Self-Confidence

	High Caste		Low Caste	
	Some Education	Illiter- ates	Some Education	Illiter- ates
<i>Index of Support for Administration</i>				
Percentage at the lowest levels of support (score 0-3)				
Rural	24%	24	9	16
Urban	32	43	53	29
<i>Index of Self- Confidence</i>				
Percent at the lowest levels of self-confidence (score 0-2)				
Rural	15	38	9	20
Urban	27	59	28	35

levels, compared to 21% of the rural sample). If we now look at the score by these indices for caste and educational groups we can see the differential importance of social factors (Table 3:7). On the support index our findings suggest that caste and education are relevant in both urban and rural areas. It is interesting that the lowest level of criticism is found in rural areas among low caste members with some education; in urban Delhi the lowest level of criticism is found among illiterates who are low caste. The high caste illiterates, however, are much more critical in the city. Among all groups the range in support is considerable—from 9% to 16% of rural low caste members are critical, but from 30% to 50% of the urban low caste and high caste members are critical. The urban environment seems a very consistent factor, perhaps more important than either caste or educational status. The government has the greatest support in the villages, and particularly among the low caste members in the villages.

On the self-confidence index (based on several items designed to identify the extent to which the citizen feels he can act effectively in the political-administrative system and has an important role in that system) the rural population again has a much better set of scores for caste and educational groups. The urban high-caste illiterates are the least self-confident (59% feeling alienated), while the rural low-caste educated are the most confident (9% feeling alienated).

Both caste status and educational status seem important in rural areas—it is high caste plus illiteracy which is related to low self-confidence. In urban Delhi illiteracy seems to be the chief factor, although again high caste illiterates have the largest proportion of alienated among illiterates. This convergence of high caste status and illiteracy seems then to be linked to lack of political *self-confidence*, while these factors are much less clearly relevant to the variations in political *support*.

#### *The Influence of Village Environment*

Having discovered and demonstrated that there is more support for administrative officials and programmes in rural areas, as well as more optimism in the role of the citizen in the system, the question can now be raised whether the type of village the citizen lives in is related to these supportive and self-confident

perspectives. We did our interviewing in this study in eight villages, selected at random but in such a manner that they included small villages (under 1,000 population), medium-sized (population 1,000 to 2,000) and large villages (from 2,000 to 5,000 population). They were also selected to include villages which could be objectively described<sup>2</sup> as traditional and isolated, as well as more modernized and in closer proximity to Delhi. This permitted us to analyze our data by village type, differentiating between the two factors of size and modernization status.

Our data reveal that it is not the small or most "traditional" villages, on the basis of our index, which are the least supportive and most out of touch with the administrative system (Table 3:8). Rather, one finds two different patterns, one for small and one for large villages. The greatest support and political self-confidence is actually found in the smallest villages which are most "modernized". Among small villages the support of government ranges from 38% to 13% being highest in the small village which was most "modernized". The same was true for self-confidence, dropping from 46% to 21%. In the larger villages the amount of criticism of the government, and pessimism about the individual's role, tends to be higher than in the small villages, and increases as the village becomes more modernized. Thus, two of our larger villages which scored high on our modernization index revealed the greatest criticism or lack of support of the government—at the 46% level of criticism—and the lowest percentage of self-confidence—less than 5%. But a caution must be injected into the analysis, because our most "modernized" large village had relatively high levels of support and self-confidence, not as high as the most modernized *small* village, but higher than was the norm for larger villages.

What is suggested here is that modernization tendencies in small villages reduce governmental criticism and personal pessimism about government drastically. As larger villages go through the transitional-modernizing process, however, the contacts of citizens with government become more negative, and criticism increases. In the most modernized village, however, one in which a great deal of investment of resources and personnel by the government takes place, citizens' perceptions of government and

<sup>2</sup> As explained in the Introduction and Appendix note on methodology.

TABLE 3:8  
Village Differences in levels of Public Support and Confidence

	Small Villages			Medium and Large Villages		
	Most Modernized	Most Traditional	Least Mod- ernized	Transi- tional	Moder- nized	Most Mod- ernized
% low on administration support Index	3%	11	21	21	19	46
% low on self-confidence index	5	7	13	17	21	37
% high on administration support	38	17	13	14	26	0
% high on self-confidence	46	33	21	21	24	2
					4	28

Note : The interviews were conducted in eight villages— three small and five medium to large.

of their role in the administrative pattern of relationships change. In such large villages it is possible that there develops a sense of citizen involvement and support for governmental programmes and administrative action. In any event, in our study the greatest citizen "alienation" is not found in small villages, but in traditional, small villages *and* in larger villages where the modernization process is incomplete. It is in these latter villages that the problem of developing citizen identifications and acceptance of the system may be most critical.

### *Role of the Newspaper*

The relevance of newspaper readership for public perceptions of the bureaucracy and its programmes is a subject on which there is little information. The high percentage of illiteracy and the small percentage of the population which has developed the "daily newspaper habit", go hand-in-hand to some extent, and limit the newspaper's potential role. In our study we found that only 24% of our rural sample read a newspaper regularly, while 60% in urban Delhi claimed they were regular newspaper readers. Despite such levels of relatively low exposure, it is important to analyze to what extent such exposure is associated with differential levels of public support for government.

Generally, we find that the regular readers tend to be more supportive (Table 3:9). There is a considerable difference again between rural and urban samples. In rural areas readership seems to reduce citizen criticism of the government, and personal defeatism in dealing with officials, to a minimum. The difference is not as great, though in the same direction, in urban Delhi. It is significant that our rural respondents who *do not* read were more supportive and self-confident than our urban respondents who *do* read. Living in urban Delhi seems related to more criticism of the government and more personal alienation than in rural villages, irrespective of greater exposure to what is going on through the newspaper medium.

It is important, however, to control for newspaper readership within social groups, to see whether social group status eliminates the importance of exposure to newspapers, and, conversely, whether newspaper readership makes social distinctions unimportant in this analysis. Caste differences in newspaper readership are, of course, great. In one study we found that in

TABLE 3:9

## Newspaper Readership and Public Support for the Bureaucracy

	Rural		Urban	
	Readers	Non-readers	Readers	Non-readers
Low Level of Support for Governmental Programmes and Leaders	12%	26	33	38
Low Level of Self- Confidence in Relationship to the Bureaucracy	11	23	30	40
<i>Number of Cases</i>	76	237	199	130

the villages only 13% of the low caste respondents read the newspaper, while 43% of the high caste members did. In urban Delhi 18% of the low caste members were regular readers, compared to 71% of the high caste members. In Table 3:10 we have presented the data for caste groups and newspaper readership, using our indices of political support and self-confidence.

Both caste status and newspaper readership seem to be relevant factors explaining some of the differences in citizen attitudes. But the findings are somewhat peculiar, and not consistent. In rural areas it is clear that low caste status is still important—for example, among the rural “Non readers” the low caste members have the lowest criticism scores (13% low caste, 31% and 35% high and middle caste). Readership is a discriminating factor in the rural middle and upper caste groups; it is less relevant in the low castes, although among rural low caste members who read the newspaper, none were low in self-confidence. (One must remember, of course, that only 13% of our rural low caste sample do regularly read a newspaper !)

In urban Delhi the role of caste and newspaper readership is strange, and it is difficult to see any consistent meaning in the data. As was to be expected there is much more criticism and

TABLE 3:10

## The Importance of Caste and Newspaper Readership in Explaining Citizen Perspectives Toward Administrators

	High Caste		Middle Caste		Low Caste	
	Non- Readers		Non- Readers		Non- Readers	
	Readers	Readers	Readers	Readers	Readers	Readers
<b>Low Level of Support</b>						
—Rural	15%	31	8	35	14	13
—Urban	34	33	—	—	54	34
<b>Low Level of Self-Confidence</b>						
—Rural	8	36	17	21	0	20
—Urban	30	38	—	—	30	36

Note: Each percentage is a proportion of each readership group who ranked low on each index.

less support in all urban subgroups. The relevance of caste status differences in urban Delhi seems to be "washed out" when we divide caste groups into those who read a newspaper and those who do not. The one exception is the 54% of the urban low caste "readers" who are very critical of the government (coinciding with the educated low caste members in Table 3:7). Readership makes some difference in self-confidence scores in urban Delhi; but the factor of illiteracy, as pointed out previously, is much more important probably than newspaper readership. In short, our data suggest again that in rural Delhi newspaper readership is an important variable, except for low caste members' political support levels, which are high despite readership. Our data suggest also in urban Delhi that readership may have some relevance but that reading a newspaper does not necessarily lead to greater support of the government. In urban Delhi newspaper readership may be relatively unimportant in the mobilization of public support and in the generation

of political-administrative self-confidence in the citizen's relationship to the bureaucracy. His educational status may be more important, although even here the pattern is not completely consistent in urban Delhi.

*The Relevance of Party Contact*

An interesting query which should be posed for a developing society with democratic political group structures is: To what extent is contact with party organisation and leadership associated with support for administrative programmes and officials? In India the "party struggle" has a long history even though well developed party structures have come into existence only in the past two decades. Today there are many parties besides the dominant Congress party. In the Delhi area one finds the Jana Sangh as a primary opposition party, as well as the Swatantra, Socialist, and Communist parties, with varying degrees of organizational articulation and strength. The question is to what extent is exposure to, or contact with, these party leaders functional for the generation of attitudes supportive of administrative behaviour?

We asked the citizens in our sample whether they felt

TABLE 3:11

Citizen Perceptions and Contacts with Party Leaders in the Context of Personal Assistance on Administrative Problems

	Urban	Rural
A. Would Party Leaders be Helpful ?		
Yes	19%	40
No	35	34
Don't know	45	22
B. Have you Sought the Help of Party Leaders ?		
Yes	16	18
No	76	77
Don't know	8	4

party leaders would be helpful in problems requiring governmental action, as well as whether they had ever sought the help of party leaders. The distributions are shown in Table 3:11. The data suggest a considerably higher confidence in party leaders in rural Delhi than in the city—40% compared to 19% feeling party leaders would be helpful. A large proportion of urban respondents (45%) were uncertain on this matter. Not quite one fifth of both urban and rural samples had gone to party leaders for assistance. This is probably a higher proportion than in "developed" societies such as the U.S. in recent years.<sup>3</sup> It suggests the potential role which the party might play in mobilizing citizen support, or in communicating public demands, in India.

The social characteristics of those who had sought the help of party leaders are interesting. The middle and upper income groups in rural areas were more likely to go to the party leaders than the lower income groups. The illiterates in both urban and rural Delhi did not seek out the party for help to the extent that those with a middle and high school education did. Among the castes, the Harijans and lower caste members in urban Delhi were more actively in contact with party leaders, while it was the Jats and other middle caste and high caste members who were more likely to approach party leaders in the rural areas. Generally, with the exception of the urban Harijans, those with lower social status do not approach party leaders as much, due either to their lack of knowledge of these leaders, a feeling that they are not accessible, or feelings that such action would be improper or not efficacious.

Does party contact seem related to increased or decreased support for the administration and to feelings of self-confidence in the citizen's perceived role in relationship to the administrator? If we identify those who have gone for help to party leaders and look at the level of their support and self-confidence (as measured by our two indices) we find virtually no relationship in rural areas and a slight inverse relationship in urban Delhi (Table 3:12). About 20% of our rural respondents were highly supportive irrespective of their experiences in

<sup>3</sup> In our 1956 study in the Detroit area less than 1% of the adults in the sample said they had gone to party leaders for action on personal or governmental problems.

TABLE 3:12

## Relationship of Personal Experience with Party Leaders to Administration Support Levels and Personal Self-Confidence

	Rural		Urban	
	Had an Experience	No Experience	Had an Experience	No Experience
<b>Levels of Administration Support</b>				
High	20%	20	0	9
Moderate	51	59	65	55
Low	29	18	29	34
No Support	0	3	6	2
<b>Levels of Personal Self-Confidence</b>				
High	24%	22	0	4
Moderate	62	59	63	62
Low	14	19	35	27
No self-Confidence	0	3	2	7
<i>Number of Cases</i>	39	270	54	293

contacting party leaders. Similarly from 22% to 24% had self-confident perspectives whether or not they had contacted party leaders. For our urban sample one can observe that, first, they had lower levels of support and self-confidence than rural citizens, and, second, that they were less likely to be highly supportive if they had had contacts with party leaders. The percentage differences are small and exist only at the high support levels. Nevertheless, the finding may be significant for urban residents. Contact with urban party leaders certainly does not seem functional to the mobilization of public support or feelings of confidence and optimism in dealing with administrative officials.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> We hasten to add that this is only a preliminary, and therefore tentative, exploration of this crucial matter. We are in the process of analyzing the functional consequences of party activity and leadership in a separate study.

We tested these findings by using other indications of contact with party leaders, particularly whether the respondent knew party leaders "personally". An "index of personalized party contact" was calculated for each respondent based on three responses in which he might have manifested personal contact with or personal knowledge of party leaders. The same patterns emerged (Table 3:13). The urban-rural differentials are again striking at the high score levels. There is virtually no urban high support despite party contacts, while over 20% of rural respondents are supportive and self-confident. Further, urban respondents with the least party contacts are more highly supportive—

TABLE 3:13

Relationship of Personal Party Contact and the Indices of Political Support and Personal Self-Confidence

Indices	Party Contact Scores:					
	Rural			Urban		
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
Political Support						
High	25%	18	19	0	0	11
Moderate	50	55	61	56	70	53
Low	25	25	17	40	26	34
No support	0	2	3	4	4	2
Political Self-Confidence						
High	23	22	22	2	2	4
Moderate	59	53	59	55	70	62
Low	18	22	16	41	28	25
No confidence	0	3	3	2	0	9
Number of Cases	55	63	211	45	57	244

11% of those with "low" party contact are highly supportive while none of those in urban Delhi with "high" or "medium" contact are highly supportive. It seems, therefore, that on the basis of our data party contact may be relatively unimportant

for the mobilization of citizen administrative support and self-confidence.

A final point of interest is the relationship of party affiliation to citizen attitudes towards administration. It is significant that we found this to have no explanatory power in our study. Among our rural respondents we found that 20% of Congress followers were highly supportive; but 20% of those who voted for opposition parties were also highly supportive. At the other extreme, 22% of the Congress followers were highly critical and non-supportive, while 20% of those voting for opposition parties were not supportive. The same basic percentages obtained on our self-confidence index, with no discernible difference for Congress and opposition followers. From this very preliminary analysis, then, it appears that identification with the Congress party does not seem to be related to citizen attitudes towards the administrative system. Congress followers are no more supportive of, nor alienated from, the bureaucracy than those who identify with other parties.

### *Conclusions*

This exploration of the social basis of public attitudes towards the Indian bureaucracy suggests several important findings. The rural public in our study was consistently more supportive than the urban public, less alienated, more confident about how to act in relationship to officials, possessed of more "instrumental knowledge" about the administrative process. However, social status differentials exist in both urban and rural areas. High status groups tended to be more critical of government, more skeptical of the worthwhileness of government, and to some extent more self-confident about their relationships with bureaucrats. Those with the most education tended to score highest on our self-confidence index in both urban and rural samples. This was not true for the "administration support index", however. The low caste illiterates in rural areas had the least criticism of government officials and programmes.

Within the rural sample we found that the greatest support for the bureaucracy was located in the rather small village which is not completely isolated or "traditional", and in those larger villages scoring very high on our "modernization index". However, even our most "traditional" small villages had better

"support and self-confidence" scores than larger villages which appeared to be in a "transitional" stage of change. The most modernized, large village had high "support" and "self-confidence" scores. Both village size and developmental status seem, therefore, to be related to attitudes toward governmental administration.

Newspaper readership is clearly related to public attitudes supportive of public administration, in rural areas, particularly in middle and upper caste groups. Among low caste members the relationship is dubious. In the urban areas, readership is slightly associated with self-confidence perspectives, but not with administration support perspectives.

The greatest pockets of actual, or potential, discontent or alienation seem to be in certain social categories of the urban populace and among residents in the large villages, which are undergoing a modernization process. In urban Delhi both the high caste illiterates, and the low caste members with some education, are critical of governmental programmes and performance. The high caste illiterates in the urban population may be a particularly significant factor, since three fifths of them have defeatist and negative perspectives about their roles in relationship to the new bureaucracy. This group of high caste illiterates, constituting over 10% of our urban sample, represents considerable "frustration potential" in the Indian society. It is this category, plus the residents of middle sized and large villages moving from a "traditional" to a "modernizing" status which appears only *minimally* committed to, identified with, knowledgeable about, and supportive of the administrative process in modern India.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### HOSTILITY TOWARDS ADMINISTRATION

In the preceding chapters we have dealt primarily with the ordinary Indian citizen's cognitive and perceptual orientations towards the Indian bureaucracy as a system or subsystem. We have been concerned with his answers to questions probing his evaluations of the job the governmental officials are doing, whether he feels governmental programmes and services are worthwhile, the extent to which he knows and accepts the purposes of these programmes, his perceptions of official corruption, and what he would do if he had a problem to take up with governmental officials. These questions elicit *general* reactions or evaluations by the public. We have utilized the responses as information concerning the levels of support or lack of support, of citizen confidence or lack of confidence, regarding the administrative system. Throughout this analysis, despite relatively high levels of public support in response to certain questions, there has been considerable evidence also of personal hostility towards administration. It is obvious that citizens may be supportive of governmental programmes and actions generally, while also being personally hostile to officials, as the result of personal experiences with them or in a stereotypic sense. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze specifically the extent and nature of this hostility, some of its probable sources, and its relationship to the levels of public support.

A variety of questions used in our study can be used to suggest the range of personal antagonism towards administrators (Table 4:1). The vast majority of respondents reveal some degree of hostility towards the police, when asked about police treatment if they "got involved in some trouble with the police". Almost 90% of our rural sample and 67% of the urban sample felt they would be mistreated. This is the extreme incidence of hostility. No doubt other questions concerning the

behaviour of policemen produced hostile reactions from a much smaller proportion of the public. Thus, less than 50% feel the police are discourteous, only six per cent (urban) and nine per cent (rural) feel that the police would not be helpful in time of personal need, and only about 10% (of each sample population) say they would not go to the police for help. There are different kinds of questions, then, which reveal hostility to the police. And only a small minority are consistently critical and bitter in their responses.

The same observation is true when we look at the components and extent of hostility to other types of officials. A sizable minority are antagonistic towards health officials—less than a third at the most in rural Delhi, slightly higher, at least on certain questions, in urban Delhi. Postal officials' behaviour evokes very little hostility, while the behaviour of the inspectors on the DTU buses evokes considerable antagonism. Although some people are consistently hostile towards one agency, there is no doubt a latent, cumulative pattern of hostility towards administrative officials which could interfere with the development process in India.

TABLE 4:1  
Evidence of Personal Hostility Toward Administrators

Types of Hostility Responses	Rural	Urban
Police would mistreat citizens	89%	67%
Police are rude or discourteous	28	43
Health officials favour the wealthy, upperclasses, or politicians	30	40
Health officials are rude or discourteous	20	24
Has had specific unsatisfactory contacts with postal officials	6	6
Critical of Delhi Transport Undertaking (Urban only)	—	47

We constructed an "Index of Personal Hostility to Administrators" based on responses to twelve questions used in

our study, probing the personal contacts and experiences of citizens with different types of officials. Each hostile response was scored separately, with a maximum score possible of 12. The distributions for our respondents are found in Table 4:2. From this one can see that the frequency of hostility responses is much greater in the urban area. Roughly, for every three urban respondents who reveal personal antagonism there are two rural respondents. From 30% to 45% of urban respondents indicate some repetition of hostility in their responses, compared to 20% to 30% of rural adults who are "chronic complainers". Only 16% of our urban adults manifest no hostility at all, while 35% of our rural adults do not seem to be hostile. A minority of one-fifth seem to have personal antagonism only against one agency or one type of officials included in our survey.<sup>1</sup>

For these citizens who do reveal hostile attitudes toward administrators a majority are hostile towards more than one agency. The "hostiles" who complain only against one agency are divided as follows:

Hostile only Towards:

	Police Officials	Health Officials	DTU Officials	Postal Officials
Urban	10%	10	7	.4
Rural	16	20	—	.4

Thus, certain officials are the only targets of hostility for certain segments of the population, notably police and health officials.<sup>2</sup> But over 50% of the rural "hostiles" and over 70% of the urban "hostiles" do not concentrate their antagonism.

<sup>1</sup> Actually, the hostility level would be higher for both samples if we had included the responses to the question concerning mistreating and physical beating by the police. Since this type of stereotypic hostility included 89% of the rural and 67% of the urban populations, and was at a much higher level than other hostilities, and therefore probably not discriminating as a test of hostility, we excluded it from our index.

<sup>2</sup> There were no respondents who were hostile only against Community Development officials.

TABLE 4:2

## Distributions of Citizens on an Index of Personal Hostility to Administrators

Scores	Index I (Based on 12 items)		Index II* (Based on 11 Common Items for both samples)	
	Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
Highest= 5 plus	18%	9%	13%	8%
4	12	10	9	8
3	15	10	14	12
2	21	13	18	13
1	19	22	25	23
Lowest= 0	16	35	22	37

\*The responses to Panchayati Raj and the Delhi Transport Undertaking are eliminated from this index since they were relevant in either the urban or rural areas, but not in both.

They are inclined to be hostile towards more than one category of officials, and usually this includes officials at more than one level of governmental authority.

Analysis of the socio-economic correlates of hostility reveals that the phenomenon pervades all levels of the social stratification hierarchy in India (Table 4.3). But we found less hostility among low status groups than in the upper social strata, particularly in the rural areas. Thus, if one looks at those with no evidence of hostility towards administrators, one finds a consistently larger proportion of those in the lowest social stratum with low hostility. For example, 30% of the urban illiterates have a zero score, while only 5% of those with most education have zero scores. (The differentials are in the same direction, but smaller for the various rural subgroups.) Conversely, if one

TABLE 4:3

## Social Status and Hostility Towards Administrators

	Social Factors	Index of Hostility Score:						N*
		5+	4	3 and 2	1	0		
A. Caste								
—Low (Urban)		18%	10	27	20	24		49
(Rural)		4	9	23	25	39		108
—High	(U)	19	12	37	18	13		206
	(R)	10	11	22	24	33		63
B. Education								
—Illiterates	(U)	10	4	33	24	30		84
	(R)	8	11	25	24	33		207
—Much Education	(U)	27	17	36	15	5		125
	(R)	12	12	12	35	31		26
C. Income								
—Lowest	(U)	7	7	47	20	20		15
	(R)	15	0	19	17	48		52
—High	(U)	23	15	39	15	8		124
	(R)	9	20	14	14	43		44

\*N=number of cases

looks at those with relatively high hostility score (five or more) one finds the high status groups more hostile. For example, 23% of the urban high income groups reveal "chronic" hostility, while only 7% of the lowest income groups are very hostile.

The greatest hostility is found, in both the city and the villages, among those with considerable education.

The suggestion implicit in these findings is that improvement in social status is accompanied by increased hostility toward the administrative system, that there is a greater tendency to criticize public authority as a person moves from his traditional and depressed social status towards more enlightenment, higher income, and more exposure to "modernization" influences. Although it is difficult with our data to test here

the "trend hypothesis of movement", it is possible, and perhaps instructive, to test the proposition that the more traditional a person's orientation towards the system is, the more inclined he is to accept authority and to mute his personal antagonism towards administrative officials.

We asked each respondent to react to two statements which may tap his "traditional" or "modernizing" attitudinal orientations. These were :

Item 1 : "If something grows up over a long time there is bound to be much wisdom in it."

Item 2 : "The way the government runs things today is better than the way things were run in the past."

Although "traditionalism" is a complex set of perspectives and attitudes, agreement or disagreement with these statements suggests the direction of a person's thinking—whether he has a "retrospective" or "prospective" oriented cast of thought, whether he prefers the political past to the political present. By combining these two measures we can begin to classify citizens in a country like India. Actually our respondents were very discriminating in their responses to these statements: 78% of the rural sample (54% of the urban) agreed with the first statement, but only 15% of the rural sample (29% of the urban) disagreed with the second statement. Thus, although there is a latent retrospective "traditionalism" in the sense of respect for the past, only a minority translated this into a preference for government officials and programmes of the past.

Using these two measures and relating them to patterns of citizen hostility towards administrators, interesting findings emerge (Table 4:4). The hypothesis seems confirmed that the more traditional one's orientations in a developing society the greater one's acceptance of authority, and, thus, the less one's hostility towards authority figures such as administrators. Those with nostalgia for the past (in response to item 1) revealed much lower hostility—70% of our "traditional" rural respondents were at the low end of our hostility scale, while 60% of our "traditional" urban respondents revealed low hostility towards administrators.

The second test (using item 2 also) suggests that such

TABLE 4:4

Citizen Hostility Towards Administrators in Relation to  
Latent Traditionalism

(Generalized Preference for the Wisdom of the Past)

If something grows up over a long time, there is bound to be much wisdom in it.		Hostility Scores:						
		High	4	3	2	1	Low	N*
		5+	—	—	—	—	0	—
Agree	(Rural)	10%	10	8	13	22	37	260
	(Urban)	15	10	17	22	19	17	187
Disagree	(Rural)	10	15	20	12	17	26	41
	(Urban)	35	14	14	20	14	2	84

\*N=number of cases

findings are not supportable.<sup>3</sup> For, when we look at the "hard-core" traditionalists (those who not only are generally nostalgic but also specifically prefer the government of the past), we find much more hostility towards administrators (Table 4:5). Almost 50% of the "hard-core" and "confirmed" traditionalists score high on our hostility index, while less than 20% of our "modernizing" traditionalists do so. It seems from these data that those Indian citizens who rigidly adhere to nostalgia for the past are in a minority, but this rigid traditionalism is reflected in considerable antipathy to present day administrative officials. From 50% to 65% are revealing "modernized" attitudes towards public authority, perhaps reluctantly recognizing that the administrative process today is superior to the past. Along with such modernizing attitudes comes less bitterness and antagonism for governmental officials. Admittedly this is only one test of the "traditional-modern" hypothesis as reflected in citizen attitudes towards government. As such it is highly suggestive.

<sup>3</sup> We are here making a distinction between "modernizing traditionalists" and "hard-core traditionalists". The former are conceptualized as having a nostalgia for the past but accepting the government of the present. The latter not only have a nostalgia for the past but specifically prefer the government of the past.

TABLE 4:5

A Typology of Traditionalism-Modernism in Relation to  
Citizen Hostility Towards Administration\*

Group	Hostility Scores :							
	Rural Sample			Urban Sample			N**	N**
	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low		
I. "Hard Core"								
Traditionalists	48%	30	22	33	46%	44	10	39
II. Modernizing								
Traditionalists	14	19	67	213	20	38	42	143
III. Confused								
Traditionalists	45	21	34	29	51	29	20	69
IV. Consistent								
Modernists	22	39	39	23	29	45	26	31

\*Each group was classified on the basis of the following responses to the two statements used :

Group	Item 1	Item 2
I	Agree	Disagree
II	Agree	Agree
III	Disagree	Disagree
	No Opinion	Disagree
	Agree	No Opinion
IV	Disagree	Agree

\*\*N=number of cases

Are hostility feelings a consequence of contact with officials or does this phenomenon appear to be a stereotype, unrelated to bureaucratic contact? Our data suggest that *some* contact seems to be definitely a factor in explaining hostility. (Table 4:6). Thus, we find that in rural Delhi those with no bureaucratic contact are much less likely to be hostile towards administrators.<sup>4</sup> Only 8% are very hostile compared to about 20% of those who have come into frequent contact with

<sup>4</sup> The technique employed for scoring each respondent in terms of "contact" with administrators is explained in detail in Chapter VI.

TABLE 4 : 6

The Consequence of Bureaucratic Contact  
for Citizen Hostility Towards Administrators

Bureaucratic Contact Score:	Hostility score :							
	Rural			Urban				
	High	Medium	Low	N*	High	Medium	Low	N*
Very High (Score 7+)	18%	26	56	66	37%	39	24	132
High (Score 5-6)	19	24	57	63	35	38	27	85
Medium (Score 3-4)	22	21	56	95	25	31	44	75
Low (Score 1-2)	22	26	52	86	9	26	65	55**
Zero (no contact)	8	22	70	27	—	—	—	***

\*N=number of cases

\*\*Includes six cases with "zero" contact scores

\*\*\*Too few cases for analysis

administrators. In urban Delhi, where the proportion who have had contact is higher, we again find that those with no (or little) contact are less likely to be very hostile—9% compared to 25%, and 37% with a high frequency of contact.

This is a paradoxical finding for Indian government from a "practical" standpoint. For it suggests that expansion of the bureaucracy and the policy of involving citizens with developmental programmes through more contact with officials also has its risks. It may produce hostility and alienation from the administrative subsystem which could be dysfunctional to integrative goals.

To assess further the conditions under which bureaucratic contact was functionally related to hostility we attempted to determine the relevance of a variety of factors. For those individuals with a high frequency of contact, we looked at the social characteristics of those who were hostile and not hostile, and found that such characteristics were not significantly different.

Illiteracy, for example, was not a discriminating factor. Two other factors did seem related however: whether the respondent had had a personal experience with the police, and whether the respondent had a personal acquaintance with administrators. We found the following differences in rural Delhi:

<i>Among those with a high bureaucratic contact score:</i>	<i>Had Police Contact</i>	<i>Had Considerable “Personalized Contact” with Officials</i>	<i>N*</i>
Those very hostile	59%	93%	29
Those not hostile	37	63	27

\*N=number of cases

Thus, police contact seems related to hostility to administrators, as does the personalized nature of bureaucratic contact. In our urban sample we found the same type of differences. This suggests, *first*, that bureaucratic contact does not necessarily lead to hostility—the nature and character of the contact is important. *Second*, there is a certain amount of stereotypic hostility to administrators, since 30% or more of our respondents with little or no contact with administrators are hostile. Contact with administrators of certain types does seem conducive to hostility reactions. But “contact” by itself does not lead to hostility necessarily. It is significant that 35% of our rural sample had high frequency of contact with administrators, and 55% of these had little or no hostility. The corresponding urban percentages were 60% and 25%.

The final question in this analysis is: What are the consequences of personal hostility for public support and self-confidence in relation to the administrative system? Our measures of “support” reflect the individual’s cognition and evaluation of administrative policies, programmes, and the job performance of officials. Similarly, our measures of “self-confidence” reflect the individual’s assessment of his own competence and efficacy in the system. The question now is whether personal “hostility” (as a separate measure) is related, as might be expected, to lower “support” and less “self-confidence”.

As can be seen from Table 4: 7 there is some relationship between intensity or amount of hostility and degree of “support”, in both urban and rural populations. As personal hostility increases, support declines, indicating that these two

responses, the one effective and other cognitive are functionally related. But it is only at the highest hostility levels that support for the administrative system declines to a significant, or dangerous, point. Two thirds of those with high hostility scores

TABLE 4:7

The Consequence of Personal Hostility for Public  
Support to Administrative Programmes and Officials

Personal Hostility Index	Administrative Support Scores:											
	High 7+		Moderate 4-6			Low 1-3			Zero		N*	
	R**	U***	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U
High (5+)	3%	0	29	31	65	64	3	5	31	61		
Moderate	5	6	67	63	27	27	1	3	112	164		
Low	20	15	61	58	14	26	5	0	74	65		
Zero	37	12	57	58	5	26	1	4	118	57		

\*N=number of cases

\*\*R=Rural

\*\*\*U=Urban

are not supportive of administrative programmes and officials; those at the three lower levels of hostility have percentages of 74% to 94% who are either very supportive or moderately supportive of the system. Thus, though hostility inhibits support, since less than 20% are very hostile in both urban and rural areas, the magnitude of the problem is not alarming. Further, it is significant for Indian society that 29% to 31% of those who have a high hostility score are still moderately supportive of the system.

Personal hostility also seems to be somewhat related to individual feelings concerning one's role in the system (Table 4:8). In rural areas particularly, much more than in urban Delhi, high self-confidence and feelings of efficacy about participation are linked to relatively low levels of personal hostility against administrators. Thus, while only 3% of the very hostile rural respondents were very self-confident, 36% of the non-hostile rural respondents were very self-confident. This relationship

TABLE 4:8

The Consequences of Personal Hostility for Self-Confidence  
 Concerning the Role of the Individual in the System

Personal Hostility Index	Self-Confidence Scores :										N*	
	High	Moderate		Low		Zero		R		U		
	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U
High (5+)	3%	2	55	54	42	42	0	2	31	61		
Moderate	15	3	63	68	20	25	2	4	111	164		
Low	20	6	57	65	16	23	7	6	74	65		
Zero	36	2	52	52	10	29	2	18	117	56		

\*N=number of cases

\*\*R=Rural

\*\*U=Urban

does not appear among our urban respondents. Their level of self-confidence can be as high if they are hostile as it is when there is low hostility. In fact the highest incidence of "zero self-confidence" (18%) is found among those urban respondents with no apparent hostility. These may be the "withdrawn", "apathetic", or "alienated" urban respondents, who may be more resigned than hostile. Although there is no significant relationship for urban respondents in these data, the fact that a lessening of rural hostility is related to higher rural self-confidence is a finding of no little importance for the developmental process in rural India.

### Conclusions

This exploration of patterns of citizen hostility towards administrators indicates that the incidence of this phenomenon varies by type of agency, by the fact of urban or rural residence, to some extent by socio-economic status, by traditionalist attitudinal orientation, and by frequency of contact with administrative officials. We found from 8% to 13% of our respondents very hostile; from 22% to 37% not hostile at all. We found that for most hostile people their antagonism is not directed at

most functionally related to hostility. It seems that "hard-core" traditionalists are most likely to have hostile reactions, often stereotypic reactions, towards authority figures such as administrators. The extent and nature of bureaucratic contact can intensify such latent hostility feelings apparently, although bureaucratic contact is not necessarily a contributing factor. It is perhaps to be expected in a transitional society, such as India, that bitterness and hostility towards administrators emerges as the administrative system assumes new duties and establishes new relationships with the citizenry. It is gratifying that the public is highly supportive of the system in the face of moderate levels of hostility. In rural India particularly, "support" and "self-confidence" levels, though apparently affected by personal hostility towards administrators, are rather high despite such hostile feelings. As the bureaucrats in the field assume less authoritarian postures and techniques, and convince the public of their service-functional and instrumental role in the system our data suggest that hostility will decline and all but the most "hard-core" traditionalists will come to accept the new bureaucracy, support it, and participate cooperatively with it.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE ADMINISTRATOR : SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS, PERSONAL ORIENTATIONS

Our study of citizen attitudes towards administrators would not be complete without analysis of the administrator himself. The preceding chapters have explored a variety of factors which help explain differential patterns of public perceptions. But the bureaucratic subsystem consists essentially of citizen and administrator interacting with each other, and reacting to each other. Theoretically, the administrator is acting upon his images of his role, his career, his "public". And it is this set of administrator perspectives, and consequent behaviour, individually and collectively, to which the public is responding. It is necessary, therefore, to describe the bureaucratic context or contexts within which the citizen is located, and, if possible, to link that context to citizen response.

In designing this portion of our study we selected agencies which were relevant to the geographical areas in which our public sample was located, which represented local, state, and national levels of authority, and which represented both the historic, standard administrative system and the newer Community Development bureaucracy. We decided to interview officials in the Police, Postal and Health agencies in both urban and rural Delhi, to interview Community Development officials in rural Delhi, and officials in the Delhi Transport Undertaking in urban Delhi. Further, we desired insofar as possible to interview officials at two hierarchical levels—at the levels of officials directly in contact with the public (police constables, bus inspectors, village level workers, etc.), and if possible at the level immediately above (police superintendents, doctors in charge of health clinics, community development officers, etc.). We were not able to completely fulfil this latter objective for the DTU and the urban postal service. Finally, we selected

these officials by a procedure which emphasized the identification of officials with the eight villages and 25 urban mohallas in which our public lived. This would permit as tight a "fit" as possible between the officials in our study and the public in our study.<sup>1</sup>

We were particularly interested in developing a theory which focussed on the conditions and criteria most useful for determining the extent to which Indian administrators are "democratic" and "welfare-state oriented" in their understanding of their roles and responsibilities. The components of "democratic" orientations to which we paid particular attention included: "acceptance" of the democratic system and a willingness to perform within it; a "responsible awareness" of the needs and demands of the public; "sensitivity" to the public in the sense of being service-oriented and clientele-conscious, rather than being exclusively preoccupied with private organizational goals and tasks; "adaptability" and "accountability", defined as a willingness to be reasonable in implementing rules, and a recognition of the need to explain and justify administrative actions and decisions; and, finally, "humility with dignity", by which is meant the ability to respect the citizen while also respecting one's own professional status. The absence of these component orientations would, indeed, be suggestive of a paternalistic, if not authoritarian, set of role perceptions, smacking of pre-Independence India, and certainly not conducive to the achievement of administrative goals in a system strongly reliant on citizen cooperation.

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<sup>1</sup> Technically it should be noted that in certain of our administrative subcategories we interviewed not a sample but every available person of a particular category. Thus we interviewed all Block Development Officers in our areas, all Extension Officers, all Panchayat Secretaries, all Village Level Workers, all Medical Officers in charge, all Postmasters, all Police Station House Officers, all ASI's. Further, for a second category of officials we interviewed a sample of 50% or more: compounders, midwives, Lady Health Visitors (9 or 10), head constables. Finally, for one category —police constables— we interviewed approximately a 10% sample, randomly selected. These interviews provided us with both rich diversity of administrative types as well as sufficient geographical concentration, thus permitting analysis of hierarchical differences, agency differences, and patterns of congruence between administrators and the public, in the total Delhi areas as well as in particular geographical sectors.

Closely tied to this conceptualization of the "democratic administrator" was the concept of the "welfare-state administrator". Two basic components were uppermost in our minds. One concerns the "distributive" orientations—does he feel that he as administrator has the positive responsibility to be concerned with improving human welfare, solving social problems, and allocating economic justice? The second component concerns his "egalitarian" orientation—does he believe that administration must be conducted in such a way as to treat all citizens equally and fairly, in a non-discriminatory style, with particular awareness of the validity of the needs and rights of the "have-not" sectors of Indian society? By operationalizing these concepts and testing their incidence in our study it was our hope to collect valuable evidence and to work towards a meaningful and realistic theory of democratic administration in a developing society.

#### *The Personal Backgrounds of Administrators*

Description of the personal backgrounds of administrators is useful in at least two ways. It tells us what social sectors of the population these officials come from, and whether agencies differ in social origins. It also can indicate whether within agencies there are social gaps between the higher and lower echelons of officials.

Our data (Table 5:1) reveal, first, that the lower social strata of Indian society are poorly represented in these agencies. The lower castes have less than 10% of these positions; those with a primary school education or less are found generally only among the police constables (26%): and those with low family incomes are found in sizable numbers only among constables (67%) and postal officials (31%). There is a considerable spread among age groups, with a surprising number found in the age category of "30 and under". Hindus dominate all agencies, as might be expected in the Delhi area. The community development administrators differ from the others in two important respects: they tend to be younger, especially the "staff" officials, and they have a larger percentage of non-Hindus among the "line" officials.

A second type of finding concerns the hierarchical differences

TABLE 5:1  
Social Characteristics of Indian Administrators

Variable	Police Constables	Staff	Health Staff	Compounders	Community Development Staff	Postal Line	DTU
1. Age—30 and Under	39	27	32	48	35	23	0
—31 to 40	58	27	27	52	43	37	24
—older	3	46	41	0	22	40	76
2. Religion—Hindu	91	91	86	91	87	61	91
—other	9	14	9	13	39	9	88
3. Education—					4	9	0
Illiterate or Primary	0	26	0	0	87	77	100
Secondary	66	71	0	95	68	14	0
Higher	34	3	100	5	32	9	0
4. Caste—Brahmin and upper	21	24	43	53	38	24	56
—Middle Caste	76	70	57	42	52	70	35
—Lower Caste	3	6	0	5	10	6	9
5. Family Income (monthly)					13	31	0
—under 150 rupees	11	67	3	5	9	35	53
—151 to 250 rupees	26	24	0	77	26	52	43
Over 250 rupees	63	9	97	18	65	52	47
Number of Cases	35	33	29	22	23	23	17

within agencies.<sup>2</sup> There is high congruence in these agencies between "staff" and "line" on the social characteristics of caste status and religion. This may be very significant, suggesting a recruitment process which is both nondiscriminatory and hierarchically balanced. The "colonization" of particular agencies by certain castes does not appear in our data. Rather there is a social mixture of caste groups. Thus 14% of the police staff are Brahmins while 21% of the constables are Brahmins; 7% and 10%, respectively, come from other upper caste groups; 70% to 76% are middle caste.

There are, however, other social status differences between "staff" and "line" in these agencies—in educational and income status. The latter is most striking in the police and health agencies. The greater majority of the staff are *relatively* well-off (from 63% to 97%), but only a small minority of the constables and compounders make over 250 rupees a month. Among community development officials one does not find these social status differentiations—both "staff" and "line" are relatively well off.<sup>3</sup>

These administrative cadres, then, while under-representing lower status groups, do comprehend and reflect considerable social diversity. Hierarchical differences in educational and financial status are great, except in the Community Development cadre. These differences may be related to agency communication patterns, morale, role perspectives, and public response. Tensions may be modified within these agencies by the balanced representation of caste groups.

#### *Job Tenure, Mobility, and Satisfaction*

The administrators in our study have held their positions for varying tenures. From 25% to 40% of those in staff positions are fairly recent appointees, while "line" incumbents tend to have much longer tenures. The turnover of postmen is

<sup>2</sup> Note that we could not differentiate hierarchically from our data for the postal and DTU agencies.

<sup>3</sup> A detailed analysis by the three Community Development blocks in our study reveals different patterns, but high congruence. For example, in only one Block was there significant representation of lower caste groups, but these were found at *both* the "staff" level (23%) and the "line" level (17%).

much greater than constables and bus inspectors, however. The "line" personnel in Community Development have a relatively balanced set of tenures, 50% having held their positions for over five years, and about one fourth being recent appointees. If one combines this with the data on total job mobility while in governmental service (Table 5:2), the significance is clear. The staff personnel, as might be expected, have been highly mobile, with a third or more having come rather recently to their positions at the time we interviewed them. The "line" personnel, however, show very limited mobility and are individuals who tend to have held their present positions for a relatively long time. As a matter of fact we found the following percentages of "line" personnel in these agencies to have spent over 10 years in governmental service with no advancement:

Police Constables	61%
Medical Compounders	50%
Community Development	32%

This leads to the query: Are the "line" personnel satisfied with their positions, or is there a morale problem in certain agencies due to the lack of upward mobility? A further question is: How difficult is it for staff personnel to motivate and commit "line" personnel, who have been on the job for a long period of time and non-mobile, to new perspectives in developmental administration? The important finding in these data is that many of these officials most closely in touch with the public have held their jobs for some time, suggesting an accumulation of experience, standardizing patterns of dealing with the public, and perhaps frustration. Has it been difficult, therefore, for such officials at the "cutting edge" of administration to adapt to new administrative norms in working with the public?

The majority of officials told us they found their jobs interesting (Table 5:3). Job satisfaction appeared to be particularly high in the health and community development agencies, where we found from 70% to 100% asserting that they "liked their work", although smaller proportions claimed their jobs were "interesting". The field personnel in Community Development seemed particularly satisfied. Combining their

TABLE 5:2  
Tenure and Mobility of Officials by Agency

	Police Staff	Police Line	Health Staff	Health Line	Community Development Staff	Community Development Line	Postal	DTU
<i>Tenure in present position</i>								
Less than one year	29%	3	24	5	22	13	26	0
1 to 3 years	9	6	17	14	9	13	17	6
3 to 5 years	17	12	28	23	48	22	29	29
Longer	45	79	31	58	22	52	29	65
<i>Job Mobility</i>								
No mobility	3%	97	46	82	35	81	29	6
Upward mobility	97	3	54	18	65	19	68	94

TABLE 5:3  
Job Interest and Satisfaction for Officials in Various Agencies

	Police Staff	Police Line	Health Staff	Health Line	Community Development Staff	Postal Line	DTU
Is your job interesting?							
Yes	65%	67	62	64	87	74	46
Somewhat—has reservations	30	21	38	32	13	26	37
No	5	12	0	4	0	0	17
How do you feel about your work?							
Likes his work	74	58	97	73	78	100	71
Has reservations	26	42	3	27	22	0	29

responses to these questions concerning job satisfaction with job tenure, we found a strong relationship between length of time in governmental service without career mobility and job dissatisfaction. Thus 59% of the non-mobile police constables with long tenure had mild or strong reservations about their jobs; and 62% of health compounders with similar career patterns seemed somewhat frustrated. Community Development field personnel had shorter tenures and greater job satisfaction—only 34% of the non-mobile officials in the agency, three years or more, indicated any dissatisfaction with their positions.

There is potential for disaffection, then, in the agencies we studied. Large proportions of "line" personnel have not been able to advance. Their jobs are not interesting or satisfying to possibly one third of these officials. In the Community Development programme the probabilities of tension and disaffection seem lower, despite long tenure without career advancement. Officials in Community Development work seem to be highly committed to their tasks and roles.

#### *Emphases in Training*

A central question for a "modernizing" society like India is whether the administrative system has incorporated and is transmitting "democratic" and "welfare state" norms to its personnel. Examination of the training function is relevant in this context. To what extent are training programmes directed to the developmental requisite of an administrative cadre conscious of public needs, aware of the goal and value of public involvement, and committed to "good public relations"? The emphases in training perceived by the officials in these agencies whom we interviewed will indicate whether Indian bureaucracy is moving towards such developmental objectives.

Different proportions of the urban and rural officials in our study indicated that they had gone through extensive training programmes. About one third of the urban and one tenth of the rural officials said they had not been exposed to any training programmes for government work. Others had gone through brief training. But slightly over 40% of the urban officials and approximately 70% of the rural officials appear to have had considerable training for their present jobs. Most of these officials felt that training had been worthwhile.

But training varied greatly by agency. For the "line" personnel the following proportions in each agency said they had had *no* training or *very brief* training sessions :

	No Training	Brief Training
Police Constables	3%	12%
Health Compounders	41	23
Community Development	9	9
Postmen	59	18
DTU	82	12

The police and Community Development programmes apparently subject their personnel to the most intensive training. This is true also for the police "staff" officers, only 3% of whom were never exposed to a training programme. The Community Development staff personnel, however, appear less trained—22% reported that they were not trained for the particular positions they now hold. This compares favourably, however, with the medical officer corps in our study, 54% of whom said they had not undergone training for their positions.

Obviously, the postmen and bus inspectors are left to learn their jobs "on the job". In the other agencies only small minorities are not subjected to some type of training. The issue is, what is the content of this training? Particularly, does it communicate "public relations" aspects of the work, with what degree of emphasis, and in what substantive directions? We used a series of open-ended questions to get the respondents to tell us about the content of training programmes and the nature of instructions given to them. The results of three of these are given in Table 5:4.

The agency with least emphasis on "public relations" is the postal service. As noted previously, less than 50% undergo a training programme. Of those who have had such a programme, over half do not refer to "public relations" as a primary emphasis in that programme. Again, about 50% of the immediate supervisors of postmen seem to emphasize public relations; the remainder are never seen or emphasize other

TABLE 5:4  
Emphasis on Public Relations in Administrative Training

	Police Staff	Police Constables	Health Staff	Health Line	Community Development Staff	Community Development Line	Postal Staff	DTU
<i>Training Emphasis:</i>								
Public Relations emphasized	71%	73	18	45	70	74	16	18
Public Relations not emphasized	26	24	28	14	8	17	25	0
No Training	3	3	55	41	22	9	59	82
<i>Content of Instructions in Dealing with Public:</i>								
“Democratic” content	63	85	17	50	65	87	26	24
“Bureaucratic” content	9	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Both contents	9	6	3	0	4	0	0	0
Not ascertained, don’t know and inapplicable	19	9	80	45	31	13	74	76
<i>What does your Superior Emphasize?</i>								
Public Relations mentioned	79	85	37	55	70	61	49	88
Public Relations not mentioned	18	12	48	45	30	39	40	12
Never see him	3	3	15	0	0	0	11	0

aspects of the job. The supervisors of transport inspectors apparently are much more conscious of public relations (88% emphasize it); this may compensate for the lack of a training programme.

The police and Community Development officials seem to be the most conscious about the problem of maintaining good relationships with the public. Seventy per cent or more indicate that public relations is emphasized in formal training. What is equally interesting is the finding that supervisors of our respondents in police and CD communicated an awareness of public relations. Thus 80% of our police superintendents and station house officers report that they see *their* superiors and that these superiors emphasize the public relations aspects of the job of police superintendent. In turn, 85% of the police constables report that *their* superiors communicate the same emphasis.

The image of a police hierarchy transmitting "down the line" a concern for dealing with the public clearly emerges from these data. The same basic image emerges from our interviews with CD personnel. Thus, 70% of our "second echelon" respondents (BDO's, Panchayat Secretaries, Extension Officers, etc.) report that they see *their* superiors and that public relations are emphasized. In turn, 61% of our CD "line" personnel report the same hierarchical transmission of concern for the public. There is, indeed, a sizable minority of Community Development personnel who are either not trained or are not aware of an emphasis on public relations in their training or in their relations with their superiors. These represent one third approximately of CD personnel. They are a genuine problem for the system, as are the health personnel (no more than 50% of whom seem particularly aware of the public relations aspects of their job). Generally, however, the police and CD agencies seem self-consciously aware of public relations responsibilities, as a result of formal training and intra-agency communication processes.

#### *The Job Orientations of Administrators*

We have examined the social background from which the administrator comes, his career status, and some of the organizational conditions to which he is exposed. These contextual influences obviously vary for particular agencies and within

agencies. We come now to the critical question of the administrator's own perspectives towards his role, particularly his image of himself as an actor interacting with the public. Do the attitudes of administrators towards their public responsibilities and relationships also vary ? It is one thing to find public relations training programmes, lower social class origins, and job satisfaction; or, conversely, no training programmes, upper middle class origins, or job dissatisfaction. It is another to find "democratic" or "undemocratic" role perspectives correlated with such contextual influences. For a developing democracy such as India the incidence of "democratic" administrative orientations is a crucial test for the probable success of the system. The bureaucratic structure, which is above all a "structure" of the job and role perceptions of administrators, can provide us with significant clues as to the movement of the system towards developmental and democratic goals.

A variety of questions were put to the officials, mostly open-ended, the responses to which we hoped would permit us to determine their orientations towards their jobs, particularly their orientations as officials interacting with the public. Aside from standard questions asking them to describe "the nature of your job" and "which duties take most of your time", we probed for specific orientations with the following type of questions. Do you find it at times necessary in your position to relax the procedures to do a more effective job ? Do you find it possible to relax procedures ? Do you think the public makes extra demands on you over and above what you do for them in the ordinary course of your job ? (If yes) can you tell me something about the nature of these demands ? Do you think it is necessary for you to explain to citizens the reasons for your decisions ? How important do you think it is for your particular agency to get cooperation from the public ? Why (or why not) ? What kinds of cooperation from the public do you think you should get ? And then this key question : Some people say that serving the public is most important ; others say that following the orders of your superiors is most important. How do you feel about this ? (Probe: If says both, ask for the one which is more important of the two.) These questions were useful to determine democratic role orientations by agency and by level within the hierarchy.

It is quite obvious from our data that the emphasis on public relations in the Indian government and society has impressed upon the large majority of officials the importance of getting public cooperation. An overwhelming number of them (88%) said that public cooperation was "very important" to their agencies ; the remainder said it was "somewhat important" (with the largest concentration of these among urban health officials, 33% of whom gave this response). None said it was unimportant. Further, in certain agencies large proportions of officials sense the pressure of public demands for administrative service. This is indicated in the responses to our questions as to whether the public makes "extra demands". Police constables and bus inspectors responded negatively to this question (only 12% indicating they were aware of such demands). The remainder seem particularly cognizant of public pressure : 67% of the CD officials, staff and line, and approximately 70% of the police staff personnel and postal officials. Although police constables and bus inspectors report little pressure for extra service, they are overwhelmingly aware of the need for public cooperation in their work—over 85% of the inspectors and over 95% of the constables said it was "very important".

Despite an awareness that they are functioning in an administrative system and in a society with high expectations of cooperative citizen-administrator relationships, the extent of the commitment of the officials in our study to "democratic" roles and behaviour varies considerably. When we asked these administrators whether they thought it was "your job to treat everybody fairly", we found very few (only 10%) taking a negative position. Further when we asked whether the official felt a necessity to explain to the public the reasons for his decisions, a somewhat larger proportion took the "bureaucratic" viewpoint, but over 70% in all agencies at both hierarchical levels responded affirmatively (Table 5:5). There were no significant agency differences. The Community Development staff officials were slightly more "bureaucratic" than in other agencies, but the differences are not great enough to be taken seriously.

Much more evidence of a "bureaucratic" orientations was found when we asked about the relaxation of administrative procedures. The findings here are interesting. First, staff officials are generally inclined to admit the necessity for relaxing

TABLE 5:5  
Specific Job Orientations of Administrators

	Police Staff	Police Constables	Health Staff	Health Compounders	Community Development Staff	Postal Line	DTU
1. Necessary to Explain reason for decisions (to the public)?							
Yes	79%	75	89	77	73	86	100
No	18	13	7	18	27	14	0
Don't Know	3	13	3	5	0	0	0
2. Necessary to relax procedures?							
Yes, and does relax them	36%	25	17	29	35	57	27
Yes, but does not	18	13	54	12	39	19	18
No	46	63	29	59	26	24	17

procedures. Over two thirds of staff personnel in all agencies except police take this position, and approximately 50% of police staff personnel also admit to the necessity for being adaptive. But the "line" personnel are much more "bureaucratic" in their responses, in all agencies except Community Development and the postal services. Whereas over 50% of line personnel in other agencies deny the need to relax procedures, only 17% of postmen and 24% of Community Development officials in direct contact with the public take this position. Over 60% of police constables gave bureaucratic responses to this question. This suggests a more pragmatic-adaptive approach to the public for Community Development workers and postmen, than for other officials.

Second, although large percentages of officials see the need for relaxing procedures, many officials in each agency say they cannot or do not in fact modify procedures. Just slightly over 50% of all the staff officials in our study who see this necessity are pragmatic in their administrative operations, while two thirds of line officials are. Community Development "Line" officials and postmen, again, are the most willing to be flexible in administrative actions.

In sum, the officials in our study seem to have been indoctrinated with the idea of administrative flexibility in dealing with the public—staff personnel more so than "line" personnel. But, except in the Community Development and postal structures, only one fourth to one third do actually reflect this "democratic" norm in their behaviour.

This evidence of a basic bureaucratic orientation is corroborated when we asked officials which is more important—"serving the public" or "following the orders of your superior"? Large minorities insisted both were (Table 5:6). But significant proportions placed greater importance on "following orders"—ranging from 3% among the medical officers, to 40% of the police superintendents and, 39% of the Community Development staff. It is interesting that except for the health officials, "line" personnel were more service oriented than staff personnel. It is significant also that the Community Development line personnel—the village level workers and their associates—seem least committed to the



bureaucratic tradition. Over 80% of Community Development "line" personnel place high emphasis on serving the public.

The evidence presented here on the public service orientations of agencies is conflicting. There are apparently individuals with "democratic" and highly "bureaucratic" perspectives in all agencies. On balance there is cumulative evidence to suggest that the Community Development village workers and "line" personnel are the most inclined to be "democratic" in job perspectives. The training programme emphasizes public relations, the concept of adapting to public needs and working to solicit public cooperation appears to be transmitted in the CD hierarchy, and the majority of the personnel in the field manifest this emphasis in the answers they gave us concerning their jobs. Postmen have almost as consistent a set of democratic orientations, although their training programme is poor. In the other agencies the evidence is mixed. Policemen, for example, seem democratic on some dimensions, but bureaucratic on others. The same is true for health officials and bus inspectors.

The extent of consistency in job perspectives by agency can be demonstrated by examination of responses for individual administrators on three of the questions we used : how important did he feel public cooperation was for his agency, did he relax procedures, and was "serving the public" or "following orders" more important. The distributions for selected sets of officials were as shown in Table 5:7. If a rigorous test of consistency is used, less than one fourth of these "line" personnel measure up to "democratic" requirements.

On the other hand, almost all of them do occasionally respond in "democratic" terms, attesting to the penetration of the norms of public service and responsibility into the lower reaches of the Indian bureaucracy. If we call those who are consistent on at least two of these dimensions to be "democratic", the CD officials can be contrasted to bus inspectors—96% of the former and 59% of the latter qualifying as "democratic" administrators. Postmen are close to CD officials, followed by the constables, with health "line" personnel closer to the bus inspectors in "democratic" perspectives.

We developed an "Index of Democratic Job Perspectives" for all our officials, since we felt that reliance on one or a few

TABLE 5:7  
Consistency in "democratic" Job Perspectives

	CD Line	Constables	Postmen	Health Line	Bus Inspectors
Consistently "democratic" on all three dimensions	26%	18	29	18	12
"Democratic" on two of the three dimensions	70	52	53	45	47
"Democratic" on one dimension only	4	30	15	23	35
"Democratic" on none	0	0	3	14	6

responses would not properly permit us to type officials. In the index we used the three responses referred to above, as well as three other types of information: their reactions to and characterization of their training, whether they felt it was necessary to explain their administrative decisions, and their description of the nature of their jobs. Weighting "public relations" oriented responses as more important than other responses for this purpose, we scored each individual on all six items. Maximum score possible by the index was 12. Actual scores for respondents ranged from 2 to 11. The pattern of scores by agency and echelon are found in Table 5:8.

When all the responses are cumulated into our index we are able to see more clearly the variation in "democratic" role perspectives by agency, at two levels of the hierarchy. The police are particularly interesting, for their "staff" personnel demonstrate the greatest awareness of "democratic" norms, but the constables are least aware of all the "line" personnel. Therefore, there is the greatest gap in the police force between superintendent and constable, with the latter most bureaucratic in his perspectives. This raises serious questions about the adequacy and penetration of their training programmes. In health there is a fairly even distribution between "staff" and "line". If one takes those with scores of seven or more, 45% of the medical officers as well as the compounders are "democratic", with, however, many more compounders at the low, or bureaucratic, end of the scale. Community Development presents yet another situation. The "line" personnel are far and away the most "democratic", with three fourths scoring above six. But the staff by this index are much less "democratic"—only 43% are "democratic". This suggests, then, a hierarchical gap also, but the reverse of the one found in the police force, and probably very functional to the achievement of public cooperation, support, and respect. The postmen (on this index in contrast to earlier data—primarily because of training inadequacies) and bus inspectors do not reveal as frequently a respect for "democratic" norms as do the CD village level workers and their associates.

In sum, the balance in most of these agencies seems to be slightly on the "bureaucratic" side, although usually only small percentages show no real evidence of "democratic" job

TABLE 5.8  
Index of "Democratic" Job Perspectives

Scores	Staff	Police Constable	Staff	Health Line	Community Development Staff	Postal Line	DTU
High (9-11)	30%	18	7	18	13	39	9
Moderate High (7-8)	32	24	38	27	30	35	38
Moderate Low (5-6)	32	42	45	18	52	26	30
Low (Below 5)	6	15	10	36	4	0	23
							6

perspectives. CD is an exception for "line" personnel. For all officials in our study, 13% score high on this index, 35% are moderately "democratic", 33% are moderately "bureaucratic", and 19% seem clearly "bureaucratic".

### *Factors Related to "Democratic" Job Perspectives*

What distinguishes administrators with "democratic" as contrasted to "bureaucratic" attitudes towards their work? Why should some emphasize public service, relaxation of rules, sensitivity to public demands, concern for public cooperation while others emphasize "following orders", strict enforcement of procedures, unawareness of public demands or their propriety, and unconcern about public cooperation? We have already seen that agencies differ in their incidence and pattern of "democratic" job perspectives. This suggests differences *between* agencies as well as hierarchical differences *within* agencies. Agency norms may differ, and yet there may not be the communication or transmission of these norms within an agency. This is the paradox of the police force and Community Development, but in quite separate ways. In the police force there is a low incidence of "democratic" norms at the constable level, despite democratic norms at the "staff" level and an apparently comprehensive training programme. In CD the opposite is true—democratic norms at the base of the structure despite low incidence of "democratic" norms at the "staff" level, and a training programme. Are, then, organizational conditions contributory, or are other factors more helpful in explaining "democratic" job perspectives?

One might well expect that the social background from which an administrator comes in India would be related to his job perspectives. Our analysis revealed little evidence to this effect. One factor which is particularly interesting in this respect is caste status. As was demonstrated earlier in this chapter there is a mixture of caste groups in each of these agencies, although low caste groups are only minimally represented. From 20% to over 50% of the personnel have high caste backgrounds; from 3% to 10% roughly, come from low castes.<sup>4</sup> But caste status seems to be only partially related to

<sup>4</sup> See Table 5:1

TABLE 5:9  
Caste and "Democratic" Job Perspectives

<i>Index of "Democratic" Job Perspectives</i>	<i>High Caste</i>	<i>Middle Caste</i>	<i>Low Caste</i>
<i>All Personnel</i>			
"Democratic" (Highest Scores)	18%	18	0
Moderately "Democratic"	33	33	42
Tends Bureaucratic	38	36	25
"Bureaucratic" (Lowest Scores)	11	13	33
<i>Number of Cases</i>	73	114	12
<i>All "Line Personnel"</i>			
"Democratic"	13%	19	
Moderately Democratic	39	33	
Tends Bureaucratic	37	31	
"Bureaucratic"	11	17	
<i>Number of Cases</i>	46	63	*

\* Too Few Cases for Analysis

"democratic" job perspectives (Table 5:9). The high caste personnel are no more "bureaucratic" in job perspectives than middle caste officials. Approximately 50% of both groups, irrespective of the agency, fall into the "democratic" category. The few lower caste personnel in our sample do appear to be somewhat more "bureaucratic", but the percentage differences do not present a striking contrast. Over 40% of our low caste officials have developed "democratic" attitudes towards their jobs. This pattern of findings may indeed be very significant. It indicates that the caste system, the traditional bastion of conservatism, is no necessary impediment to development. Or, rather, that despite the caste origin of administrators they can and do develop "democratic" orientations towards their administrative positions. Perhaps the most important conclusion is that Indian public servants in our study who had a long record of government service were as likely to be "bureaucratic" as "democratic" in their job perspectives. This suggests that other factors are operating and have been operating to produce public servants

with new "democratic" job orientations under certain circumstances and conditions.

Length of tenure in governmental employment might also be associated with job perspectives. One might expect the newer recruits to government service to be more amenable to, and supportive of, the "democratic" norms of the post-Independence administration. Generally, however, no relationship was found which seemed significant (Table 5:10). Actually personnel with shorter tenure in governmental service seemed least "democratic", and those with a medium tenure to be most "democratic" in job perspectives. But the differences are not large. The number of cases was small for particular tenure-groups for specific agencies, so a reliable analysis could not be made. Among the Community Development staff personnel, for example, we found long tenure in governmental service seemingly associated with "bureaucratic" perspectives, while the reverse seemed true for the CD "line" personnel.

There is a basis for some optimism in these findings concerning "caste" and "tenure" in relationship to administrative perspectives. They suggest that despite social structural and traditional organizational affiliations and commitments which might lead him in "bureaucratic" directions, the Indian public servant can and does adapt to "democratic" norms. In addition, we were interested in investigating the psychological predispositions of these civil servants to see what their latent "authoritarian-democratic" orientations might be, and then to compare this latent predisposition with the respondent's perspective concerning his administrative role. In developing such an "authoritarianism index" we explored the utility of the following statements, asking the respondent to indicate agreement or disagreement with each. (The proportion indicating *agreement* with each is indicated in parentheses.)

1. "A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk." (85%)
2. "People can be trusted." (63%)
3. "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn." (99%)
4. "The world is too complicated to be understood by anyone but experts." (84%)

TABLE 5:10  
Job Tenure and "Democratic" Job Perspectives

	<i>Index of "Democratic" Job Perspectives</i>	Short Tenure (5 years or less)	Medium Tenure (5—15 years)	Long Tenure (Over 15 Years)
<i>1. All Personnel</i>				
"Democratic" (Highest scores)	16%	22	16	
Moderately Democratic	27	38	34	
Tend Bureaucratic	39	32	35	
"Bureaucratic"	18	8	16	
<i>Number of Cases</i>	49	78	83	
<i>2. All "Line" Personnel</i>				
"Democratic" (Highest scores)	21	20	18	
Moderately Democratic	18	45	31	
Tends Bureaucratic	36	25	33	
"Bureaucratic"	25	10	18	
<i>Number of Cases</i>	28	48	51	

5. "People are getting soft and weak from so much babying and coddling." (78%)

If "toughness", "strong leaders", an overwhelming respect for "authority" and a need for the "expert" are clues to personal "authoritarian" predispositions, these leaders appear so disposed. Except for item 2, the "authoritarian" response was high; in the case of the third statement, so high that as a discriminating measure it was of no utility. Although one may question the validity and applicability of these statements (used widely in American studies) to India, in the absence of more valid and reliable measures these do, indeed, indicate that the Indian civil servant is basically "authoritarian" in his *personal* predispositions and view of the political world. The distributions for all the administrators in our study (excluding item 3) reveal this :

	Proportion of all Administrators
Four "Democratic" responses	2%
Three      "	5
Two      "	24
One      "      response	45
No      "      "	24
	<hr/> 100%

The incidence of personal "authoritarianism" by agency is interesting (Table 5:11). Community Development officials are least "authoritarian", with over 40% of these administrators tending to give "democratic" responses to these items. This contrasts to 18% on the DTU and "line" officials in the health service. The police fall in between—the constables slightly more "democratic" than the police staff, and postal officials as "democratic" as the police. Thus, though a high level of authoritarian response is found in all agencies, recruitment into the CD programme seems to yield a higher proportion of officials whose latent predispositions are "democratic".

The basic and primary query for us, however, is whether these latent *personal* predispositions correlate with *job* perspectives. Do we find that the administrator who reveals, by his responses to our statements about the political world, a

TABLE 5:11  
 Personal "Authoritarian" and "Democratic" Predisposition  
 of Agency Personnel

<i>Authoritarian-Democratic Index</i>		Staff	Police Constables	Health Staff Line	Community Development Staff Line	Postal	DTU
2 to 4 "Democratic" responses	29%	36	21	18	48	43	34
One "Democratic" response	45	31	51	68	43	35	43
No "Democratic" response	26	33	28	14	9	22	35

tendency to be "authoritarian" in his images also to be the administrator who looks on his job in "bureaucratic" terms, and has little feeling for the public service aspects of his job? This is a critical problem, and our findings, as well as their meaning for Indian administration today, must be assessed carefully (Table 5:12).

We find in fact a peculiar non-congruence between manifestations of "democratic" orientations in *personal* predispositions and in *job* perspectives. There is only a slight tendency for administrators with "democratic" personal predispositions to be less bureaucratic than the others. Over 40% of the former tend to have a "bureaucratic" job perspective. On the other hand, 50% of our "authoritarian" administrators indicate that they are inclined to be basically non-bureaucratic in the way they view their jobs.

TABLE 5:12

Relationships Between "Authoritarian-Democratic" *Personal* Predispositions and "Bureaucratic-Democratic" *Job* Perspectives

	Job Perspectives Index					
	Democratic		Bureaucratic			
	(Score 9+)	(Score 7-8)	(Score 5-6)	(Score under 5)	N*	
Authoritarian-Democratic Predisposition Index						
Democratic						
(Score: 2+)	21%	36	33	10	67	
(Score: 1 )	15	33	36	15	99	
Authoritarian						
(Score : 0)	19	31	37	13	52	

\*N=number of cases

This suggests four possible interpretations. One is that these indices are not valid or meaningful for the Indian context. Further studies will help determine whether this is so. It should be accepted, however, that the degree of authoritarianism

we found in our study may be tenable, as well as the extent to which Indian administrators genuinely espouse "democratic" role perceptions. A second interpretation is that Indian administrators compartmentalize these two syndromes—they can in fact be both "authoritarian" and "non-bureaucratic", for example. This possibility should certainly not be ignored. A third interpretation is that there is a close linkage between predispositions and role or job perspectives, and that one of these two syndromes predominates (psychological predispositions), and that, further, when *Indian* administrators talked to us about their jobs they used "democratic" jargon which they really did not accept. This would mean that despite indications to the contrary that Indian administrators in the development bureaucracy are accepting "democratic" norms of behaviour, they are overwhelmingly still "authoritarian". This is indeed a possibility, but the variety of responses we have on which we built our index of job perspectives, relying both on direct and indirect questions, leads us to question this interpretation.

This leaves us with a fourth interpretation, that under certain conditions, primarily organizational, administrators who are latently "authoritarian" can take on genuinely democratic perceptions concerning their jobs. And that these democratic perceptions, though conflicting with basic authoritarian predispositions, can predominate, reinforced as they are by organizational expectations, and be functionally related to a meaningful "democratic" performance. This is an optimistic view of the data, but one for which we find much supporting evidence.

There is no question but that administrative structures differ in expectations in this respect. We have found differences by type of agency both in the incidence of "democratic" job perspectives (Table 5:8) and in authoritarian-democratic predispositions (Table 5:11). A further test of the theory that organizational conditions are related to the development of democratic job perspectives is possible by analysis of the factor of training. The key question here is whether exposure to an in-service training programme, and particularly a training programme oriented towards the democratic and "public service" aspects of administration, seems conducive to the occurrence of democratic job perspectives in such agencies.

TABLE 5:13  
The Role of Training in Developing Democratic Job Perspectives

"Democratic" Job Perspectives Index	Training Oriented to "Public Relations"		Training not Oriented to Public Relations		No Training Programme
	72%	30	34	42	
High Scores-Democratic					
Medium to Low Scores	26		45		42
Very Low Score	2		25		24
Number of Cases	103	44	62		

Our data suggest that the existence of some type of training programme by itself may be a factor related to "democratic" job perspective. Our three agencies whose officials reported to us with the greatest frequency that there was no training programme—Health, DTU, and Postal—had the lowest scores on the democratic job perspectives index. The contrast between Community Development and the Health "line" officials is perhaps the most striking. About 40% of CD officials compared to 7% of Health officials were found in the highest score category on the "democratic" perspectives index. In the former there was an extensive training programme, in the latter virtually none, according to the reports of our respondents.

It is not, however, merely the existence of a training programme which is relevant, but whether the training programme was *understood and perceived as emphasizing "public relations"*. The same training programme in the same agency could be interpreted differently. As Table 5:13 indicates there is a striking difference in job perspectives for those officials who perceived and did not perceive the training as emphasizing "public relations". Over 70% of those who saw their training as emphasizing "public relations" had very "democratic" orientations. On the other hand, the existence of a training programme not emphasizing public relations was no more efficacious in developing democratic perspectives than if there was no training programme at all. Thus, a training programme which does not "get through" to its personnel is of critical importance, and obviously many officials do not perceive training programmes as oriented towards "public relations".

The importance of this factor of differential personal perceptions of training programmes is seen by a careful inspection of the Police and Community Development agencies. Both of these agencies reputedly had training programmes which emphasized public relations. *But* not all Police or Community Development personnel perceived the programme as emphasizing "public relations". About 25% of police officials and 15% of CD officials did not. These differential perceptions were related to differential job perspectives. These data can be summarized quickly, as follows:

Percentage with High  
Scores on "Democratic"  
Job Perspectives Index

Perception Category	Police	CD
Perceived Training as Oriented Towards "Public Relations"	63%	73%
Did not perceive Training as Oriented Towards "Public Relations"	28	25

Note : Each per cent is the proportion of each "perception category" who had high scores on the democratic perspectives index.

Thus, within the same agency despite the existence of a "public relations" training programme, certain personnel for some reason are not aware of the programme's emphasis. And this can produce significant consequences for their attitudes toward the public. It is these two interrelated findings which perhaps have the most significance for Indian administration today.

Admittedly, it might be argued that our reasoning here is "circular": that obviously those officials who hold "democratic" jobs perspectives would be those who said their training emphasized "public relations". For three reasons we do not believe this to be the case. First, we operationalized each variable differently, with different sets of questions, to minimize this overlap. Second, we asked the questions in a sequence which would separate the two variables in the minds of the respondent. And third, our data themselves show that this is not the case—not all officials who had "democratic" perspectives saw their training as emphasizing "public relations", and *vice versa*. It is doubtful, therefore, that we are measuring the same phenomena with different sets of questions. Training perceptions may or may not lead to particular sets of perspectives ; training programmes which are "public service" oriented may or may not be thus perceived; when they are seen as "public service" oriented they do indeed seem to have an impact on official role perspectives. Finally, despite a possible "circularity" the finding that training perceptions and job perspectives are clearly linked in India is important.

One final finding concerning the "authoritarian"

predispositions of Indian administrators is interesting in connection with the above analysis. We find very little linkage between this latent predisposition and the administrator's perception of a training programme as "public service" oriented or not. For example, 68% of the CD officials who showed the highest scores on the "authoritarian" index perceived their training programme as "public service" oriented, compared to 76% with the lowest "authoritarian" scores—not a significant difference. (In the police agency the comparable percentages were 75% and 90%, respectively). Further, if we look only at those officials who did see their programme as public service oriented, we see no linkage between "authoritarian" predispositions and job perspectives. Thus, among CD officials 70% of those with high "authoritarian" scores defined their job in "democratic" terms: and 75% of those with low "authoritarian" scores defined their jobs in "democratic" terms—again no significant difference. (Among police officials, the percentages were 62% and 64%, respectively.) This means that although relatively large percentages of Indian administrators indicate a latent personal "authoritarianism" this does not interfere with their capacity to understand and see a training programme as oriented towards public service; nor does it mean their total job perspective is warped by this latent predisposition.

#### *Congruence and Tension: A Comparison of Administrative and Public Attitudes*

A critical problem in the analysis of any administrative, or organizational subsystem is the measurement of the extent of congruence in perspectives between different levels of the system. In the study of administrative organizations we must be concerned with the differential images of political reality held by the official cadres and their public or clienteles. For India, it is particularly important to know whether administrators see the system as functioning in the same manner as the public sees it. If great disparities exist in these two images it may not only be difficult to mobilize support more importantly, it may be difficult to change the system. Disparities would suggest perceptual isolation and unreality, or indifference or both. The ideal objective in the developing Indian system would be administrative cadres which could accurately predict

and interpret public views and evaluations of the administrative system, whether or not there was congruence on personal preferences for policy goals. The greater the incapacity of administrators to predict and interpret, the greater the likelihood that misunderstanding, inappropriate expectations, and noncooperation will develop.

In our study design we purposely asked both officials and citizens some of the same questions, in both urban and rural Delhi. A simple presentation of the distributions of their responses reveals the extent of congruence, or "distance", in their perceptions.

It is obvious that administrators have a much more sanguine view of their relations with the public than the citizens do. The "estrangement" is particularly noticeable in urban Delhi. Officials are very reluctant to say their "relations" with the public are "poor" or even "fair", while 30% (rural) to 60% (urban) of the public perceive their official relations as unsatisfactory (Table 5:14). Insofar as these responses represent the true picture, there is a suggestion of a gap in mutual perceptions which may be significant.

The same tendency—for officials to be optimistic and citizens to be cynical about the relations between officials and the public—is reflected in responses concerning the general role of the citizen in the Indian political system (Table 5:15). Over 50% of the administrators in our study feel that "officials really care" about citizen opinion, and approximately 50% of our administrators feel the citizen does have a "say" in what the government does. Public cynicism is more frequent, particularly in urban Delhi where 67% to 90% are not optimistic.

The difference between officials and the public is revealed in the patterns of responses to other questions. We asked both samples what the citizen should do if he had a problem with the government—should he go himself or should he get help from other (influential) persons or organizations? Over 50% of the officials felt that he could be successful by handling his problem personally—while only 25% of our public cross section were sanguine about the efficacy of personal effort unaided by assistance from others.

Further evidence of the low congruence in mutual perceptions emerges from our data on the extent of administrative

TABLE 5:14  
Citizen-Administrator Perceptions of Relations with Each Other

"Relations" are :	Urban		Rural	
	Official Image of Relations with Public	Public Image of Relationship with Officials	Official Image	Public Image
Poor	0%	18%	2%	15%
Fair	0	41	2	15
Good	86	24	96	55
Very good	12	3	3	3
Don't know	2	14	—	9

TABLE 5:15  
Comparative Perceptions of the Citizen's Role By Officials and the Public

		Officials Perceptions		Public Perceptions	
		Urban	Rural	Urban	Rural
"Public Officials really care quite a lot about what the ordinary citizen thinks."					
Agree	65%	56	53	36	53
Disagree	28	39	39	51	39
Unsure	6	5	7	13	7
"The Average citizen does not have much say about what the government does."					
Agree	53	46	48	88	68
Disagree	41	50	49	4	26
Unsure	6	4	5	8	5

corruption. We asked a series of questions of both officials and citizens related to this subject, including questions requiring them to estimate the extent of official corruption. The results reveal wide divergence in these estimates (Table 5:16). Officials are inclined to minimize the extent of corruption, while a majority of the public is ready to charge officials with corruption. About 60% of our public sample is convinced that half or more than half of the officials are corrupt; but only 20% to 30%, roughly, of the officials in our sample have the same pessimistic view. Although only a very few of the officials claim that *all* officials are "clean", they reject the idea that a majority is corrupt. If these findings are reliable reports of mutual perceptions, they suggest great differentials in the confidence which the public and administrators have in the integrity of the Indian administrative system.

We also asked officials to predict what percentage of the public would say that officials are corrupt. The discrepancies between these predictions and the *actual* public response were great (Table 5:17). From one third to over 50% of the officials in our study seem to be poorly informed of the public's image of administrative corruption—they predicted that all citizens feel that administrators are honest. Or, to put it another way, less than 10% of our officials would admit that the majority of citizens would contend that officials are corrupt, whereas over 70% of the public say there is some corruption, and close to 60% of the public contend that at least one half of all officials are corrupt.

Obviously officials were, at first, reluctant to admit to official corruption, and, second, were reluctant to admit that the public views administrators as corrupt. Despite disinclinations to frankness, however, these findings suggest, in conjunction with previous findings concerning the divergences in perceptions, that there is either considerable tension between officials and citizens, or unreality in mutual perceptions, or both.

### *Conclusions*

In summary, then, our data suggest that despite caste backgrounds and different social status, and despite long tenures in the public service, "democratic" attitudes towards one's job can be developed, and have been developed, in Indian

TABLE 5:16  
Estimates of Administrative Corruption by Officials and the Public

	Urban Officials	Urban Public	Rural Officials	Rural Public
What % of public employees (officials) would you say are corrupt?				
None are corrupt	4%	7	11	12
Some—but less than 1/2	29	19	38	16
About 50%	9	17	8	9
Majority (or over 50%)	10	42	24	48
Don't know ; refusal	48	15	19	16
<i>Number of Cases</i>	<i>106</i>	<i>347</i>	<i>114</i>	<i>337</i>

TABLE 5:17

## Official Predictions of Public Perceptions of the Extent of Official Corruption

Predictions	Percentage of all officials predicting a given type of public response:		Actual perceptions of the public:	
	Urban Officials	Rural Officials	Urban Public	Rural Public
100% of the public would say there is <i>no</i> corruption	35%	56	7	12
Less than 25% of the public feel officials are corrupt	19	28	11	72
25% to 50% of the public say officials are corrupt	37	9	78	
Over 50% of the public say officials are corrupt			5	
Don't Know			15	16

administrators. Administrators who began their government service many years ago, presumably in the "iron framework" of the bureaucratic tradition, and who came from conservative, traditionalized milieus, can "take on" democratic perspectives. This despite a latent personal "authoritarian" predisposition for large numbers of administrators. The critical factor seems to be the agency they are part of, and the training programme in this agency—whether they perceive this training programme as emphasizing and demanding public service, sensitivity to public demands, and flexibility in working with the public. No doubt recruitment patterns differ also, with possibly more personnel predisposed to democratic norms and amenable to a public-service-oriented agency programme recruited into Community Development work than into other agencies. But this by no means seems conclusive. Organizational conditions in an agency are basic. The pattern of supervisor-subordinate relationships and the communication of organizational expectations differs from one agency to the next. Where such a set of relationships and communication system seriously demands administrative perspectives which are "democratic", and overcomes personal bureaucratic and authoritarian orientations, administrators will incorporate and exhibit consistently "democratic" attitudes. This apparently is what has been happening in India in certain agencies since Independence, despite caste, despite long tenure, despite the traditionalism in which most administrators have previously been reared.

It is difficult to identify any large numbers of the officials in our study as "traditional", in contrast to "modernizing". We did use two items in our questionnaire which might permit an exploration of this dimension. These two, on which we asked our officials to indicate agreement or disagreement, were :

1. "The way the government runs things today is better than the way things were run in the past."
2. "Rapid improvement in the economic and social welfare of the Indian people is not possible under the present democratic system of party government."

The distribution of responses to these two items for all administrators was as follows :

	Percentage
Consistently "traditional" on both	11
Consistently "Modernizing" on both	45
Not consistent	
Traditional on 1, Modern on 2	8
Modern on 1, Traditional on 2	35
Unsure on one or both	2

Various interpretations can be drawn from these data. From a pessimistic standpoint one can conclude that a minority have emerged completely from "traditional" orientations. On the other hand, only 10% of the administrative establishment seems still completely committed to traditional views, while almost 50% have adopted "modernizing" orientations. The remainder are in a state of transition. This is a more optimistic view and perhaps a more realistic statement of the condition of the Indian administrative service. What is particularly encouraging is that in the Community Development "staff" and "line" administration less than 5% of the officials are explicitly and consistently "traditional" in their responses (in contrast to 20% in the postal service, 20% among the health "staff", and 15% among police "staff" personnel). There is considerable evidence, therefore, that Indian administrators are developing "modernizing" perspectives, especially in the developmental bureaucracy.

Finally, our analysis reveals a great "distance" between administrators and the public in their perceptions and evaluations of the system. The administrator feels the system functions relatively well, corruption is minimal, and that "relations" with citizens are "good". Indian citizens in the Delhi area do not unanimously or consistently share these perceptions and evaluations insofar as our data reliably describe the state of mutual citizen-administrator attitudes. There is more tension and potential disharmony in the system at present than congruence and mutual understanding. As Indian administrators become more adaptive and "democratic" in their job orientations and public contacts one can hope that these tensions will be reduced, reality perceptions will converge, and greater cooperative behaviour will emerge.

## CHAPTER SIX

### BUREAUCRATIC CONTACT

We come now to a central question, and analytical problem in our investigation—what is the impact of administrative behaviour on public attitudes and performance? This is a question which concerns us for pragmatic reasons, and also because of its significance theoretically for the development of the Indian society. In our introductory chapter we explained our larger theoretical concerns. Empirical examination of elite-citizen contacts and communication will hopefully lead us to an understanding of the Indian prospects for achieving political consensus and unity, for "democratic" involvement with new and transformed political institutions, and for public participation in social and economic developmental innovation. While looking explicitly at citizen-administrative contacts, and identifying the conditions and consequences of such interactions for specific types of behaviour, we hope to uncover clues suggestive of the pattern of movement in India towards major societal goals.

In setting forth our data here we are concerned primarily with five specific theoretical propositions for the developing social and political system in India. These are :

1. If citizens are to be properly involved in the system and in the achievement of system goals, administrative contacts with the public, to be relevant, must be extensive, continuous, and *penetrate* to those sectors of the population most "traditional", most probably alienated, and most vital for the success of developmental goals.
2. If citizens are to be properly involved in the developing India of today, these administrative contacts if relevant should lead to greater *information* and

knowledge, instrumental and substantive, about governmental programmes, policies, plans and goals.

3. If citizens are to be properly involved, these administrative contacts, if relevant, should result in greater citizen *belief* in, and support of, governmental actions and programmes. One should not expect, however, that there will be unanimous consensus over goals or means, but rather a consensus by the large majority that programmes exist which are worthwhile, and feasible.
4. If citizens are to be properly involved, these administrative contacts, if relevant, should inspire *confidence* on the part of the public in the integrity, efficiency, and "bureaucratic style" of officials, leading to a feeling that officials care about the citizenry, treat them fairly, and, thus, that the individual citizen counts in the system, and that his actions are considered meaningful for the system.
5. If citizens are to be properly involved, these administrative contacts, if relevant, should tap the realistic aspirations of the common man, appeal to these aspirations, whether strictly utilitarian or idealistic, and motivate the individual to *action* and achievement, which is significant for the citizen as well as for the system. (This proposition is discussed in the following chapter.)

The goals then must be penetration, information, belief, confidence, and action. Our major query here is whether administrative contacts with the common man in India (Delhi State) in 1964 indicate that bureaucratic contacts are functional or dysfunctional in these respects.

#### *The Index of Administrative Contact*

We asked our respondents a series of questions about their contacts with administrative officials which permitted us to develop an index of "administrative contact" for each person in the sample. We primarily focused on the following agencies in our study : Community Development (Rural areas), Health, Delhi Transport Undertaking (urban), Police and Postal. We

asked about the frequency and/or nature of contact by each respondent with each of these sets of officials, with a maximum score possible of 14. Eleven per cent of our respondents had scores of nine or above, five per cent had zero scores. Two other indices were also developed for the study, one based on "general communication status" (including newspaper readership, group or association memberships, and knowledge of leaders), and a second conceived as "political leadership contact" (including personal contact with village or local leaders and party leaders). The distributions in these two indices will be presented briefly, but are not employed analytically in this chapter. The individual items in the "administrative contact index", such as frequency of contact with Community Development officials, as well as the index as a total score permitted us to classify our respondents in a variety of ways and to analyze the interrelations between type of contact and citizen action.

The basic distributions of our respondents by these three indices as well as their "total communication score" can be seen from Table 6:1. From this it can be seen that the urban population generally has higher scores than does the rural population. There is one notable and significant exception—that of personalized contact with political and governmental leaders. Almost half of the urban sample have no such contacts while less than 10% of the village population is out of personal touch with all political leaders and officials. This is a significant finding in its own right and relates to our "penetration" hypothesis referred to above. The average villager in Delhi State has less frequent occasion to see administrative officials. He may also be less involved with newspapers and group associations, than is the urban resident, although his knowledge of local leaders may substitute for his lower level of newspaper readership and group memberships. But he is personally familiar with political and governmental leadership to a greater extent than is the urbanite. His overall communication status, therefore, compares very favourably with the urban resident. If we combine our last two categories we could say that in Delhi State less than 10% of the rural population seems isolated, while about 12% of urban residents may be isolated, in terms of their public communicative involvement patterns.

These indices are to some extent interrelated and

TABLE 6:1  
The Indices of Communication Status

Categories*	General	Administrative Contact	Communication Status	Personalized Contact with Communication Leaders	Total Status
	Score-14	Score-10	Score-12	Score-36	Score
<b>Highest Scores</b>					
Rural	7%	3	10	7	
Urban	16	6	8	7	
<b>Medium Scores</b>					
Rural	60	33	43	85	
Urban	68	35	21	80	
<b>Low Scores</b>					
Rural	25	54	38	7	
Urban	14	30	22	12	
<b>Zero Scores</b>					
Rural	8	10	9	2	
Urban	2	29	49	1	
	100	100	100	100	

\*The score categories varied, of course, for each index, but were applied consistently for urban and rural populations. The highest "scores" were as follows: for administrative contact (9 and above), in general communication status (7 and above), for personalized contact with leaders (8 and above), for total communication status score (20 and above).

cumulative but by no means perfectly (Table 6:2). The individual who has low exposure to mass media and social groups may also be isolated from administrative contacts. But he may also substitute other types of communicative relationships. In the rural area we find that 90% of the sample with low scores in

general communication status are also limited in their administrative contacts, but the other 10% did have frequent contacts with administrators. On the other hand 60% of those with a high general communication status had infrequent administrative contacts. Alternative channels for communication and contact exist, therefore, for the ordinary citizen and these cannot be ignored in any development strategy.

TABLE 6:2  
Relation of General Communication Exposure to  
Administrative Contacts (Rural Only)

General Communication Status	Administrative Contact Rare or Never (Score 2 or less)	Administrative Contact Low (Score 3-6)	Administrative Contact Medium (Score 7-8)	Administrative Contact High (Score 9+)	N*
Low (Score 2 or less)	43%	47	7	4	215
High (Score 5 or more)	22	39	19	19	36

\* N=number of cases

*The "penetration" problem*

Seventeen years after Independence and after considerable training of the new administrative cadre, particularly in the field of community development, what was the extent to which the ordinary citizen was exposed to the new bureaucracy? Has the "new administration" established contact with the lower classes and with those living in apparently isolated and "traditional" villages, or is most of its contact with the upper and proximately urban strata of Indian society? Table 6:3 presents data relevant to these concerns. It reveals first that the higher the social and economic status of the individual the more

likely he is to have very frequent contact with administrative officials. Only 10% to 15% of the low castes, illiterates and low income groups in both urban and rural areas report high frequency of contact, while upper income, educational and caste groups are consistently higher. Second, the data show that

TABLE 6:3

Administrative Contact Status for Educational, Income  
and Caste Groups

	Administrative Contact Score:			
	Rural		Urban	
	Very High & High	Rarely & Never	Very High & High	Rarely & Never
<i>Education</i>				
Illiterate	12%	39 (207)*	14	35 (84)*
Primary	35	26 (66)	23	24 (79)
Middle	40	24 (37)	48	7 (56)
High+	27	19 (26)	60	3 (125)
<i>Monthly Income</i>				
Under 50				
Rupees	15	34 (95)	23	23 (13)
51—100	18	48 (96)	22	27 (79)
102—200	22	16 (85)	41	14 (118)
201—300	29	38 (21)	50	7 (42)
Over 300	30	9 (23)	50	12 (82)
<i>Caste</i>				
Low	14	34 (108)	16	20 (49)
Middle	21	34 (159)	—	— (9)
High	25	32 (63)	43	13 (206)
Brahmin			41	7 (46)
Harijan			26	26 (19)
Muslims			5	53 (19)

\* ( ) denotes number of cases

urban subgroups are consistently higher in frequency of administrative contacts. For example a comparison of the upper educational strata in urban and rural populations indicates a discrepancy of over 30 percentage points; that of upper income groups a discrepancy of 20 percentage points; that of upper caste groups a discrepancy of 17 percentage points. Third, in actuality this results in much greater differentiations among strata, or more disparities in administrative contact, in the city than in the village. In the village the upper castes do not seem to be extremely "privileged" by having contacts with administrative officials to a greater extent than lower castes—a difference at the "high" end of the scale of about ten to eleven percentage points. But in urban Delhi there is much more distance between low and high caste groups—26 percentage points. For educational groups this distance seems to be extreme. Finally, it is clear that fully a third of the lower socio-economic strata of the rural population in the area near the nation's capital rarely or never has contact with administrative officials. The record in the city is somewhat better. It is premature to be assertive about this finding, pending further data. While on the one hand it is clear that the access of upper social and economic groups to the administrative cadre is much greater and more frequent than that of the low caste, illiterate, low income population, it also appears that administrative effort has reached downwards into the lower levels of the system to a considerable extent. The Harijans in the urban area, for example, reveal frequent contacts with administrators and few seem completely isolated. It is clear that considerable "penetration" has taken place, if one judges penetration by the single criterion of "contact" alone.

Our study design provided for the selection of eight villages which were classified by objective criteria as probably "traditional", "transitional" and "urbanized-modernized". A complex variety of objective indicators were used, including occupational pattern, caste character (percentage from scheduled castes), degree of literacy, geographical location, communication facilities, educational institutions, transportation and roads availability, postal facilities, presence of governmental offices, and the like. If we look at the extent of administrative contacts by village type we see that penetration has occurred where one would perhaps least expect it (Table 6:4). If one

TABLE 6:4

Extent of Administrative Contact—  
“Traditional” and “Modern” Villages

Adminis- trative Contact	Most “tradi- tional” Vil- lages				Most “Modernized Villages				Urban Sample
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	
Very High & High	21%	31	32	13	32	4	8	18	38
Medium	54	41	38	47	44	54	58	46	46
Rare or Never	25	28	30	40	24	41	33	35	16
Never	0	6	6	7	5	13	13	7	10
<i>Number of Cases</i>	24	32	47	30	41	46	48	82	

compares the three most traditional villages (A, B, and C) with the three most modernized villages (F, G, H) one sees in fact greater exposure to the administrative cadre in the so called “Traditional” communities. From 25% to 30% in our samples from traditional villages rarely were exposed to administrators, but up to 40% were rarely exposed in the urbanized-modernized communities. Neither physical or functional isolation, in a formal classificatory sense, nor “traditionalism” as determined by social or economic characteristics, therefore, seems associated with isolation from administrative penetration. Villages in the most “isolated” areas do see administrators and interact with them.

The same finding emerges if we look exclusively at citizen contacts with Community Development officials alone. The *relative* extent of contact is high in the most traditional and isolated communities. In our entire rural sample 67% of the villagers were out of contact with CD officials. But in our most “traditional” village, 50% of our sample had some exposure to CD officials, compared to 42% for the most

"modernized-urbanized" community. Similarly, all three of the most "traditional" villages reported a "high" frequency of contact equal to or surpassing the 26.5% figure for the total rural sample. Although one may feel that this degree of exposure to Community Development officials is too low for the rural sector—67% did not know CD officials or never saw them—one cannot say that the traditional or isolated communities are discriminated against by the development bureaucracy. Indeed, what evidence we have indicates that they are relatively well exposed among villages, although the exposure of the urban population is greater.

*Knowledge of, belief in, and support for Governmental Action*

Since public cooperation and involvement in development programmes is so crucial in India, from the standpoint of governmental objectives, the level of information of the public about such programmes is a major focus of any inquiry. Roughly 16% of the urban sample had no significant contacts with administrators, while 33% of the rural sample had no such contacts. One query is whether administrative contact was associated with greater knowledge about such programmes.

We used a variety of approaches to test the respondent's knowledge of governmental activities, services, and goals ; only a few of which can be presented here. In Table 6:5 the extent of ignorance about governmental programmes and administrative services is illustrated for the rural sample. It is obvious that administrative contact is related to much greater knowledge about specific services and programmes, and is related to a better understanding of governmental expectations concerning citizen action. Those with below average frequencies of bureaucratic contact (over 60% of the rural sample) are extremely and consistently ignorant of what the Community Development programme is (from 60% to 80% have no idea about its nature and aims). On more specific questions concerning agriculture and the health programmes the ignorance is less apparent, generally, but still considerable. One fifth to one half of those with infrequent contact have no specific knowledge of the health services, for example.

The importance of general administrative contact whether or not there has been exposure to the Community Development

TABLE 6:5

Information Level by Extent of Administrative Contact  
(Rural Sample)

Information Item	Administrative Contact Score :					
	Very High	High	Average	Occasional	Rare	Never
1. No Knowledge of Community Development Programme	29%	29	48	63	67	81
2. No Knowledge of ways government is trying to improve agricultural production	4	7	21	37	38	44
3. What does government want you to do in agricultural programme ? <i>*Don't know</i>	5	17	20	30	44	47
4. No Knowledge of health services	9	5	10	23	22	48
5. Does not know where family planning centre is	43	61	68	82	91	96
6. No opinion on what to do if one has a problem involving administrative agencies or officials	0	0	5	7	4	19
Proportion of Sample	7	12	19	29	25	8

\*Farmers only

Note : Each percentage should be read as a proportion of those in each administrative contact category. For example, 29% of those with "very high" administrative contact had none of the CD programme, etc.

bureaucracy, is demonstrated in Table 6:6. For those villages who had limited contact with administrative officials generally, exposure to the CD bureaucracy significantly reduced ignorance about the aims and expectations of the CD programme. But among those with a generally high level of administrative contact, the absence of contact with CD officials was not important.

TABLE 6:6

Relative Impact on Knowledge of Governmental Programmes  
of General Administrative Contact and Contact with  
Community Development Officials (Rural)

Information Item	Highest Administrative Contact Scores		Medium Administrative Contact Scores	
	High CD Contact Scores	Low CD Contact Scores	High CD Contact Scores	Low CD Contact Scores
1. No Knowledge of CD Programme	33%	23	35	63
2. No Knowledge of ways government is trying to improve agri- cultural production	8	4	17	35
<i>Number of Cases</i>	39	26	29	131

In urban Delhi the extent of ignorance about governmental services is extremely high for those who have not had administrative contacts. The illustrative items in Table 6:7 suggest that in the vital area of health services over 60% of the "isolated" are completely ignorant. Even among those with a high administrative contact score lack of knowledge of health services is widespread—from 30% to 50% have no specific knowledge. If one compares the rural and urban distributions, one notices that there are differential patterns of ignorance. The rural population is very much better informed about

specific health services—at least a third of the rural population is more knowledgeable. (This is not true, however, so far as knowledge of the Family Planning Centre is concerned.) The urban population, furthermore, is much less knowledgeable as

TABLE 6:7

Level of Information by Frequency of Administrative Contact (Urban)

	Administrative Contact Score:				
	Very High	High	Average	Occasional	Never
1. No Knowledge of health services	47%	62	63	61	88
2. Does not know where Family Planning Centre is	32	51	54	78	81
3. No opinion of what to do if R has a problem involving administrative agencies or officials	13	13	19	34	44
<i>Number of Cases</i>	54	78	85	73	57
Proportion of Sample	16	23	25	21	16

how to process problems with administrative officials. The citizen-official relationship in the village has apparently educated villagers on how to seek administrative action.

What is the impact of administrative contact for illiterates as compared to literates, a question of no little significance in a country with 75% illiteracy? The evidence is mixed, but generally administrative contact seems to be a factor reducing ignorance of governmental services in urban Delhi, among both literates and illiterates. Thus, among illiterates not exposed to

TABLE 6:8  
The Influence of Literacy on Level of Information about Governmental Services (Urban)

Administrative Contact Score :	Very High, High, & Average			Occasional			Rare or Never		
	Literates		Illiterates	Literates		Illiterates	Literates		Illiterates
	Literates	Illiterates	Literates	Illiterates	Literates	Illiterates	Literates	Illiterates	
1. No Knowledge of Health services	60%	53	65	54	89	86			
2. Does not know where Family Planning Centre is	43	83	73	92	78	86			
3. No opinion of what to do if R has a problem involving administrative agencies or officials	10	53	27	50	33	60			
Number of Cases	179	30	48	24	27	29			

administrative services, 86% are ignorant of health services, while only 53% are ignorant if in frequent contact with administrators; the comparable figures for literates are 89% and 60%. It is a curious and significant finding that illiterates in all administrative contact categories are slightly better informed than literates on this particular item concerning the health services. On the other measures of knowledge, however, this is not so. Illiterates are extremely uninformed and uncertain about specific administrative services and about procedures for contacting administrative officials. On this latter point, those with an education who have also had frequent contact with officials are well informed on how to process grievances and problems through the administrative hierarchy. Getting an education in India does not, in short, seem to be very functional by itself to knowledge about governmental programmes. Experience with the administrative apparatus seems more functional, for certain types of information, though among illiterates with such contacts considerable ignorance of administrative procedures and services persists.

#### *Public Support of Governmental Officials and Programmes*

When one examines the degree of support for governmental officials and programmes in India (Delhi State), there are striking differences for urban and rural populations, as well as for illiterates and those with considerable education. When asked what kind of a job the central government is doing, less than 40% of the urban population say it is doing a good or very good job, while about 55% of the rural population is supportive. The urban disapproval is widespread among all educational classes; the rural disapproval is highest among illiterates (only 47% approving). When asked to evaluate the job of a specific set of officials, as health officials, roughly the same differences appear, although the support is from five to ten percentage points higher. The rural population, and its educational subgroups, is consistently more supportive, but large segments of the population, especially among the lower status groups, are very critical of the central government and its programmes.

The impact of administrative contact on these support levels can be seen from Table 6:9. In rural areas those who are

TABLE 6:9

The Role of Administrative Contact in Developing Belief in,  
and Support for, Governmental Programmes

	Administrative Contact Score :					
	Very High	High	Aver- age	Occa- sional	Rare	Never
<i>Rural</i>						
Believe Government officials are doing a good/very good job						
—village officials	88%	78	75	64	58	48
—central government officials	89	51	67	47	54	39
Believe Health services should be provided by the government	100	100	98	95	94	85
Believe Community Development Programme is worth while	100	98	66	63	60	52
Believe CD officials doing a good job	88	83	59	50	52	44
—not a good job	3	5	22	27	19	11
—no opinion	0	2	19	23	29	44
Rare and Never						
<i>Urban</i>						
Believe government officials are doing a good/very good job						
—municipal (Delhi)	17	35	22	30	23	
—central government	30	44	40	45	22	
Believe Health services should be provided by government	98	90	96	89	81	

frequent interactors with the bureaucracy have extremely favourable attitudes towards governmental officials, local and central, as well as highly approve the health and Community Development programmes. Those out of touch with the bureaucracy are much less supportive. Less than 40% of those who are isolated say the central governmental officials are doing a good or very good job, under 60% feel the Community Development programme is worth while, and 50% or less feel that CD officials are doing a good job. Health programmes are supported by overwhelming majorities in both urban and rural areas. But urban residents are very critical of government officials, local and central, and contact with these officials does not contribute to a greater approval for the job they are performing. Administrative contact, thus, seems much more functional to the development of supportive attitudes in rural than in urban areas.

#### *Public Confidence in the Bureaucracy*

A general theoretical concern in any society is the nature and extent of the public's belief that administrators are, as Morris Janowitz has put it, "principle-minded", that is guided by an interest in, as well as observing rules providing for, impartiality and "public" service.<sup>1</sup> Can the citizen expect fair treatment from officials, or "is political pull" indispensable? In addition, does the citizen feel he can act alone in approaching administrators or does he need help? Finally, is there any effective redress if one feels that officials are not doing their jobs properly? Expectations of impartiality, realistic circulations as to how to approach administrators, and feelings of optimism concerning the efficacy of interactions with administrators—all are important components of the confidence perspectives in citizen-official relationships. Data on such components will tell us a great deal about the general problem of public citizen perceptions of authority as well as indicate for India what the potential is for citizen cooperation with development plans.

The general pattern of responses to questions we asked in

<sup>1</sup>See Morris Janowitz, *et al*, *Public Administration and Public-Perspectives Toward Government in a Metropolitan Community*, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan Bureau of Government, 1958.

the Delhi study in this substantive area revealed a pattern somewhat similar to those found in Detroit by Janowitz. For example on the question of whether "political pull" is important in "whether the government will help a private citizen" the distributions for Detroit in 1954 and Delhi in 1964 were as follows :

	Detroit	Delhi Urban	Delhi Rural
Yes, it plays an important part	41%	54	70
Yes, it plays some part	28	6	5
Depends	4	3	2
No	15	7	11

On the question "if you had a problem to take up with a government bureau, would you do it yourself or do you think you would be better off if you got the help of some person or organization ?" the following distributions were found :

	Detroit	Delhi Urban	Delhi Rural
Would do it himself	16%	25	23
Would get help	67	50	64

What we were particularly interested in the Indian study was the extent to which administrative contact was related to these confidence perspectives. Table 6:10 presents the data.

The relatively high confidence in both administrative behaviour and in the capacity of the citizen to act effectively in contacts with administrators is noticeable in the response patterns of the rural sample. But the peasant's perspectives appear to be somewhat inconsistent, if not naive. For he feels that officials are impartial, but that "political pull" is also important, and despite this he is more likely to attempt direct contact with administrators than is his much more cynical urban counterpart. The urban resident doubts the fair-mindedness

TABLE 6:10

## The Relevance of Administrative Contact for Citizen Confidence in the Political System

	Administrative Contact Score :					
	Very High	High	Aver- age	Occa- sional	Rare	Never
<i>Rural</i>						
Officials treat all citizens fairly	65%	59	60	58	59	48
Citizens can act if officials are not doing their jobs properly	83	78	69	57	45	33
Would act by himself if has a problem with the government	42	24	30	19	19	19
Political pull is important in dealing with administrators	79	81	79	79	69	56
<i>Urban</i>						
Officials treat all citizens fairly	44	36	36	42	33	<i>Rare or Never</i>
Citizens can act if officials are not doing their jobs properly	72	59	55	63	63	
Would act himself if has a problem with the government	30	32	21	26	16	
Political pull is important in dealing with administrators	65	68	71	44	47	

of administrators and also has less self-confidence in dealing with them. These differentials are consistent for most of these administrative-contact-score categories.

Does increased contact with administrators seem related to greater confidence in the bureaucracy? Yes and no. Those with "very high" contact scores emphasize the role of "political pull" much more than the "isolates"—a 23 percentage point differential in the rural sector, and 17 percentage point differential in the urban sector. But there is also an increase in the proportion who feel optimistic about the success of citizen contacts with administrators, either in initiating actions or in reprisals. The data are not completely consistent on this matter for the urban sample but point in that direction. It seems then that although there may be some rural naivete, and considerable distrust of administrative impartiality and responsiveness to public demands (although probably no more so than in the United States), exposure to the bureaucracy in India brings with it a certain realism as to how administrative decisions are made.

In addition, among those with high contact scores there is a feeling that the citizen *can* act. On the question what would you do if you have a problem with the government, 44% of those with no contact with officials in urban Delhi had "no opinion", while only 13% of those with "high" contact scores were at a loss as to how to approach such officials. In the rural sample there was more self-confidence, but whereas none of the respondents in the "high" contact categories had "no opinion" as to how to proceed, 20% of those isolated from the bureaucracy had "no opinion" on action alternatives. Administrative contact, then, may be functional to the achievement of greater "realism" about administrative behaviour and greater self-confidence in dealings with administrators.

#### *Patterns of Citizen-Administrator Relationships in Three Blocks*

Communities differ in their social and political characteristics; administrative systems vary by geographical area. Bearing these theoretical assumptions in mind, the critical question to explore in concluding our analysis is: Do differential patterns of administrative behaviour appear to be related

to differing levels of public support for the administrative system in India? In order to secure evidence on this matter we took the three developmental areas or Blocks in which our rural survey was conducted—Alipur, Najafgarh, and Mehrauli—and examined the background and attitudes of all administrative officials in our sample, on the one hand, and the attitudinal data for our public sample, on the other. By isolating these data for these three basic geographical areas, we can demonstrate different administrative system orientations and

TABLE 6:11  
Block Differences in Public Attitudes  
Towards Administrators

	Alipur	Najafgarh	Mehrauli
Perceptions of "Relations" with officials :			
Poor	9%	9	33
Fair	12	13	24
Good	68	70	26
Very Good	3	5	1
Don't know	8	3	16
Ignorance of Administrative System (% of public in each block with no knowledge) :			
Of village officials			
performance	4	4	15
Of Block officials'			
performance	11	8	19
Of central government			
performance	13	32	
No knowledge of what to do "if you have a problem with a governmental official"	2	2	14
Number of Cases	159	84	94

seek to link public responses to these three administrative systems, hopefully arriving at clues as to the relevance of administrative behaviour for public behaviour.

Significant differences exist in public attitudes and relationships in these three Blocks. One of them in particular stands out as an area with poor administrative-public "relations". In Mehrauli, public knowledge of the bureaucratic system, including "instrumental" knowledge, is less than in the other two Blocks. More important is the much larger percentage of citizens who perceive their relationships as unsatisfactory—57% in Mehrauli compared to 21% in Alipur. Further, our indices of "administrative support" and "political self-confidence", which summarize a great variety of responses, indicate again that the Mehrauli population seems less supportive, more bewildered, or alienated, than in the other two Blocks (Table 6:12). One finds very few people in Mehrauli who enthusiastically support administrators—9% compared to over 20% in the other Blocks. Close to 50% of the Mehrauli public reveals low support for administrators, compared to 14% or less in the other Blocks. Similarly, there are striking

TABLE 6:12

Variations in Public Support for Administration and  
in Political Self-Confidence—Three Blocks

	Alipur	Najafgarh	Mehrauli
<b>Administrative Support Index:</b>			
High Support (7+)	21%	29	9
Moderate support (4—6)	67	57	46
Low support (1—3)	11	14	39
No support (0)	1	0	6
<b>Political self-confidence Index:</b>			
High self-Confidence (6+)	28%	33	3
Moderate self-confidence (3—5)	57	51	59
Low self-confidence (1—2)	15	16	29
No self-confidence	0	0	10

differences in the citizen's level of self-confidence in dealing with officials in Mehrauli and the other two Blocks.

The intriguing question for us is whether the background, training, attitudes, and behaviour patterns of the administrative officials functioning in these three blocks helps explain these differing patterns of public perceptions of, and support for, these officials. We tested many hypotheses, and found that the personal characteristics and training of officials did not vary greatly in these Blocks. We did find that there was some difference, though not striking, in the commitment of officials to "democratic" relationships. Thus, on our "index of democratic job perspectives", the officials in the Blocks were distributed as follows:

Official Score	Alipur	Najafgarh	Mehrauli
High (most democratic)	56%	51	44
Moderate	31	30	44
Lowest	13	19	12

Similarly, on the question of whether "serving the public" or "following the orders of the superior" was most important, 40% of Mehrauli officials in our sample took the bureaucratic position, compared to 37% of Najafgarh administrators and 34% of those in Alipur.

Much more suggestive is the finding that the extent of citizen contact with administrators was significantly different. The findings were:

Citizen Contact Scores	Alipur	Najafgarh	Mehrauli
High Contact (9+)	12%	5	1
Moderately High (7-8)	9	25	5
Some Contact (3-6)	44	44	57
Low Contact (1-2)	28	21	24
No Contact (0)	7	5	13

It is clear from this that citizens in Mehrauli Block had more sporadic contacts with administrators—6% had "high contact", compared to over 20% with frequent contact in the other two Blocks. This may be due to several factors including public apathy, or greater proximity to the metropolitan area but it is

probable that officials in Alipur and Najafgarh were more actively engaged in regular contacts with the public than was the case in Mehrauli.

Our data strongly indicate that the most important difference between Mehrauli and other Blocks is the extensive pattern of official contact with the public. Mehrauli officials do not differ significantly from other officials in background or training. They are inclined to be only slightly more "bureaucratic" in their orientations towards their work. But they seem to be much more out of touch with the public, with the result that a poor public image has developed of the Mehrauli bureaucracy. People see their relationships with Mehrauli administrators as "poor" or only "fair", probably because of their feeling that Mehrauli officials are out of touch. As a consequence, even those with rather frequent contact with Mehrauli officials are less "supportive", as the following data reveals:

Percentage of those in frequent contact with officials who score highest on our "index of administrative support":

Mehrauli	0%
Najafgarh	16
Alipur	32

It appears that once an image of official bureaucracy develops it persists, despite the training, attitudes, or special contacts of certain citizens with officials.

### *Conclusions*

In this very preliminary and exploratory effort we have sought to examine the extent to which the "new bureaucracy" in India has penetrated into those citizen sectors in India which are most critical for development, most probably passive, and most potentially alienated or alienatable. Further, we have examined the relevance of administrative effort for increased knowledge about governmental programmes, increased belief in and support for those programmes, increased confidence in the citizen's capacity to cope with officials, and positive action to implement these programmes. On balance the data suggest

that there has indeed been "pay off" from administrative effort. Where citizens have been in contact with officials, particularly in rural areas, the experience seems to have been functional to citizen involvement in the system. This is not to say that the behaviour of Community Development officials specifically, or the behaviour of other administrative cadres, has been completely successful in India. As reported previously, many citizens are as yet completely isolated, and many citizens in contact with Indian officials have deep suspicions, basic dissatisfactions, and uncooperative attitudes. Nevertheless there is evidence that the bureaucracy is having and can play an important role. These data are not significant only from the standpoint of achieving economic or social goals. They have important implications for the eventual development of integrative citizen perspectives, for identification of the citizen with the larger collectivity of "the state", and for the involvement of the citizen in the "modern" bureaucratic apparatus of India which is so essential if national unity is to be achieved and, on the other hand, if bureaucrats are to act responsively.

Our study suggests that it is actual contact with the public in the field that counts—contact which is courteous and responsive while efficient and fair. Our analysis strongly indicates that officials with democratic orientations who are actively involved with the citizens in the field, and not bureaucratically shut off from them, can and are having a tremendous impact on the attitudes and behaviour of Indian citizens.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

India's Community Development programme has been called a massive governmental "extension service". Its aim has been to train and send out an "army" of competent officials to establish contact with rural citizens and help them improve their personal and village conditions of living, in health, education, transport and roads, communication, and agriculture. It is "development" and "welfare" oriented. In the last analysis its success depends on the commitment and support of the rural citizenry, both attitudinally and behaviourally, to the philosophy and goals of the programme, as well as to the personnel assigned to carry it out. While competent and dedicated "extension" officials are needed and without adequate resources all efforts would be largely futile, given proper resources and competent officials success is still contingent on the capacity of the system to motivate and activate the peasants and villagers.

We probed in great detail in our study for information about the general levels of public knowledge, support, and cooperation with Community Development, and with the agricultural programme in particular. Although we have alluded to some of these findings at other points in this report, we will here present a more complete analysis of our data. The key questions confronting us are, of course : Does the public know about the programme and understand it ; is the public positively supportive of it ; and does the public's behaviour indicate it is a programme evoking a maximal or minimal involvement, and an involvement which is meaningfully related to the goals of the programme ? Above all, is the work of Community Development officials effective, as measured by the

extent of the public's contacts with these officials and the relationship of this contact to citizen behaviour?

### *General Patterns of Involvement*

As already indicated (see Chapter 2) the rural public in our study revealed considerable general support for Community Development. Only a fifth felt that Community Development was doing a "poor job", over two thirds felt the programme was worth while, and there was only a small proportion who felt that there was great opposition to the programme. On the other hand, very few had considerable knowledge of the goals of Community Development—5%—while over 50% were almost completely ignorant. Similarly, when asked to explain what the accomplishments of Community Development in their villages were, only a third could mention any specific accomplishments, while a fifth said nothing had been done, and over 40% said they didn't know what the accomplishments were. Improvements of roads, water facilities, and agricultural assistance were most frequently mentioned by those who were aware of accomplishments (Table 7:1).

TABLE 7:1

#### Public Recognition of the Accomplishments of Community Development (Rural only)

(What in your opinion are the most important  
accomplishments of Community Development here?)

---

Nothing has been accomplished	22%
Don't know about accomplishments	42
Mentions specific accomplishments :	37
Streets, roads mentioned	33%
Water and Irrigation mentioned	22
Agricultural assistance mentioned	21
Schools mentioned	15
Health improvements mentioned	8

---

In terms of time perspectives, evaluations of the programme also seemed mixed. We asked our respondents whether they thought Panchayati Raj had improved block administration in the past 10 years. Only a fifth saw a change for the better, 16% saw a change for the worse, while over 60% said no change had occurred or they didn't know (See Table 7:2).

TABLE 7:2  
Public Evaluations of Panchayati Raj

(In what ways has the formation of Panchayati Raj changed the Block Administration?) (Rural only)

Changed for the better	20%
Changed for the worse	16
No Change has occurred	25
Don't know or Unsure	39

Thus, although the rural public seems to approve, and not oppose, these governmental programmes, they are not aware of, or extremely enthusiastic about, the changes that have been made. The low level of public interest in Community Development, no doubt a major factor in this pattern of attitudes, is frankly admitted by villagers. Only 27% of our sample said they were "very interested", while 32% said they had no interest (Table 7:3).

TABLE 7:3  
Level of Public Interest in Community Development  
(Would you say that you are very interested in the Community Development Programme, somewhat interested, or not interested?) (Rural sample only)

Very interested	27%
Somewhat interested	29
Not interested	32
Don't know, or No opinion	11

### *Support for the Agricultural Programme*

When we move beyond general evaluations to specifics, and ask particularly about the agricultural programme, we see the relative impact of governmental programmes on the attitudes and behaviour of villagers and farmers in the Delhi area. The findings when viewed together reveal an interesting blend of perceptions concerning the relevance and irrelevance of governmental action. Farmers may not be self-consciously aware of what their specific responsibilities are, but for a sizable proportion of the farm sample changes are taking place, and partially as a result of governmental encouragement.

A first point to be noted is that when we asked the villagers to tell us what the government was specifically doing to increase agricultural production only 29% answered "nothing". However, when we asked them to tell us "*what the government wants you to do*" to increase agricultural production only 15% could give a specific and relevant response. Most say they "don't know" or merely say they are to "work hard".

This tendency towards ambiguity is manifest in all social sectors (Table 7:4). True, the responses of the higher income and educational groups indicate that they have more awareness about governmental plans, and they are less likely to say they are completely uninformed. But specific knowledge of what the government wants farmers to do does not increase greatly or considerably by social status.

Despite such ambiguity as to their responsibilities, approximately 60% of the farmers claim that they have made changes in their farming methods or facilities in the past five years (Table 7:5). The number and types of changes reveal that the use of improved seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides are the most common changes which have been introduced (from 70% to 80% mentioning these three). But sizable numbers of farmers are making more use of implements, subsidiary farm occupations (as vegetable or "truck" farming), different cropping patterns, etc.

In analyzing carefully the way farmers are working their farms, it is interesting to note the labour force utilization trends, as reported by our villager-farmer. We asked them whether they were relying more on their own labour today or whether

TABLE 7:4

Social Status Differences Related to Knowledge of  
Governmental Agricultural Planning(“What are the ways in which the government has been  
trying to increase Agricultural Production?”)

	Mentions 3 or more ways	Mentions 1 or 2 ways	Mentions None or says “Don’t know”	N*
<i>Income Status (Monthly)</i>				
Under 50 rupees	36%	28	36	50
51—100 rupees	37	30	33	87
101—200 rupees	55	22	23	87
201—300 rupees	76	5	19	21
over 300 rupees	70	4	26	23
<i>Educational Status</i>				
Illiterates	38%	21	40	202
Primary Schooling	55	32	13	62
Middle Schooling	65	21	14	37
Higher Education	76	20	4	25

\* N=number of cases

they were using more hired labour, or if there was no change in the way they worked their farms. It is significant to note that of all farmers 39% are relying more on their own labour and only 6% are relying more on hired labour. To put it another way, of those farmers who have made changes in their methods of farming 70% are relying more on their own labour and only 11% are relying more on hired labour (See Table 7:6). There are different possible interpretations of these data. But it appears plausible that much of the increase in agricultural production in the past five or more may have occurred as the result of farmers working their own farms harder, without outside hired help. It may well be that hard work by the farmer

TABLE 7:5

Ways in Which Farmers Have Changed Their Farming  
Methods in the Past Five Years

*General Distributions*

Have not changed	40%
Have changed	60

*Types of changes* (Percentages based on the number of respondents who said they made changes)

Seeds	83%
Fertilizers	88
Insecticides	70
Implements	41
Subsidiary farming	40
More investment	33
Tractors	29
Cropping patterns	26
Water & Irrigation	21
Marketing	12
Transporation	7
Storage	5
Tubewells	4

*Number of changes*

One	8%
Two	12
Three	14
Four to six	48
Over six	18

and his family has been paying greater dividends in increasing production than the distribution of seeds, fertilizers, water facilities, or insecticides.

There can be no doubt from our data that farmers want to make changes in farm methods in order to increase production. There is no great resistance attitudinally to such changes. At

TABLE 7:6

## Changes in the Utilization of Farm Labour

("Are you relying more on your own labour today in the way you work your farm, or are you using more hired labour, or is there no change compared to five years ago ?)

Have made no changes at all	40%
Have made changes	60
But no changes in utilization of labour	10
Changes in utilization of labour	90
Rely more on hired labour	6
Rely more on own labour	84
<i>Summary (of those who have made some changes in farming)</i>	
Rely more on own labour	71%
Rely more on hired labour	11
No changes in using labour	18
	100
<i>Summary (of all farmers in sample)</i>	
Rely more on own labour	39%
Rely more on hired labour	6
No change in use of labour	55
	100

least 83% of our sample were interested in change, said that the majority wanted to make changes. Further 60% revealed that

TABLE 7:7  
Public Perceptions of How Many People Want to Make  
Changes in Agricultural Production  
(Does the majority of the people here want to make changes?)

Yes	83%
No	14
Don't know	3

they had made changes. When we probed we found that they felt that Community Development and governmental officials had encouraged them to make changes. When asked "What promoted you to make these changes?", two thirds attributed it to the advice and prodding of CD and other governmental officials (Table 7:8). From 20% to 30% said it was at least partly

TABLE 7:8  
Public Perceptions of the Role of Community Development  
in Making Changes in Agriculture  
("What prompted you to make these changes in  
agriculture?")

(Based on an N of 105 farmers who said they had  
made at least one change)

*Reason*

Encouragement by CD officials or by "government officials"	66%
Own initiative solely	19
Village leaders, or friends, relatives encouraged	8
CD officials <i>and</i> own initiative	4
Village leaders or friends—relatives <i>and</i> own initiative	4
	100%

their own initiative which was responsible. Thus although the great majority of villagers and farmers cannot articulate clearly what the goals of Community Development are, or even specify clearly what the government wants them to do in the matter of increasing agricultural production, over 50% are making specific changes, or have done so, and are working their farms harder by themselves. Although governmental prodding may be promoting such changes, it is the individual farmer's own hard work which is of tremendous importance in producing results. His own motivation plus governmental encouragement seem to have worked together to produce the increase in production in the agricultural sphere which has occurred.

The question arises—why have the 40% who have not made changes continued to operate today as in the past? We asked these farmers to explain their reasons in detail (Table 7:9). A great variety of explanations were given: "no need for a change", "the old way seems best", "don't know what to do," and "no interest". One segment of this group said frankly that changes would be too expensive or that they had very little land and thus could not make any changes. These two categories include at least 30% of those who had not made changes. It may well be that other responses also have an undertone of financial inadequacy or economic futility. If we add these findings to the previous findings that many of the types of changes in agricultural methods recommended by the government are not being undertaken by those farmers who are change-oriented, the critical element of the need for economic assistance can be seen if agriculture is to move ahead.

In order to attempt to secure some evidence that a change in governmental programme might lead to even greater changes in agricultural production, we asked an "iffy" sort of question:

"If the government would promise the farmers that they would not lose money if they made these changes—by giving them credit and not insisting on repayment of their debts unless their crops improved with such changes in methods—do you think that the farmers would follow the advice of the government?"

This question was patiently explained to the respondents by our interviewers and their reactions noted. We found that 85% said they would make changes, and that the majority of farmers would make changes, if the government adopted this policy. Here then is evidence that the level of farmer effort to step up production might be jumped by 25% if such a new credit policy were adopted.

TABLE 7:9

Reasons for Not Making Changes in Agriculture  
or Farming Methods

(Based on those farmers who had not changed in  
the past five years)

---

Too expensive	21%
Very little land	13
Don't know what to do	13
No interest	5
Old way seems best	12
No need, doing well	5
Other; no facilities	13
Don't know why	8
Not ascertained	12
<i>Number of Cases</i>	<i>103</i>

---

There can be no question concerning the willingness of farmers to make changes in their methods. They see their standard of living as realistically related to such progress

TABLE 7:10

Potential for Agricultural Change: Credit Incentives  
 ("Would you change if the government provided easier credit terms ?")

---

Yes, would change	86%
No, would not change	11
Do'nt know, depends	3
<i>Number of Cases</i>	205

---

(Table 7:11), and they are interested in cooperating with governmental efforts. But apparently more action could be undertaken by the government to relieve financial and economic impediments to such changes in agricultural production, and a much more serious effort in informing farmers about the goals and objectives of the programme is necessary, if the government is to maximize the achievement of its agricultural goals.

TABLE 7:11

Perception of Relationship Between Standard of Living and Increasing Agricultural Production

("Do you think your standard of living would improve if you did improve your ways of farming and follow the advice of government for increasing farm production?")

---

Yes, standard of living would increase	85%
No, standard of living would not increase	7
Depends, can't say, don't know	8
<i>Number of Cases</i>	206

*The Importance of Citizen Contact with  
Community Development Officials*

Perhaps the most practical and relevant query in a study such as this is: Is there any evidence that the activities of Community Development officials produce results? Or, to put the question another way: Are the attitudes and behaviours of citizens who have been in contact with CD officials markedly different than those who have not been in contact with these officials? It is one thing for rural respondents to tell us that the encouragement of CD officials was important to them. It is another matter to demonstrate that there was indeed interaction between peasant and official, and that this contact was related to changed perspectives and behaviour. The latter is not an easy consequence to document.

We asked our rural sample several questions to determine whether there were *official* "dealings" with CD officials, as well as whether there was *personal* acquaintanceship with them. Then we asked: How often in the past month have you seen these officials? Almost two thirds of our sample had never had any contact with these officials, while about one fifth had had frequent contact. The distributions were as follows:

	Total Sample	Farmers Only
Did not know officials—		
Never had contact	66%	59%
Knew officials—		
Saw them once or twice in the past month	6	8
Saw them rarely or on special occasions	1	—
Saw them three or four times in the past month	6	7
Saw them five or six times in the past month	2	3
Saw them more than six times in the past month	18	22
Don't know how often saw them in the past month	2	1
Number of Cases	335	208

The differences in contact by social status are significant (Table 7:12). Whereas over 70% of the illiterates and low-income members of our sample were out of touch with these officials, only 27% to 42% of the upper-income and well-educated groups had no such contact.

TABLE 7:12  
Frequency of Contact with Community Development  
Officials—By Social Status

	No Contact	Some Contact	High Contact (Over Six Times)	N*
<i>Income Status (Monthly Family Income)</i>				
Under 50 Rupees				
51—100 Rupees	73%	7	20	51
101—200 Rupees	78	11	11	92
201—300 Rupees	60	20	20	85
over 300 Rupees	55	20	25	20
	27	37	36	22
<i>Education Status</i>				
Illiterates				
Primary	74	11	15	203
Middle	55	23	22	64
Intermediate and High	66	17	17	35
	42	20	38	26

\*N=number of cases

Although there clearly appears to be some "social selectivity" in public contacts with CD officials,<sup>1</sup> a certain amount of "penetration" by the developmental bureaucracy is beginning to take place. One fourth of the poorest and most illiterate peasants do have some contact with these officials, and for 15% to 20% it is rather frequent. Further, it is conceivable that despite lack

<sup>1</sup>In addition, there may well have been some purposeful selection in

of contact there is a gradual "percolation downward" of Community Development aspirations and plans through the social status hierarchy. This is speculative, not documented by our data. But it is suggested by the fact that 66% of our farmer respondents said that encouragement by CD officials was a factor in their changed farming methods, *although only one third had had personal or official contact with these officials.*

We can begin to see the possible consequence of contact with Community Development officials if we divide our

TABLE 7:13

The Relationship of Frequency of Contact with Community Development Officials to Citizen Evaluations of the Programme

	Community Development Contact Scores			
	Frequent	Some	Little	None
CD officials doing a "good job"?				
Yes	84%	62	63	51
No	11	35	26	20
No opinion	5	4	11	29
Accomplishments of CD?				
Nothing has been done	8	15	15	26
Don't know what has been done?	21	38	30	47
Failures of CD?				
No failures	48	19	21	17
Don't know about failures	36	38	58	65
CD Programme worthwhile?				
Yes	90	81	80	60
No	0	15	5	10
Uncertain	10	4	15	29
Number of Cases	61	26	20	228

respondents into those with "frequent", "some", "little", contact and contrast their attitudes and behaviours with those who have had no contact whatsoever. It must be remembered that almost two thirds of our respondents had no contact whatsoever, directly and personally.

Evaluations of the job of CD officials and the accomplishments of the CD programme vary by frequency of contact with these officials (Table 7:13). True, there is very high support for the programme among those who have had no contact with the CD bureaucracy. Thus, 50% say the officials are doing a "good job", and 60% think the programme is worth while, even though they are out of touch with the personnel involved with the programme. But 84% and 90% of those in "frequent" contact evaluate the job and programme favourably. And even a little contact with officials seems to increase the level of support. Those who have met CD officials are much less likely to point to failures in the programme or to say that there have been no accomplishments. The "don't knows" are still relatively numerous (21% of those in frequent contact say they do not know what the accomplishments are). But there seems to be clear evidence that information about Community Development is transmitted by these officials and produces much higher levels of support. It is interesting that those who have had contact with officials point to road improvements as the most outstanding accomplishment (about 50% mentioning this), with improvements in irrigation, schools, and agricultural assistance mentioned next (by one fourth to one third).

The interest of people in the Community Development programme is relatively high, even among those not exposed to the apparatus and personnel of the programme (Table 7:14). One may discount these findings with the argument that people would be inclined to give affirmative, "respectable" responses. Yet there was considerable variation among the Contact groups. And even those in frequent contact were not inclined to say they were "very interested". Contact seems related to interest. But the differences are not as great as one might expect. Above all, the potential for involvement seems high. Almost 50% of those not in contact with CD officials revealed some interest in the programme.

Knowledge about the programme is not restricted to

those who have had contact with CD officials. Forty per cent of those respondents (farmers) out of touch with officials could

TABLE 7:14  
Interest in the CD Programme—By Frequency of Contact

<i>Level of Interest</i>	Community Development Contact Scores			
	Frequent	Some	Little	None
Very interested	42%	31	26	23
Somewhat interested	40	35	21	26
Not interested	18	26	53	35
Don't know	0	8	0	16

mention three or more specific ways in which the government is trying to increase agricultural production. This compares to 64% of those in "frequent" contact and 58% who had "some" or a "little" contact. Thus, again, although the efforts of the officials may be paying off in more substantive and instrumental knowledge, there may be a general diffusion of knowledge through other bureaucratic or communication media, or a dissemination of knowledge through social groups or interpersonal associations.

#### *Action Orientations Relevant to Community Development*

In our study we asked a long series of questions seeking to discover in detail how the farmer was working his farm, what changes he had introduced in recent years in the use of seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, in cropping patterns, marketing methods, and the like. In addition we attempted to discover the nature of his financial and standard of living aspirations for himself and his family, and whether he felt he could or would participate in the government's programme to increase agricultural production. This brings us to the heart of the question of the relevance of bureaucratic effort for economic and social change in India. In short, we were interested in discovering what the role of the Community Development bureaucracy was in

moving farmers to cooperate with the Five Year Plans' objectives in the agricultural sector. We can present only a few of the relevant findings here, but they are highly suggestive (Table 7:15).

As our previous report indicated the farmers in our study were highly motivated to improve their economic status. The

TABLE 7:15  
The Relationship of Administrative Contact to  
Self-Interest Aspirations and Positive Actions  
in the Agricultural Spheres  
(Rural Sample—Farmers Only)

	General Administrative Contact Score				
	Very high & High	Occa- sional	Average	Rare	Never
Feel standard of living would improve if followed the advice of the govern- ment in agricultural sphere	77%	65	56	71	55
Have changed ways of farming in the past five years	70	56	34	39	25
Contact with Community Development Officials					
	Very High	Moderate	Low	None	
Feel standard of living would improve if followed the advice of the government in agricultural sphere	76%	81	56	61	
Have changed ways of farming in the past five years	83	67	33	32	

overwhelming majority of them had aspirations to improve their lot and were convinced that the proposals of the government would indeed assist them to improve their standard of living. As Table 7:15 reveals the evidence does not suggest that contact with administrative officials, generally, or specifically in the CD bureaucracy, was instrumental to that end. True, 77% of those with "high" contact scores felt their standard of living would increase, but 71% of those rarely in contact with officials had the same conviction. The same finding is true if one looks at exposure to the CD bureaucracy alone. But the striking finding is that *action*, as contrasted to aspirational *conviction*, differs markedly for those farmers exposed to administrative officials. Whereas 70% or more of those with high contact scores *did* change their methods of farming, only one fourth to one third of those isolated from contact with administrators took action to improve their methods of farming. This is a significant difference and consistent as one moves from high to low contact with the CD bureaucracy. A much more detailed analysis is necessary to test the relevance of other variables. But these data strongly suggest that bureaucratic efforts were functional for translating aspiration, belief, or conviction into positive action.

When the farmers in our sample were asked to state specifically "what the government wants you to do", contact with officials seems relatively ineffective. Virtually identical proportions (15%) of those with "frequent" contact and no contact gave evidence of "instrumental" knowledge of governmental objectives. The paradox in these findings is that despite this inability to state the specific expectations of government for increasing agricultural production, those farmers in contact with CD officials did, indeed, reveal much greater evidence of changing their farming patterns. This is perhaps the most significant finding in this section of our study.

### *Conclusions*

The Indian farmer and peasant is at the "take off" period in development. He has in fact been altering his way of life and method of farming considerably. He believes in the Community Development programme, is gradually getting more information about it, and is inclined to support it positively. Theoretically the officials manning the Community Development

bureaucracy can have a tremendous impact. Thus far this impact has been marginal and minimal. Even in the area surrounding Delhi less than a third of the farmers have been in contact with these officials. And the level of knowledge of the programme seems to be higher among the higher social and economic status groups. But penetration of the Community Development programmes, goals, spirit, and value is taking place, almost despite the inadequacy of bureaucratic efforts. Given continued governmental interest, perhaps policy changes providing greater incentives and assistance, and more direct contacts by these officials, our data suggest that much greater changes in farming behaviour can take place. For India to move farther beyond the "take-off" stage, the Community Development effort must become more extensive, greatly intensified, and directly relevant to the economic needs and aspirations of the Indian farmer.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### THE BUREAUCRACY AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL PROCESS

Indians face many internal conflicts over the goals for their society and the implementation of these goals. These conflicts exist among the elites and in the minds of ordinary citizens. The Indian body politic is involved in a continuous debate, private and public, over the ideological direction of societal efforts and over the types of structures and tactics which should be utilized in the pursuit of these goals. "Expert" theories as to the direction, technology, and speed of development are legion in India. Often the common man, already conflicted between traditional and modernizing motivations, is further confused by incessant public controversy over the issues of development. Tarlok Singh, of the Planning Commission, in his evaluation of the Third Five Year Plan, put the matter well in 1964:

"Unless the basic conflicts are resolved to the satisfaction, not merely of the elite and organized groups, but of the common man, who is bound to judge all policies and plans from the reality of his own living conditions and opportunities and the problems encountered from day to day, there can be no consistent and continuing pattern of development."

In a period of great transition, characterized by controversy and conflict, the Indian society has articulated new social aspirations to be communicated and implemented in part through new and older administrative cadres functioning through new, or modified, structures of authority and action. Two key questions confronting any analysis of modern India obviously are: what is the empirical evidence that the new and older administrative cadres are recruited and socialized in such a way that they are responsive to these social aspirations and capable of mobilizing public support for them? What is the

empirical evidence that the Indian public is developing an awareness of the social goals of the new regime, is communicating with the development bureaucracy of the new regime, and as a consequence is responding positively to the developmental planning objectives of the new regime? These two key questions comprehend much of the developmental "crisis" in India today. They are the central questions to which this empirical study is addressed.

The study of elite-citizen interactions may, indeed, represent only a partial window to the functioning of the Indian system. Nevertheless, it is significant not only for securing an image of "governmental relationships", narrowly conceived, but also for developing a theory of the present patterns and probable prospects for welfare-state democracy in an India staggering with fantastic material and human needs.

Our study is admittedly only a beginning of knowledge and insight into these problems. It was based on interviews personally conducted with approximately 700 adults who were a representative cross section of the male population of urban and rural Delhi, and 220 interviews completed with administrative leaders at the agency level of interaction with this public. In the brief survey of major findings presented here the reader is reminded again that these findings and generalizations are strictly relevant for the Delhi public and its administrative cadres.

One of the major observations emerging from our data concerns the uneffected patterns of public contacts with administrative officials. One can be both optimistic and alarmed at these findings. The opportunity for the citizen to be influenced by the regime through its administrative cadres, (and for the regime to be influenced by citizens) is great, since 60 to 75% of the citizens in urban and rural areas have frequent contacts with these officials. Less than 10% seem to live in complete isolation from the bureaucracy. However, the new Community Development bureaucracy has yet to establish contact with a majority of residents in the villages. The image of the Community Development programme as a vast network of officials covering the countryside and working with villagers daily on their problems, is not borne out by the data. At least 60% of the villagers do not know the CD officials and/or never have had contact with them.

“Bureaucratic penetration” has occurred in the most traditional and isolated villages of Delhi State, in the low caste groups, the illiterates and the very poor. This suggests that the “citizen base” of the political system is being expanded, that the regime is consciously attempting to contact remote sectors of the society, communicate with them, and involve them attitudinally and behaviourally with the new system and its goals. It is extremely significant that over 30% of our respondents in our most “traditional” and isolated villages had frequent contact with Community Development officials, whereas the rural norm was 26%.

Certain key differences in exposure of social groups to the bureaucracy, however, suggest critical restrictions on information flow in the Indian system. This seems to be less a caste-differential problem than one related to education and income status. In rural Delhi 73% of the well-to-do villagers have some contact with officials, while only 27% of those in the low income groups are in contact. Similarly, 60% of those with considerable education have some contact whereas only 26% of the illiterates do. Although “penetration” has been taking place, the Indian regime is out of direct administrative contact with the bulk of the lower social classes even in the area surrounding the capital city of India. The significance of this for involvement and political development need not be underlined. Unless there is greater and more extensive governmental contacts with the common man, his images of the system must rest on stereotypes, laden with his historical connotations, rumours and hearsay, indirect and informal “secondary” communication channels or the local opinion and political leaders in the village with whom he has contact and whose “information” he cannot subject to “reality testing”. Whether this is dysfunctional depends on the local context, his potential role in the system, and the particular content of the “information flow” which he casually and informally absorbs and believes.

The attitudes of Indian citizens towards their government, and its administrative officials particularly, is a complex and paradoxical mosaic of support and hostility, of consensus and critique. From 75% to 90% view governmental jobs as prestigious, 90% feel that health and Community Development programmes are worth while, and less than 50% (20% rural) are

critical of the job performance of central government officials. On the other hand, the majority feel that 50% or more of the officials are corrupt, large proportions (60% urban, 32% rural) say their "dealings" with officials are unsatisfactory, and the majority sense that their probabilities of gaining access to officials, and being successful in processing their complaints with them are low. Over 50% feel officials in certain agencies are not fair, that the citizen can do little by himself, and from 60% to 75% feel that "political pull" is important in getting administrative action. Only a minority (22% urban, 37% rural) reveal no hostility attitudes towards bureaucrats. This is a peculiar blend of respect for "authority" and impatience with "authorities", of desire for administrative progress and frustration at administrative tactics and style, of "realism" as to how things get done and bitterness that one cannot get things done, of confidence in the system and cynical appraisal of the system. On balance, Indian citizens tend to be supportive of the administration, though not consistently or enthusiastically so. Our composite "index of support" reveals that only one fifth to one fourth are clearly critical, apathetic, or rejective. In the villages 80% are moderately or very supportive; in the city two thirds are supportive. Similarly, our "hostility index" reveals no more than one fifth to be consistently hostile, while 50% (urban) to 60% (rural) manifest virtually no hostility reactions. Indices, however, are summations of responses and hide nuances of sentiment and attitude. Even among those highly supportive of administration one finds an underlying hostility at the 20% level in rural areas and at the 40% level in urban Delhi. Thus, although the movement is towards consensus and support, conflict exists, and the consensus is tenuous or mixed with doubt. Perhaps the most significant finding is that one finds such basic support in cognitions of the bureaucracy, despite the existence of considerable latent hostility.

The image which persists in our data then is one of citizen acquiescence and support, as well as actual and potential disaffection. But the character of this public response varies for particular social sectors of the population. The upper status groups in urban Delhi are the most critical of administration, while at the same time being more informed.

The educated and relatively "wealthy" criticize the job performance of officials, feel they are paying more taxes than they should, and are cynical or pessimistic about the efficacy of citizen action in relation to the bureaucracy. Urban low status groups are less critical, but also more pessimistic about the efficacy of citizen action, though less well informed about the administrative system. Rural citizens are least critical (particularly, those with low incomes), but also are very dubious about the efficacy of citizen action (particularly rural illiterates). It is somewhat disturbing to find that in urban area, among upper caste members and the educated, one finds the greatest hostility to administrators, while among the rural illiterates one finds the least hostility. Illiterates seem most uninformed, but relatively highly supportive—no doubt a peculiarly "saving" element in the Indian system. Despite imperfect knowledge and ambiguous images, the lower classes are supportive. The suggestion is implicit that as educational level rises as more information about the system may be disseminated, and as certain types of contact with certain types of bureaucrats became more frequent, hostility and criticism also may increase. This is one of the important paradoxes of a developing society requiring solutions at the policy level, and also suggesting the need for new patterns and the techniques of socialization. It also highlights the significant role of administrative behaviour.

Much more optimistic are our findings concerning public responses to the administrative system in "traditional" as contrasted to the "modernizing" sectors of the society. We analyzed this relationship, first, by comparing the attitudes of citizens in traditional-isolated villages and in more transitional-modernizing-urban environments we found the greatest support for the administration, and the greatest citizen self-confidence, in the small villages which could be classified as "transitional-modernizing" on the basis of our objective, aggregative, criteria, and in larger village where the "modernization process" is advanced. The greatest tension exists both in the most traditional, small villages and in the larger villages in an incomplete stage of development. We found, further, in a second analysis based on an examination of respondents' attitudes, that the "hard-core traditionalists" who had a pre-development orientation

to the system, are most hostile to the new administrative system—about 50% are very hostile—while those who have taken on more development-oriented and prospective, “modern” attitudes are much less so—under 20% are hostile.

The following theoretical interpretation of what is transpiring can be advanced. Our data indicate that the Indian administrative system is penetrating into the most traditional sectors and areas, that it has been having only very limited impact on those citizens whose thinking is retrospective and whose socialization to the “new order” is slow. But citizens involved in the modernization process, are responding more supportively and self-confidently if they see their demands and expectations in the process of the realization and if they can tolerate the frustrations of the developmental pace. Where the transition process is beginning, its pace slow, where demands are not being responded to, and frustration for some is intolerable, then, despite innovative governmental efforts and “modernizing” personal attitudes, citizens can be critical, cynical, and even hostile. This, too, is a basic paradox of the system. Hopefully, it is a paradox which will eventually be resolved, as bureaucratic efforts become highly relevant to, and ameliorative of, citizen demands and expectations.

The relationships and interactions between Indian citizens and officials at the base of the administrative hierarchy are generally functional to the achievement of integrative and developmental purposes. There are exceptions to this, and there are certain conditions under which the public response despite exposure to administrators is negative. Our data suggest that hostility reactions can increase as a result of bureaucratic contacts, particularly in the urban area, and particularly in rural areas as a result of contacts with particular types of officials. But it is important to note that, despite this possibility, the citizen who associates or has dealings with these lower bureaucrats reveals attitudes and orientations which can only be construed as salutary for political and social change.

If we utilize the criteria for an effective relationship between citizen and bureaucrat which were set forth in Chapter I and review the basic character and direction of our finding, we can see the evidence which support this optimism. First, the “involved” citizen who is interacting with the administrative

cadre is much better informed about the government, its services, and policies. His "instrumental knowledge" of the health services and Community Development activities, for example, is high compared to the non-involved, isolated citizen. A striking example is the contrast in knowledge about the Community Development programme—only 29% of those with high contact scores are ignorant, while 81% of those who are isolated are ignorant. Second, the involved citizen is more likely to affirm that developmental programmes are worth while, although there is widespread support for these programmes even among those not in contact with the bureaucracy. Third, in rural areas the involved citizen more often evaluates the job of governmental officials positively, a finding which, however, does not appear in the analysis of urban responses. Fourth, although the impact and relevance of contact with officials is minimal in this respect, those citizens exposed to bureaucrats are generally more inclined to feel that these officials are democratically responsive and "egalitarian" than citizens with no such contact. Again, the difference is not significant in urban Delhi; but in the villages, for example, 65% of our respondents with considerable contact had affirmative evaluations, compared to 48% of those with no administrative contact. Fifth, as to the role of "politics" in getting things done and the efficacy of citizen action, generally we find citizens who have been exposed to bureaucrats both more realistically aware of the importance of "political pull" and more confident that the ordinary citizen can get action if officials are not performing their job properly. In rural Delhi the findings are striking in this regard—only 33% of the rural respondents who were "isolated" had optimistic views of the possibility of citizen action, contrasted to 83% of those citizens who were "involved".

On these important criteria, then, all the evidence points to the interpretation that citizen-administrative contacts are relevant and meaningful. As the polity is "expanded" and more citizens are involved with the regime their perspectives are more integrative than alienative. The net effect of bureaucratic effort is the mobilization of greater support for development. It is true, that sizable minorities of those in frequent contact with these officials are still ignorant of governmental programmes (29% knew virtually nothing about Community Development

even though they rate high on exposure to CD officials). It is true also that 10% to 20% are pessimistic about citizen action possibilities even though they are frequently in touch with officials. And personal hostility to administrators can continue or be strengthened despite bureaucratic contacts. But these are minorities. Their existence suggests the imperfections in administrative orientations and behaviour or the presence of basic or transitional conditions which constitute a barrier to proper reciprocal relations between citizen and official in any society.

Perhaps most impressive is our evidence that the new Community Development hierarchy is "getting through" to the public, not merely in terms of physical contact in the field, but in functional terms. Those in the rural area in contact with CD officials see the programme as worth while, generally approve of the job CD officials are doing, have a greater interest in the programme, and are becoming more knowledgeable about specific governmental expectations and plans. Above all, the most significant finding is that farmers exposed to CD officials are changing their ways of farming much more than the farmers isolated from bureaucratic influence. Only 32% of the farmers out of touch with the CD programme are improving farming methods, compared to 83% of those frequently in contact with CD officials.

One may well argue that CD officials may be consciously selecting only those farmers who would be cooperative and, therefore, these data are not convincing. Although conscious selections may indeed be present, directly for strategic reasons, or indirectly, these findings cannot be explained away by this argument. First, the "penetration" of the bureaucracy into the least modernizing sectors of the society, into the most remote and traditional villages, and into social categories which are least literate and leading the most marginal of existences, refutes the hypothesis that bureaucrats are working only with probably responsive villagers. Further, the response distributions for those who have had "frequent contact", "some contact", and "no contact" with the bureaucrats suggests that these officials miscalculated if they singled out only supportive farmers with which to work. That the total effort of CD officials is still only a fraction of what it

might be cannot be denied, since two thirds of our rural sample are still largely unexposed. But that this effort is both intensive and eclectic, motivated by the goal of *involving* citizens throughout the countryside, is obvious from our data. And it is an effort which is beginning to produce a harvest of public response, even among the most illiterate and poverty stricken elements of the population, which if multiplied tenfold will have a tremendous long-run impact on Indian society.

The administrator at the base of the hierarchy, at the "cutting edge" of governmental interaction with the citizen, is surely the vital cog in this system, in what has transpired thus far and what can happen in the future. Can the official at this level, committed to innovative goals and democratic perspectives, facilitate the involvement of the citizen with these system aspirations? Focusing as we did on five agencies (police, health, postal, municipal bus, transport, and Community Development) we found differing patterns of recruitment and job orientation. The officials in these agencies included few with lower status backgrounds, except possibly in the CD hierarchy. The "line" personnel revealed very limited job mobility, considerable tenure and experience, and were generally satisfied with their careers, particularly the field personnel in health and Community Development work. At most one third had reservations about their positions, but this percentage increased to over 50% for the non-mobile incumbents.

A major concern in our investigation was the character of the training programme in each agency, its "public relations" emphasis, and how this programme was perceived by officials. In health, postal, and the Delhi Transport Undertaking the training programme was limited. In police and Community Development there is a considerable training programme with heavy emphasis on "public relations". Whether or not a serious training programme existed, the great majority of these officials (over 80%) had clear understandings of the importance of "good public relations". But this has not as yet freed many of them from their rigid "bureaucratic" commitments to strict rule enforcement and a skepticism concerning the need to explain decisions to the public. "Following orders" is still for 30% to 40% a norm more important than "serving the public".

Clearly many of these officials are in conflict in the new

administrative system, indoctrinated with the need for "public relations" but imprisoned by previous bureaucratic norms. Using an "Index of Democratic Job Perspectives" we found from 7% to 39% of our "line" personnel clearly committed to "democratic" task perspectives, with the CD "line" personnel most clearly oriented to public service. But not all of the remainder were rigid bureaucrats. The large majority seemed to be moving away from inflexible, arrogant, and impersonalized perspectives associated with traditional bureaucratic behaviour. Our index suggests that usually far less than one fourth of these officials had not begun to assimilate the new norms.

Despite their social backgrounds, long tenure, and limited training therein considerable evidence that the great majority of these officials are incorporating welfare-state and public service perceptions of their roles. Further, although a large proportion of these officials reveal latent "authoritarian" personal predispositions, there is no strong relationship between these tendencies and the assumption of "democratic" job perspectives. Perhaps the most important factor related to the existence of a "democratic" job perspective is the saliency and intensity of the training programme emphasis on public service. Where officials did perceive the programme as demanding actions and attitudes which were public relations oriented, there was a significant, indeed striking, increase in the proportions revealing "democratic" perspectives. The implications of this for governmental planning must be underscored. There is a subtle process of "democratic" socialization and communication evident in these agencies. Sensitivity to public needs is maximized where the agency hierarchy communicates such an expectation and reinforces it with a training programme whose accent is clear.

Finally, in an intensive analysis and comparison of citizen and official orientations and attitudes in three development blocks, the administrative subsystem was scrutinized closely. To explain why citizens in different, but adjoining, geographical areas can have divergent patterns of attitudes towards government and authority is not an easy task. In our exploratory analysis we found that although the characteristics of administrators were similar, the pattern of citizen-administrator contacts was not. Where the public was in contact with officials,

citizens developed perceptions and evaluations of officials which were more supportive than in the area where contacts were infrequent. Public images of its government and its bureaucracy are elusive phenomena whose origins and maintenance are most baffling to determine or change. In a developing society like India it seems clear that the greater the "distance" between citizen and administrator the greater the probability of apathy, frustration, and alienation. But where contact is maximized, and the linkage of citizen and administrator in a common cause is promoted, the greater the probability of support, self-confidence, and social change.

These, then, are the major findings and interpretations from one pilot study. They suggest many uniformities ; they point to serious paradoxes and problems. It seems clear that India today faces a continued struggle of gigantic proportions to achieve a democratic and integrated society, to develop public confidence in and meaningful utilization of political institutions, such as its new bureaucracy, which are adopted from the past to the needs of today, and to involve, motivate, and mobilize citizen support for programmes of social and economic change. These three crises, elaborated at the outset of this report, must constitute the theoretical agenda, for the scholar seeking answers to hypotheses, or for the politician seeking pragmatic answers to immediate problems. In the resolution of these crises the role of the bureaucracy in India is paramount. The expansion of opportunities for contact with, and influence upon, governmental leaders and decision making is not a luxury in a developing society like India. Nor is it merely relevant to "democratic" system goals, perceived by some as peripheral if not dysfunctional to developmental achievement. The "expansion of the polity" is a vital necessity for the success of large scale innovative planning, predicated as it is on public consent and support and commitment. Unless the Indian public in the long run understands the meaning of the new society, and fervently believes in it, and in the citizen's participant role in the system, and manifests such belief in action, neither, democracy nor development can be achieved. Although progress is slow, the interviews in this study reveal that a beginning has been made, that the Indian official at "the cutting edge" is having his impact on the development process.

The public response to bureaucratic contact, as well as the public influence on bureaucratic behaviour, is moving the Indian society—even though very slowly—towards democratic relationships between the citizen and his leaders, as well as towards the realization of social and economic aspirations.

## APPENDIX A

### The Samples

Delhi State had a population, according to the 1961 census, of 2,658,612. Of this the overwhelming proportion, over 88%, is urban, residing in the capital city or its environs, divided technically by the census into three divisions—Delhi urban, New Delhi, and Delhi Cantonment. The state includes 573 square miles, with a population density of 4,640. In the heart of the city, known as Zone II, the density in 1961 was 143,113, which was double the average for Calcutta districts, and six times that for Bombay. The population of the state has been increasing rapidly since the 1951 census, by almost one million, or a 52% increase in ten years. The literacy rate for the state is relatively high and improving rapidly—52.7% in 1961 compared to 38.4% in 1951. At least 12% of the population belong to scheduled castes.

The rural area of Delhi territory according to the census had 276 villages, located in five Community Development blocks: Alipur, Najafgarh, Shahadara, Kanjawala, and Mehrauli. Actually, at the time of our study only 239 of these villages could be considered for our purposes, since the remainder had either been abandoned or incorporated by Delhi Municipal Corporation. According to the census the following was the distribution of villages by population size :

Population size	Number of Villages	Percentage of Male Population
Under 200 inhabitants	25	1.0
200 to 499 inhabitants	51	6.4
500 to 999 inhabitants	99	24.3
1000 to 1999 inhabitants	59	27.7
2000 to 5000 inhabitants	42	40.6

Our study selected two distinct and separate samples, one urban and one rural. Each was to consist of approximately 400 individuals. Our purpose was to look at urban and rural behaviour separately. Although it would be possible to generalize about the total Delhi population, because of the different population sizes of rural and urban Delhi, the two samples of 400 were not in our analysis commingled, nor should they be by the reader. We have in effect done two separate studies—one rural, one urban.

In selecting our rural sample the decision was made to select eight villages randomly from the total of 239, after classifying all villages on two criteria: population size and developmental status, objectively determined. A "traditionalism-modernism" objective score was arrived at for each of the 239 villages, by use of the following indicators:

1. Percentage of scheduled castes (zero to over 46%).
2. Literacy level (under 10% to over 38%).
3. Development Block Administrative Status (Headquarters, Panchayat centre, etc.).
4. Distance from Railway station, public road, or bus line.
5. Governmental facilities in village: dispensary, primary health centre, police station, post office.
6. Type of schools, if any, in village.
7. Community facilities—whether a market centre, a community radio set.
8. Assignment of a village level worker, midwife, to village.
9. Percentage of population employed as cultivators, or in agriculture.

The maximum score possible on this index was 42. The actual scores ranged from 3 to 40 for the 239 villages in this area. We classified all villages with a score below 9 as "traditional", those from 9 to 13 as "transitional", those with a score of 13 to 19 as "modernizing" and those 19 and over as "modern".

Combining the two criteria of population size and objective score on traditionalism-modernism, we developed the following "strata" or "grid":

*Proportion of Total Population (Number of villages in parentheses)*

	Traditional	Transitional	Modernizing	Modern
Population under 1,000	3% (21)	13% (63)	13% (53)	—(3)
1,000—1,999	— ( 1 )	10 (20)	15 (29)	24% (26)
2,000—5,000	—	8 (7)	14 (16)	

From each of the eight major "strata" thus identified we selected one village at random, these eight constituting our primary sampling points.<sup>1</sup> These eight villages were located in three different community blocks. They ranged in population from 476 to 3,929, and ranged in "traditionalism-modernism score" from 8 to 20. The number of interviews assigned to each village was proportional to the population size of each "stratum" from which the village was drawn. This procedure for drawing the rural

<sup>1</sup> The four villages which fell outside these strata were combined with villages closest to them at the same population level. Thus each village had an equal chance of being selected.

sample assured us of villages in different population categories, and in different stages of development or modernization, as objectively defined. Though interviews were clustered in eight villages, it was a random probability sample, representative of the rural adult male population in Delhi territory.

Two other features of the rural sample should be noted. The decision was made to include males only in the basic sample, because of the uncertainty that women would be available for interviewing. However, to test this technical assumption, and to compare male and female attitudes, a random sample of 50 women was selected in two villages. The interviews were conducted successfully (with a 96% completion rate) by the two women interviewers in our group. Finally, because the number of interviews assigned to one village was small (only 13) under our sample selection requirements, an additional sample of 17 was selected at random to permit (and to be used exclusively for) village-by-village comparisons.

In urban Delhi the basic geographical unit used as our primary sampling area was the "mohalla", the significant subdivision for political purposes and adaptable to administrative sampling objectives. There were 25 such "mohallas" or "wards" randomly included in our study out of approximately 80 such areas. The 400 interviews in urban Delhi were allocated almost equally to these mohallas because their population size variation was minimal. Three New Delhi Municipal Committee Areas were included in these mohallas.

The procedure for identifying respondents in villages and mohallas was random selection from the electoral lists for each area. These lists were the best available and up to date for the previous local elections. These lists were not completely accurate, as we subsequently discovered, but there was no feasible alternative open to us without the expenditure of tremendous time and money. Block-listing and house listing, particularly in the high density sections of the city would be impossible, if not misleading, because of the large numbers with no house address. Our experience suggests that, while not perfect, the electoral rolls are a fairly reliable list of the universe of adults. A more serious problem by far is the mobility and transiency of the population, both urban and rural, which makes the "discovery" of the whereabouts of respondents often impossible.

We used standard procedures in selecting our sample respondents from the list, employing a random "starting point" and a specified "interval" determined by the number of interviews we desired in a particular area, in relation to the total number of adults (males separately from females) on the given list. Because of the problem of transiency, we selected at random an alternate, second, sample in all urban mohallas to provide us with enough interviews in case the original sample mortality was too high. No substitutes could be selected by our interviewers. They were given the names and addresses of specific individuals and required to interview only these individuals. As many as ten "call-backs" were made, as well as special trips to different villages or mohallas, in order to find individual respondents.

Despite our careful and determined work, the completion rate was not as high as we would have liked, particularly in urban Delhi. The rates were as follows:

Rural—males 85%  
females 96%  
Urban—males 64%

The reasons for non-completion were varied:

*Percentages of all Interviews which were not completed*

	Rural	Urban
Deceased, Ill	9%	7%
Moved, not traceable	59	48
"Out of station" (working elsewhere, in army, etc.) not available	28	35
Refusals	4	10
	100	100

It is obvious that the major problems are residential mobility and the tendency to leave home for long periods in search of work, or because of the requirements of work, or for other reasons, leaving the family behind at the original residence. Refusals constituted no particular problem for us. In rural areas we spent time with the village leaders explaining the purposes of the study and becoming familiar with village conditions. When the interviewing began we usually found people cooperative. Interviewing often took place late at night or in the fields during harvest time. In certain villages some residents actually requested or demanded to be interviewed, particularly if they were leaders or factional representatives who had been left off our sample list. These non-sample interviews were taken and proved informative.

In selecting the administrators for our study our design required the following: (1) administrators who functioned in the geographical subdivisions (blocks, villages, mohallas) in which our public cross section lived, so that our questions concerning contact and mutual perceptions would have the greatest relevance; (2) administrators in five agencies, three of which were identical for both urban and rural population (health, police, and postal), one which was exclusively rural (community development) and one exclusively urban (Delhi Transport Undertaking); (3) officials at two hierarchical levels in these agencies, at the level closest to the public, and at the level directly above these lower echelon officials. We decided to take all officials in certain categories, and a sample in others. Thus, since there were only three Block Development Officers, we interviewed all three. But the large number of police constables obviously required the

selection of a sample selected—only in those blocks and mohallas in which our public resided.

The following table indicates precisely who was interviewed in each of our administrative leadership categories, keeping the above purposes in mind:

	<i>Sample Type</i>	
	“Line” officials (Lower Level)	“Staff” Officials (Higher Level)
Police	Constables (10%)	SHO, ASI, DSP (100%) Head constables (50%)
Postal	Subpostmaster, Postman (100%)	—
Health	compounders (67%)	Medical officers doctors (100%) —
Delhi Transport Community Development	Inspectors (20%) Village level workers (100%) midwives, dais (50%) Lady health visitors (100%)	Block development officers, Extension officers, Panchayat Secretaries, Progress Assistants (100%)

The 217 administrators in the study were, thus, representative of all officials in the respective categories in Delhi territory. They either included *all* available officials in a particular category in our subdivisions, (which, in turn, had been randomly selected), or they were a randomly selected sample. The cooperation of the agencies assisted considerably in this selection. The total list of police constables was made available to the project, for example, from which a sample could be selected. The officials themselves were very cooperative also. Time was willingly given for personal interviews, often of several hours duration, and no more than two or three officials refused interviews. With such a wide variety of officials, geographically dispersed, this part of the study was the most difficult. The interest in the project, however, was considerable, and largely responsible for its successful completion.

In this first effort, although the sample selection process was complicated and completion rates at the urban public level not optional, we feel highly satisfied with our results. Adaptation of accepted procedures in other societies to the Indian society was possible. Scientific requirements were not compromised. Many lessons were learned for future work. But the sample selection process was essentially sound and rigorous, as were the other field procedures in the project. We are confident, therefore, that our data are highly reliable and permit the detailed and precise analysis presented in this report.

## APPENDIX B

### The Questionnaires

#### *Governmental Official Interview Schedule*

1. Let's start with some questions about your job. I want to be sure I understand your position. Can you tell me about the nature of your job. (Probe for job description as respondent sees it.)
  - a. Are there any other duties that you have?
  - b. Which of these duties seem to take most of your time?
  - c. What is your rank or designation?
  - d. How long have you worked in this position?
  - e. How long have you been a governmental employee?
  - f. What positions did you have before this one? (Career details in chronological order.)
  - g. Do you find your job very interesting, somewhat interesting, or not interesting?
  - h. Do you think this job is in keeping with your qualifications and abilities?
  - i. Do you feel that you have enough authority to decide the things you should decide, or not enough authority?
  - j. Do you find it at times necessary in your position to relax the procedures to do a more effective job?
  - k. Do you find it possible to relax procedures?
  - l. Some people like their work; others think of their work as only a means of a livelihood. How do you feel about your work?
  - m. Could you tell me a little about your training for this position: What training programme did you go through?  
(If yes) What sorts of things were emphasized in this programme of training?
  - n. Was your relationship to the citizen or the public discussed during this training?  
(If yes) What were you told about the way to deal with the public?
  - o. Do you think this training has been valuable to you in your job?
  - p. In what respects? Can you give me any examples of how it has helped you?
2. Now, I would like to have you tell me a little about the people you

work with. Who is the immediate superior to whom you report? (Name and designation.)

- a. About how often do you see him?
- b. How well do you know him? Aside from your official relationship, do you know him personally?
- c. How well does he know your job?
- d. What sorts of things does your immediate superior emphasize when he talks to you about your job? (Probe : What sorts of things seem to be most important to him in the way you perform your job?)
- e. Has he ever discussed with you the problem of your relationship to citizens—the public—and the way you should deal with them?
- f. What sorts of things does he emphasize in discussing your relationship to the public?
- g. Have you ever had any differences of opinion with him about the way you should handle the public?
- h. Have you ever been warned about your work?  
(If yes) What was that?
- i. Is there an official policy on public relations—dealing with the public—for your agency? Or are there *any* written rules and regulations in your department regarding dealings with the public?  
(If yes) What are the main things it emphasizes?
- j. About how often in the past six months would you say you have been issued directions or memoranda from your supervisors about the way in which you should deal with the public?
- k. Who is the person at the top of your agency? (Name and designation.)
  - l. Have you ever met him?
  - m. Do you think he is aware of the type of work you do?
  - n. Has he ever talked to the employees like yourself about the way in which you should do your job?  
(If yes) What sorts of things does he talk about?
  - o. Does he discuss your relationship to the public at all, that is, how you should treat the public?
3. Do you think the public makes extra demands on you over and above what you do for them in the ordinary course of your job?  
(If yes) Can you tell me something about the nature of these demands?
  - a. Do you think it is necessary for you to explain to citizens the reasons for your decisions?
  - b. Some people say that serving the public is most important; others say that following the orders of your supervisors is most important. How do you feel this? (Probe : if says both are, ask which of the two is more important.)
  - c. Have you ever happened to hear criticisms about the performance of your duties from members of the public?

(If yes) What sorts of things do they criticize you about? Do you think this criticism is fair or unfair?

- d. How important do you think it is for your particular agency to get cooperation from the public?
- e. To what extent does your agency get such public cooperation, in your opinion?  
Why? or Why not? (Ask for both cases.)
- f. What kinds of cooperation from the public do you think you should get?
- g. What per cent of the public do you think would say that people in your type of position are efficient?
- h. And what per cent of the public do you think would say that officials like you are courteous in their dealings with the public?
- i. And what per cent do you think would say that officials in your position are corrupt?
- j. In general, what do you think of your relations with the public—are they good, bad, or indifferent?

4. What are your plans for staying on in your present position? Do you expect to stay for a long time, do you expect to move to a higher position, or would you like to leave as soon as possible?

- a. (If leave or move up) What type of position would you like to move to?
- b. (If leave) What are your hopes for securing another job?
- c. If you had an opportunity to take a position in private business, do you think you would take it? Why? Why not?
- d. Some people say that a large number of people working for the government are corrupt. Do you think this is so?
- e. Generally, what per cent of public employees would you say is corrupt?
- f. What per cent of employees in your own agency would you say is corrupt?
- g. (Ask Health and Community Development respondents.) Do you approve of the government spending money for the type of activity your agency is performing, or do you think the government should not be engaged in this type of activity?
- h. Do you feel that all citizens are treated fairly and equally by the people who work in your agency, or are some types of people treated favourably and others less favourably?
- i. (If discrimination is indicated) What types of people are not treated fairly?
- j. Do you think it is your job to treat everybody fairly, or do you think you have to give some people special treatment?
- k. (If have to discriminate) Which groups do you have to favour?
- l. Are there any difficulties or problems in your agency in serving the public?  
(If yes) What are they?

(If yes) What improvements do you suggest?

5. The Congress party, which is in power, has been talking for some time about governmental programmes designed to achieve "the socialist pattern of society". What do you think that means?
  - a. Do you think the government is achieving that goal, or not?
  - b. Do you think the government should try to achieve that goal, or not?
  - c. For your own type of work and your agency, what do you think is necessary for the government to achieve, or what can the government do through your agency to achieve that goal?
  - d. Do officials like you ever discuss such matters as governmental policy, programmes and goals among yourselves?
  - e. How often would you say that you do discuss such matters with fellow workers—very often, often, occasionally, rarely, never ?
6. We are very much interested in your viewpoint on current issues in India.
  - a. First, how do you feel about this statement: "To improve the welfare of our people, the government should nationalize more private businesses, industries, and banks"? Do you agree or disagree, or don't you have an opinion on this?  
(If has opinion) On this question of nationalization is the government going too far, doing less than it should, or what?
  - b. How do you feel about this statement: "Government should control the prices of food". Do you agree or disagree, or don't you have an opinion?
  - c. And this statement: "The government should control house rents." (Agree, disagree, no opinion)
  - d. And on this question of house rents : "Do you think that the government is going too far, doing less than it should, or what?"
  - e. Which political party comes closest to your opinions on these matters?
7. We know that there are many reasons why people don't vote in elections. Could you tell me whether you voted in the last election in 1962 for the Lok Sabha?
 

(If not voted) Why was it you did not vote?

  - a. Generally speaking, what political party do you support?
  - b. (If can't say or independent) Well, what party would you say you are closest to?
  - c. All in all, does it make much difference to you personally which party, whether Congress or some other party, is in control of the government?
  - d. Did any of the parties contact you during the last election campaign in 1962 for your vote?
  - e. Do you know any political party leaders in this area personally?

(If yes) What are their positions and parties?

- f. Some people think that political pull—knowing the right person plays an important part in whether the government will help a private citizen with some problem he has; other people don't think so. In your opinion does political pull play an important part or not?
- g. Do you feel that you have to provide more service to certain party leaders and their friends than to others?
- h. In general, if you were to advise a citizen who had a problem and needed governmental help, would you advise him to go personally to the department concerned, or to get the assistance of a person who was on friendly terms with the governmental official or agency concerned?
- i. (If mentions direct approach) If a citizen needs a special service or wants to get things done very quickly, would you still advise him to go personally to the department or to get help from some one who is known to the department?
- j. Have you ever had any experiences yourself which indicated that political pull helps one get service from the government?

(If yes) Would you explain that to me please?

8. Now I'd like to read some of the kinds of things people tell me when I interview them and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them, or whether you aren't sure.

- a. The average citizen doesn't have much say about what the government does.
- b. Public officials really care quite a lot about what the ordinary citizen thinks.
- c. The way the government runs things today is better than the way things were run in the past.
- d. Rapid improvement in the economic and social welfare of the Indian people is not possible under the present democratic system of party government.
- e. Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
- f. A few strong leaders could make this country better than all the laws and talk.
- g. Most people who don't get ahead just don't have enough will power.
- h. People can be trusted.
- i. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.
- j. The world is too complicated to be understood by anyone but experts.
- k. People are getting soft and weak from so much babying and coddling.

9. What daily newspapers do you normally read?
  - a. Do you think the following ways of getting news about the government are important?  
Newspaper, Radio, Publicity Literature, Government officials, discussions with friends and others.
  - b. Which one of them or any other, do you think is the most important?
  
10. Here is a list of the types of groups in this area to which people belong. Would you look at it and tell me which of these organizations you belong to?
  - a. (For each group) Would you say that you attend most of the meetings of this group, about half, just a few meetings, or none?
  - b. (For each group) Are you on a committee or do you hold any office in this organization?

### *Types of Groups*

Labour unions	Professional groups
Religious groups	Political groups
Business civic groups	Resident associations
Neighbourhood clubs, centres	Women's clubs
Language or regional groups	Charitable groups
Sports teams or clubs	Other groups (Specify).

### *Special Questions for particular officials*

#### *Community Development*

1. Are there any leaders in this area (village, community) whom you know and see a great deal of?
2. What leaders are they? (Probe : a faction leader, caste leader, etc.)
3. What do you see them about? What are they leaders of?
4. Are the leaders in this area willing to cooperate with you and your programme?
5. What types of leaders are least cooperative?
6. Do you think that the amount of money the government is putting into your agency—that is your budget—is too large, just about right, or too little?
7. Do you think that for the money spent on your agency, the taxpayer is getting back his money's worth in service?
8. Do you feel that people participate enough in your programme?
9. What per cent of the people in this area would you say are not interested in cooperating with your programme?
10. What types of people are least cooperative and what are their characteristics?
11. What can be done to get the cooperation of these people?

## Police Officials

1. Do people ever give wrong information to the police deliberately?  
(If yes) Can you give me an example of that?
2. Are there any particular groups in this area which have stronger feelings against the police than others?  
(If yes) In what respects and what groups?
3. Do you think that the public generally fear the police, respect them but do not fear them, or neither?

## Postal Officials

1. When people come to the post office, do you think they are patient and considerate enough to postal officials?  
(If not) In what ways are they not considerate?
2. When a person who comes to the post office has not prepared his letters or packages properly for mailing, do you ever have any problem in explaining this to him?  
(If yes) What do you think is the basic difficulty in such situations?

## Delhi Transport Undertaking

1. Do people usually wait for their turn in boarding the bus, or do they break the queue?  
Why is that?
2. Do you think people generally treat officials like yourself with respect, or not?  
Why is that?

## Health Officials only

1. Do people come to you for advice on health problems when it is almost too late for treatment, or do they usually come well in time for treatment?
2. Have they seen anyone else for treatment before they come to you?  
(If yes) Whom do they see before coming to you—other doctors or untrained personnel, or others?
3. Do you think the members of public have confidence in health officials like you generally, or not?  
Why is that ?
4. Is the ordinary citizen with whom you deal are grateful to you for your help, critical, or indifferent?  
Why is that, in your opinion?
5. Do you think people usually follow the advice which you give them in connection with their own health problems?
6. Do you think people are interested in ways of preventing the development of health problems (such as vaccinations and sanitary practices) or are they more interested in curing diseases after they have developed?  
Why do you think that is so?
7. What would you say is the major problem you have in dealing with the public in the area of public health?

### Background Data

Well, that completes the regular part of the interview. As I was telling you, we don't take the names of the people on our surveys, but we do need a few facts about them, such as age, marital status, and so forth. Would you help me with these specific items of information?

1. Age
2. Sex (by observation)
3. What is (or was) your father's occupation?
4. Marital status—single or married, widowed, separated, divorced, Number of children.
5. Religion : Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Sikh, other.  
Do you regularly engage in any religious worship?
6. Education : Illiterate, primary, middle, high, intermediate, degree, M. A. and above
7. How long you have lived in your present residence?  
Where did you live before you came here?
8. Where is your permanent residence?
9. Place of birth?
10. Do you own your own home, or are you buying, or do you rent?
11. Mother tongue.
12. Caste.
13. What is your monthly family income?  
How much of this is the income of the head of the family?

### *Citizen Cross Section Interview Schedule<sup>1</sup>*

1. What do you think of the officials in Delhi Corporation? Do you think they are doing a poor, fair, good or very good job?
2. Now, how about the Delhi State Administration. Do you think the officials are doing a poor, fair, good or very good job? How do you mean that?
3. And how about the central government—do you think those officials are doing a poor, fair, good or very good job? How do you mean that?
4. Now I would like to ask you about some particular government services. How do you feel about the postal service here? What kind of job are the postal employees doing?
  - a. Do the postal employees serve the public to the best of their ability in delivering letters, handling the savings account, and taking care of parcels.
  - b. How often in the last month have you gone to the post office?
  - c. Can you remember any experiences with postal employees which were unsatisfactory?

(If Yes) What were they?

<sup>1</sup> Questions 1 and 6 were asked in urban Delhi only.

5. Now I would like to ask you about the health services and facilities. Do you think the officials in charge of the nearest dispensary or hospital are doing a poor, fair, good or very good job?

- Have you or anyone in your family ever gone to the dispensary or hospital?
- (If *yes*) Which of the following do you go to—Corporation dispensaries, C.H.S. dispensaries, hospital?  
(If mentioned more than one, ask which most often.)
- How often in the past year would you say that you or members of your family go to the dispensary or hospital?
- Are the health officials courteous or discourteous to you?
- (If *no* to 5a) How is it that you or your family members have not been to the dispensary or hospital?
- Do you think it is necessary for the government to provide these health services?
- What are your reasons for your opinion?
- Do you think that all people are treated fairly by the health officials, or isn't the treatment equal and fair?
- (If favoured) What kinds of people are favoured, in your opinion?  
(Probe for status where only names are indicated.)
- Suppose you found out that a health official was not performing his job properly. Could you do anything about it?  
(If *yes*) What could you do?  
(If *no*) Why not?
- Do you know whether you have to pay for any of these health services?
- Do you know how to keep away from getting small-pox?  
When was the last time you were vaccinated for small pox?  
Have any other members of your family been vaccinated for small pox?  
(If *yes*) Which ones.  
(If *no*) Why have you not been vaccinated?  
Where do you go to get vaccinated?
- Do you know where the Family Planning Centre is in this area?  
(If *yes*) Have you gone to it in the past year?  
What kind of job do you think the Family Planning Centre is doing?

6. Let's talk about another important agency. Some people think that the Delhi bus service (DTU) is doing a good job, but others are critical of that service. How do you feel?

- Would you approve of turning the bus system over to the private companies?  
(If *yes*) Why is that?  
(If *no*) Why not?

- b. How often do you or any members of your family use the bus—daily, several times a week or occasionally?
- c. If you have a complaint against the bus service, is there anything you can do?  
(If yes) What is that?
- d. Have you ever used the complaint book on the buses?
- e. Do you think the bus fare is high, reasonable, or low, in terms of the service you get?

7. What kind of a job do you think the police are doing here—poor, fair, good, very good?

- a. Why do you think that?
- b. Have you ever had any personal experience with the local police?  
(If yes) What was that?
- c. In your opinion, what is the most important job that the police do here?
- d. On what kind of problem would you go to the police for help?
- e. Do you think they would be helpful to you?
- f. Do you think the police are courteous or discourteous to citizens?
- g. Do you know any policemen here personally?
- h. In general do you think there is corruption in the police department?  
(If yes) Would you kindly explain what you mean?
- i. Do the police do a good job in preventing crime?
- j. Do you think it is your responsibility to co-operate with the police in preventing crime?
- k. If somebody got involved in some trouble with the police, do you think the police would mistreat or beat him up?

#### General Questions

8. In general, if you had a problem to take up with a government department or municipal office, would you do it yourself or do you think you would be better off if you got the help of some person or organization—Do it myself, would go to get help from other person, would go to help from some organization, would go to get help from both, no opinion, other?

9. In general, would you say that your dealings with public employees were poor, fair, good or very good?

10. Some people think that political pull—knowing the right person—plays an important part in whether the government will help a private person with some problem he has; other people don't think so. What is your opinion about it?  
(Yes, pull is important; pull is sometimes important, no, pull hardly matters, depends, no opinion)

- a. Could you tell me how you mean that?
- b. Have you or anybody known to you had any experience which indicated that political pull helps a citizen?  
(If yes) Would you explain to me what happened in that case?

11. In general would you say that you discuss the working of the governmental departments and officials with your friends—very often, often, sometimes or never?
12. We'd like to know what people think of government jobs and government work. If these jobs are about the same in kind of work and pay and so forth, which has the most prestige—that is, which do you think the most of? Government or Private: Clerk, Night watchman, Doctor.  
*Note to interviewer:* Read the above question as follows: "Which job do you think the most of—clerk in a government office or clerk in a private firm?" Do the same for all three and record the answers above.
13. If the pay were the same would you prefer to work for the government or for a private firm?
  - a. Why?
  - b. In general, would you say that you get more courteous service and attention in dealing with governmental employees or in dealing with the employees of private companies?
  - c. Why do you think that is so?
14. How many of the governmental officials would you say are probably corrupt—more than half, about half, just a few, none, don't know, can't say?
  - a. Do you think there is a corruption in the assessment or collection of levies?
  - b. Do you think there is a corruption in connection with the services in dispensaries or hospitals?  
(If yes) Do you think this is because governmental employees are not paid enough?
15. In terms of what the government gives the public in help and services, do you think that the government gets back from the public more, less, or about the same?
16. Some people feel that they pay more taxes than they should, considering what they get from the government. How do you feel about this?
17. What are the main sources of income for the government?
18. Do you happen to know how much money a person had to make last year before he had to pay an income tax?

19. Now I'd like to read some of the things people tell me when I interview them, and ask you whether you agree or disagree with them, or whether you aren't sure.

- People like me don't have any say about what the Government does.
- Public officials really care quite a lot about what people like me think.
- Sometimes politics and government seem to be so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
- If something grows up over a long time there is bound to be much wisdom in it.
- The way the government runs things today is better than the way things were run in the past.
- Human nature being what it is, there will always be war and conflict.
- A few strong leaders would make this country better than all the laws and talk.
- Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should be taught.
- People can be trusted.

20. What daily newspapers do you normally read?  
Name of the paper..... language.....

- Do you think the following ways of getting news about the government are important?

Newspaper	Discussions with friends
Publicity literature	Local party workers or leaders
Radio	Other
Government officials	
- Which one of them, or any other, do you think is the most important? Which is least important?

21. Could you tell me whether you voted in the last election in 1962 for the Lok Sabha?

- And how about the last election for the Panchayat? Did you vote in that election?  
(If no) I notice that you did not vote. Why was that?
- Generally speaking, what political party do you support at election time?  
(If can't say or Independent) well, what party would you say you are closest to?
- Have you ever helped campaign for a party or a candidate during an election campaign—for example, by putting in time or contributing money?  
(If yes) Which party was that and when?
- Almost all of the parties organized public meetings in the last campaign. Did you attend any of these meetings?

- e. All in all, does it make much difference to you which party is in control of Delhi Corporation or Central Government?
- f. Did any of the parties contact you during the last election campaign?  
(If yes) How was that? Which parties and in what way?
- g. Do you think it would be helpful for you to go to a party leader if you needed assistance on a domestic or personal problem, or had a problem in connection with service from a Government department?
- h. Have you ever gone to a party leader for such a purpose?
- i. Do you know any party leaders in this area personally?  
(If yes) What is their position in the party, and which party is that?

22. We are also interested in your opinions on the political issues and problems of India today. Would you agree or disagree with these statements?

- a. The Government should control the prices of food.
- b. The government should not control house rents.
- c. The government should not increase the taxes on the rich.
- d. To improve the welfare of our people the government should nationalise more private business, industries and banks.

23. Who would you say are the three most important leaders in your Mohalla?

- a. Why would you say that they are influential?
- b. Do you know any of these leaders personally?

24. One of the ways in which people spend their time is in clubs and organizations. Here is a list of such groups in the Delhi area (Hand over list). Would you look at it and tell me which of these types of organization you belong to?

- a. (For each group) Would you say that you attend most of the meetings of this group, about half, just a few, or none?
- b. (For each group) Are you on a committee or do you hold any office in this organization?

#### *Types of Groups*

Labour unions	Professional groups
Religious groups	Political groups
Business civic groups	Resident associations
Neighbourhood clubs, centres	Charitable groups
Laguage or regional groups	Other groups (specify)
Sports teams or clubs	

25. How would you describe the social class to which you belong—upper class, middle class, working class, lower class?

26. Has your own and your family's standard of living improved or gone down in the past five years—improved, gone down, remain the same. No opinion?

- a. In what way?
- b. When you think about what really matters to your family, what are your wishes and hopes for the future? (Probe: What kinds of things would you like to have?)
- c. What do you think you can do to achieve these wishes and hopes?
- d. What would you like to have the government do in order to make these wishes and hopes possible for you?
- e. How many rupees per month do you think it would take to provide your family with the standard of living you would like to have?

### *Special questions for rural citizens*

1. We would like to get some of your ideas about what sort of job the government is doing. First, what do you think of the government officials in this village? Are they doing a poor, fair, good, or very good job?
  - a. And what about the block officials? Are they doing a poor, fair, good, or very good job?
  - b. How has Panchayati Raj changed block administration?
2. The Community Development programme here is also an important part of the activity of the government. Some people say that CD officials are doing a good job; other people are critical of it. How do you feel?
  - a. What would you say are the most important purposes of the Community Development programme here? (Probe: Are there other purposes, or goals, or activities that you can think of?)
  - b. Who are the officials in the CD programme in this area? (If knows) How often in the past month have you seen any of these officials?
  - c. What in your opinion are the most important accomplishments of Community Development here? (If mentions any) Why have these accomplishments been possible?
  - d. And what are the important failures, if any? (If mentions any) What are the reasons for this/these failure(s)? What is that?
  - e. Do you ever discuss the CD programme with your friends or associates or neighbours?
  - f. Who are the people here who are opposed to CD? And who are the people who are in favour of it?

g. Would you say that you are very interested in the CD programme, somewhat interested, or not interested?

3. As you know, the government has been trying to increase agricultural production. Can you tell me if you have heard of any ways in which the government has been trying to increase agricultural production? (Probe: Do you know of any particular programmes the government has started to increase productivity?)

a. What do you think the government wants you to do to increase production?

b. Have you changed your ways of farming in the past five years? (Probe, using the check list below.)

Check list of changes in farming techniques:

- (1) seeds
- (2) fertilisers and manures
- (3) insecticides
- (4) implements
- (5) subsidiary occupations—poultry, fish, dairying, vegetable farming
- (6) more investment
- (7) use of tractors
- (8) cropping pattern
- (9) water and irrigation
- (10) marketing methods
- (11) transportation methods
- (12) storage methods
- (13) using tube wells

c. Is there any change today in the way you work your farm?  
(If yes) Are you relying more on your own labour, or on hired labour or what?

d. (If changes made) What prompted you to make these changes?

e. (If no changes) Why is it that you have not made any changes?

f. What do you feel is the major reason why some farmers do not want to make these changes?

g. Does the majority of people here want to make changes, or not?

h. If the government would promise the farmers that they would not lose any money if they made these changes—by giving them credit and not insisting on repayment of their debts unless their crops improved with such changes in the methods—do you think that the farmers would follow the advice of the government.

i. Would you?

j. Do you think your standard of living would improve if you did improve your ways of farming and follow the advice of the government for increasing farm production?

4. What is a Taqavi Loan? Who can get it and on what conditions?

Background data

Well, that completes the regular part of the interview. As I was telling you, we don't take the names of the people on our surveys, but we do need a few facts about them, such as occupation, age, and so forth. Would you help me with these?

1. Age.
2. Sex (by observation)
3. Marital status: single, married, widowed, separated, divorced. number of children.
4. What is your (or your husband's) occupation?
  - a. (If retired or unemployed) What was your job; what work did you do?
  - b. What is (or was) your father's occupation?
5. Religion: Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Sikh, other. Do you regularly engage in any religious worship?
6. Education: illiterate, primary, middle, high, intermediate, degree, M.A. and above.
7. How long have you lived in your present residence? Where did you live before you came here?
8. Place of birth.
9. Do you own your own home, are you buying, or do you rent?
10. Do you plan to move from this neighbourhood in the next year or so? (If yes) Where do you plan to go?
11. Mother tongue
12. Caste
13. What is your monthly family income? How much of this is the income of the head of the family?
14. Would you say you are satisfied, or dissatisfied, with the mohalla you are living in now? Why do you feel that way?



